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1.0. Introduction to the thesis 
This thesis is about community-driven reconstruction (CDR) in the Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The CDR approach has become one of the most popular programmes in 
development and reconstruction, specifically in post-conflict settings. The experiences with 
the approach; however, have also given rise to criticisms and it has been questioned how 
successful the approach is in practice. This thesis presents an in-depth case study of one CDR 
programme, in Eastern DRC, in order to shed light on these questions. It analyses issues 
related to capacity building and its supposed outcome capacity development of local 
communities; and looks at techniques used for accountability and how these work in practice. 
The thesis also highlights issues of power and labour and how these dynamics evolve in a 
CDR programme, and examines the level of local ownership the population felt about the 
projects.  
1.1 Researching Community-Driven Reconstruction/Rationale 
‘Community-driven’ as a prefix to development or reconstruction is a part of a broader 
paradigm shift that answers well-known criticisms of the top–down methodologies that have 
controlled development interventions in the first five decades (Dasgupta & Beard 2007). 
Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) has its origin in Community-Driven Development 
(CDD) that was initiated by the World Bank and it applies the same methodology as that of 
the CDD. The idea of CDR is that local populations and local institutions are key players in 
project planning, execution, and monitoring processes by which ordinary people are actively 
involved in the intervention (McBride & D’Onofrio 2008). This new generation of 
‘community-driven’ originally comes from an old generation of ‘community-based’ 
programming’. While ‘community-based’ refers to projects that actively include beneficiaries 
in the project execution, ‘community-driven’ refers to projects in which communities have a 
direct control over key project decisions as well as the management of investment funds 
(Mansuri & Rao 2003). 
The relevance of the approach stems from the idea that it is both for poverty reduction in 
post-conflict and post-disaster (in terms of access to education, health, water, and similar 
services), and strengthening of local governance. The CDR approach is popular among the 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), donors, and collective action 
advocates. CDR/CDD represents a multi-million or even multi-billion project portfolio, and it 
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is adopted as one of the main instruments of direct development intervention both by bilateral 
donors and by such international bodies and agencies. These agencies are the World Bank, 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UN 2004). In addition to its propensity for poverty 
reduction and strengthening good governance, ‘community-driven’ is said to have another 
potential, which is interconnected to this; that is, substantial support to decentralization in the 
context of post-conflict in developing countries (Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006). 
However, the CDR approach has also been criticised in practice as it has both strengths 
and shortcomings. Four critiques about CDR and similar approaches are recurrent in the 
literature. The first critique is the complexities of power relations around the intervention. 
Not only is the local elite said to capture the intervention by excluding powerless people, but 
also the participatory approach is said to reproduce the existing power structures. A second 
questions the sustainability of the approach, in the sense that no activity takes place once the 
project ends. Another critique is about the concept of ‘community’ itself. Though it sounds 
like an idea of a cohesive and egalitarian place where reciprocity and mutual concern prevail, 
but when it comes to the notion of common interest, values, and identity for those who are 
living in the same area, the concept of ‘community’ may be quite challenging. Finally, where 
new committees are created as in the case of Tushiriki, there are de facto parallel structures, 
which may compete with the existing local institutions, such as chief-based or religious-based 
structures. As a result, the created structures cease to function with the end of the 
intervention, thereby threatening the sustainability of the approach (Zakus & Lysack 1998; 
Buchya & Hovermanb 2000; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Dasgupta & Beard 2007; Ingamells 
2007; Labonne & Chase 2007). 
This thesis wants to contribute to the debates on community-driven reconstruction by 
offering a detailed case study into one CDR programme in Eastern DRC: the SV-supported 
Tushiriki programme that was implemented by IRC. It unravels the realities of who drives the 
process, how are social relations constructed around the intervention, what is the source of 
legitimacy of those who drive it, what are the mechanisms to enhance local accountability in 
the context of post-conflict, how capacity building has been undertaken and shaped by actors, 
and what are the types of labour and the incentive structure in the dynamics of the 
programme. Through this case study, the black box of community driven Reconstruction can 
be opened to reveal the inner working of the programme, in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of the contradicting experiences with the approach. 
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1.2 Study Aim, Research Questions, and Organisation 
1.2.1. Study aim 
Purpose: To understand the social dynamics around and meanings attached to the 
Community-Driven Reconstruction programme implemented by the International Rescue 
Committee with funding of Stichting Vluchteling, in the target communities in order to assess 
the assumptions and approaches underlying the CDR programme’s design and 
implementation. 
1.2.2. Research questions 
Main research question: How do local people and IRC staff shape development through 
their everyday practice in the communities of Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba and how do 
social dynamics and power relations influence decision making and implementation of the 
CDR from 2008 to 2010?  
Sub questions 
1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation? 
2. How do they play out in individual and community-level decision making? 
3. How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the 
programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) 
translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of 
the IRC? 
4. How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same 
time affect the working of CDR in the communities? 
5. What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices 
of the CDR in general? 
1.2.3. Research organisation 
This PhD research was carried out over the period of 2007–2014 under the collaboration of 
the International Rescue Committee (IRC)–Stichting Vluchteling (SV)–Wageningen 
University (WUR). At the same time the Tushiriki programme supported by the SV was 
under implementation in Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba. Indeed, the current research was 
sponsored by the Dutch Government and SV as the latter wanted an independent qualitative 
impact research to serve as one of the instruments for monitoring and evaluation of the 
Tushiriki programme. To do so, there were conditions such as the independence of the 
researcher, the provision of feedbacks and the organisation of workshops as well as the 
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involvement in evaluations of the programme. Before I was involved in the current research, I 
was employed by the IRC as the Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor with IRC based in 
Bukavu, South-Kivu, the DRC, from late 2006 through late 2007. 
1.3. Tushiriki as a Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme 
1.3.1 Core ideas about the Community-Driven Reconstruction Approach 
As mentioned above, the CDR applies the methodology of the CDD approach that was 
initiated by the World Bank. The CDR is a proponent of the ‘reconstruction from below’ 
approach (Hickey & Kothari 2009; Hilhorst, Christoplos et al. 2010). It has two main 
objectives: speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance on the ground and 
building governance that stresses local choice and accountability (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 
2003). 
The CDR considers the processes of decision making and project implementation as 
equally important as the decisions and subsequent material outputs. It brings people together 
to exchange ideas about the future and decision-making, identifying needs, and prioritizing 
interventions. By doing so, people and local management can overcome distrust that 
originates from pre-conflict or conflict and can make effort for common recovery and 
sustainability of their area (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:3). As such, CDR is also meant to 
enhance peacebuilding. Also, projects and decision making are important and people’s 
community contribution in the form of labour to the reconstruction is crucial.  
In short, the core thought of the CDR revolves around the idea that people not just learn 
local governance through a reconstruction project but also share vision, decision making, 
prioritization, and can rebuild trust between and among themselves and their institutions. It is 
further assumed that people will feel ownership over these projects that they decided on, and 
hence will be prepared to provide labour for their implementation. 
1.3.2. Implementing agency and funding 
This section introduces the implementing agency, the short history of the programme, and its 
funding. Firstly, Tushiriki, a Kiswahili word to mean ‘let us involve in it together’ is the local 
name of one of the CDR programmes executed by the IRC, an American agency based in 
New York, via its office based in Bukavu in the DRC. It was implemented from 2008 through 
2010 in Burhinyi and Luhwindja in the Mwenga territory, and in Kaziba in the Walungu 
territory, in the South-Kivu province of the DRC. The fieldwork of the current research took 
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place in the same areas, while the Tushiriki programme was under implementation. The 
motivation for implementing such a programme lies in the fact that it is applied where there 
are weak or nonexistent local institutions, or where there are communities that are less 
willing to work together in conflict affected areas, such as in the eastern DRC (McBride & 
D’Onofrio 2008:2). 
Secondly, the Tushiriki programme consisted of two separate, but complementary 
components, that are depicted in Figure 1: the civil society and community development. 
These two sections functioned differently over the course of the programme. The community 
development section was developed under the bigger CDR programme known as Tuungane, 
which was funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID). Simultaneously, the civil society section of IRC had a distinct programme named 
Ushirika, traditionally meaning in Kiswahili ‘be involved altogether’, for strengthening 
capacity of civil society organisation partners. After the mid-term review of the programme, 
which took place in 2009, the two initially separated sections were merged under one 
programme coordination, known as Tushiriki. 
The Tushirki programme aimed to contribute to poverty alleviation and post-conflict 
rehabilitation through the CDR in the DRC, especially: (i) poverty alleviation through 
improvement of socio-economic conditions through the CDR; (ii) Governance/Civil Society 
Development (CSD) by increasing the understanding of good governance principles and 
practices; (iii) lobbying/advocacy through increasing advocacy efforts on behalf of 
communities and towards policy makers (SV & IRC 2007:6). Figures 1 and 2 depict the 
interconnection between the two sections. While the programme’s community development 
section aimed at improving governance and social cohesion through social infrastructure 
reconstruction, its civil society section aimed at strengthening governance through civic 
education and advocacy activities. 
Lastly, with regard to the Tushiriki funding, this is a CDR programme supported by the 
Dutch-Stichting Vluchteling (SV) organisation based in the Hague, The Netherlands (SV, the 
Netherlands Foundation for Refugees) in partnership with the IRC. The total amount of 
funding was $US 2-million-grant for both civil society and community development 
components of the programme (Klerk, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2011:1). In short, as conceived, 
the Tushiriki programme was executed by the IRC, based in Bukavu, and had Dutch-funding 
for governance through reconstruction in the Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba chiefdoms. 
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1.3.3. The Tushiriki Community Development Component 
The key characteristic of the community development programme is that it establishes local 
committees that are formed and become operational through standardized steps that are being 
introduced and monitored by the staff of the programme. When communities follow the steps 
and conditions set in the protocol of the programme, they receive a small fund for the 
implementation of a reconstruction project of their choice. Hence, in the community 
development component of the programme the selected infrastructure is being rebuilt. Figure 
2 shows that the community development component was formed by a set of committees, at 
the village/subcommunity and community levels. Each target village organised an electoral 
meeting through which a body of ten participants (five men and five women) was elected for 
five positions of a president, a treasurer, a secretary, a mobilizer, and an inclusion officer. 
This structure was known as the Village Development Committee (VDC). Similarly, Figure 2 
shows that besides the VDC structure, there was another body (i.e., the Relais qualité or 
Requa), that consisted of two members (one man and one woman), whose role was to be a 
watch-dog of the execution of the project by the village committee and to serve as the liaison 
between the committee and the population. Then, four to five VDCs formed a Community 
Development Committee (CDC). In total, there were four CDCs that comprised 17 VDCs in 
each of the chiefdom in Burhinyi and Luhwindja. 
In terms of the target population, the programme randomly selected communities 
inhabited by 22,948 out of 55,993 people in Burhinyi, 21,225 out of 47,073 people in 
Luhwindja, and the entire population of Kaziba; that is, 38,834 inhabitants. Table 2 shows 
that, in the two former chiefdoms, each Tushiriki ‘community’ that elected a CDC consisted 
of nearly 6,000 inhabitants. In addition, each Tushiriki ‘village’, that elected a VDC consisted 
of nearly 1,200 inhabitants.  
Although some communities were similar to groupements (groupement is an intermediate 
entity between a chiefdom and a village that composes a set of villages), and some villages 
were similar to localities, not all Tushiriki structures coincided to administrative entities. 
Some of them were a combination of entities, which were smaller to form a target structure, 
and some consisted of a section of a larger adminitrative unit. In addition to the population 
size criterion, homogeneity and location were other criteria for community and 
subcommunities formation. This thesis focuses on Burhinyi and Luhwindja. The Tushiriki 
was also implemented in all 15 communities (groupements) of the Kaziba chiefdom, but here 
it was already the third time that commnunities experienced the CDR approach. 
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That said, this study concerns VDCs rather than VDCs and CDCs. My main interest was 
to understand the local dynamics of implementation, and at the CDC level there was very 
little involvement of the population. At that level, the implementation of the intervention at 
CDC level looked more contractor-driven rather than community-driven. For instance, the 
male president of Cibanda II CDC in Luhwindja chiefdom revealed that labour in creating 
digs for water pipes was more a decision made by the project contractor than residents. 
Additionally, people’s participation in road construction work was motivated by the payment 
of wages by the contractor rather than by the mobilisation supposedly by the committee 
members. I thus decided to focus on the village level. 
1.3.4. The Tushiriki civil society component 
The civil society component of the programme consists of strengthening governance and 
advocacy in the target communities. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that the civil society 
component of the programme complemented its community development component in 
reinforcing the capacity of civil society organisation partners about good governance 
principles; particularly transparency, accountability, inclusion, and participation. To do so, 
the programme partnered with four national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), of 
which two were based in my research area: in Burhinyi (the Centre d’Etudes, de 
Documentation et d’Animation Civique, CEDAC) and in Luhwindja (the Action pour le 
Développement en Milieux Ruraux, ADMR). During the first phase of the programme (2008–
2009), these civil society organisations partnered, in turn, with Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs) known as ‘Interest Groups’ to foster sensitisation about good 
governance principles in the area. 
With regard to the watch dog role, the Requas and GAC on the side of the community 
development section and the CBOs on the side of the civil society section of the programme 
were said to play this role. However, it appeared to be duplicating because these two bodies 
(Requa/GAC and CBOs) were assigned the same responsibilities (Ferf, Kyamusugulwa et al. 
2009). As a result, checks and balances of the committee actions during project execution 
were not necessarily effective. The difference between the two bodies was not clear enough, 
and  those who were asked to be the requa were sometimes the same people, or they played 
this role for the first time. In this thesis, therefore, I will not analyse the requa function 
separate from the analysis of the other accountability mechanisms in the programme. 
Whereas the community development component executed the hard side of the programme, 
its civil society component executed, partly, its soft side.  
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Figure 1.1: Tushiriki staff-area level organization chart within IRC, South-Kivu, DRC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Tushirki partners per entity: civil society and communities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 The Community-Driven Reconstruction analytical framework 
Figure 1.3 depicts the main implementing structures and mechanisms of the CDR 
programme, as well as the actors and factors important for my analysis.  
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Figure 1.3: CDR Analytical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1. The actor orientation approach 
Ethnographic research emphasizes the crucial importance of everyday practices for 
understanding aid in conflict-affected areas. This is founded theoretically and 
methodologically in an actor-oriented approach. Such an orientation starts with the premise 
that social actors have agency, and that people reflect upon their experiences and happenings 
around them, and use their knowledge and capabilities to interpret and respond to their 
environment. Aid programmes, which must be seen as an arena, are shaped through the 
interaction of actors, where each brings its own perceptions and interests to the programme 
(Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1, Hilhorst 2003; Hilhorst 
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& Jansen 2010). This means that the programme is translated and negotiated locally, and that 
the way the programme evolves in practice may not follow the foreseen trajectories. For 
instance, participation in decision making is supposed to take place in meetings, whereas, in 
reality the negotiation over the projects to be implemented may happen in other informal 
venues before the meetings. 
One implication of this orientation is that understanding the dynamics of the programme 
requires a broader understanding of the social and political setting, power relations, and 
surrounding processes. For instance, the response of people to aid interventions is shaped by 
their experiences with earlier and concurrent interventions. When some programmes continue 
to supply material free, it is harder for people to understand why other programmes require 
that they provide a counterpart contribution. Likewise, bad memories of forced community 
labour may colour their motivation to participate in meetings. 
This is a perception of programmes as social interfaces between intervening actors (in 
particular the ‘frontline’ NGO workers, the facilitators) and the recipient population. 
Interface analysis focuses on the linkages and networks between individuals or parties at 
points where different and often conflicting life-worlds or social fields intersect. Interface 
analysis can reveal important dynamics concerning the interplay of discourses, the way in 
which power relations are shaped and actors give meaning to, and transform aid 
interventions. Power relations are not just happening inside localities but also in the process 
of implementation. These may be complex processes, for instance because staff may not only 
have an IRC identity but may be tied in other ways into communities (by their ethnicity, 
religion, kinship ties, history with the conflict etcetera). I thus view Tushiriki as an arena or a 
set of subarenas where the intervention dynamics are constructed. 
1.4.2. Resources, strategy and organization 
Figure 1.3 shows the resources, strategy and organization employed by IRC as well as the 
actors and factors that have an influence on the programme. Resources refer to (skilled) 
human, material and financial resources used within the programme, strategy refers to both 
capacity building and mechanisms to enhance democratic accountability within the 
programme.  
To implement a CDR programme, there is a lot of attention to developing capacity of the 
local actors of the created governance structures, namely the committee members (Pierson & 
Ntata 2007) and the existing Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) through skilled and 
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experienced facilitators (Hanusaik, O’Loughlin et al. 2007). Additionaly, there is emphasis 
on sensitizing local people in terms of raising awareness with regard to information about the 
project and how they could better involve it. In the Tushiriki programme, the civil society 
component emphasised the sensitization of the ordinary citizen about advocacy and good 
governance; good governance here referring to its twine principles, transparency and 
accountability that are supposedly enhanced through reconstruction. 
The CDR programme goes also with the idea that if well implemented, this approach may 
promote equity and inclusiveness, efficiency, and good governance (Tanaka, Singh et al. 
2006). To do so, capacity building involves training, management, and technical assistance 
about governance principles. It also involves partnership between the implementing agency 
and local institutions; defining skills required, material and financial resources; and it is 
associated with labour mobilization for people’s participation in the intervention. In the same 
vein, selected CBOs after being strengthened by the selected NGOs were said to play the 
watchdog role toward VDCs during a village project implementation activities.  
To analyse these processes as they happen in the everyday implementation of the 
proramme, I will emphasize aspects of power and how they influence the programme outputs 
and outcomes. I am particularly interested to understand the role of the elite in the 
programme. Even though the elite has no assigned role in the design of the programme, I was 
assuming that they would nonetheless play a role in the dynamics of implementation. In 
addition, I will look into the ways in which the IRC staff translate the approach in practice, 
and how they deal with the power structures in their everyday activities. The second 
emphasis in this thesis concerns the nature of participation. Participation is at the heart of the 
CDR approach, and in chapter 2, I will elaborate on this concept with a literature review. I 
will study participation as both a tool in development and reconstruction interventions and an 
end as it can lead to transformation of powerful and powerless beneficiaries. I will 
specifically pay attention to forms of voluntary labour that are used in the participatory 
approach of CDR and ask how local people perceive of their labour contribution. I also 
analyse how residents perceive of the idea of ‘ownership’, which is an important notion in the 
CDR approach. 
The third emphasis is on mechanisms of accountability that are applied in the studied CDR 
programme. I will analyse the ways in which mechanisms of acountability that were built into 
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the programme worked in practice, while asking how these interact with other processes of 
(informal) accountability that already take place in communities.  
1.5 Context and setting of the DRC 
1.5.1 Main dislocative events and main features of local governance in the DRC 
As can be seen in Box 1, the main dislocative events in the DRC from 1996 through 2003 
range from the rebellion movement that toppled the Mobutu regime in 997 to the killing of 
Kabila father and to the Sun City peace agreement that culminated into the run of the 
presidential and parliamentarian elections of 2006 (Dijkzeul and Wakenge 2010).  
Box 1: Short summary and timeline of the main dislocative events in the DRC, 1996-2003 
1996-97: Rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad for medical treatment. 
1997 May: Rebels capture the capital, Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo; Laurent-
Desire Kabila installed as president. 
1998 August: Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila and advance on Kinshasa. 
Zimbabwe, Namibia send troops to repel them. Angolan troops also side with Kabila. The rebels take control of 
much of the east of DRC. 
2000: UN Security Council authorises a 5,500-strong UN force to monitor the ceasefire but fighting continues 
between rebels and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces.  
2001 January: President Laurent Kabila is shot dead by a bodyguard. Joseph Kabila succeeds his father.  
2001 May: US refugee agency says the war has killed 2.5 million people, directly or indirectly, since August 
1998. Later, a UN panel says the warring parties are deliberately prolonging the conflict to plunder gold, 
diamonds, timber and coltan, used in the making of mobile phones. 
2002 December: Peace deal signed in South Africa between Kinshasa government and main rebel groups. Under 
the deal rebels and opposition members are to be given portfolios in an interim government.  
2003 June: French soldiers arrive in Bunia, spearheading a UN-mandated rapid-reaction force. President Kabila 
names a transitional government to lead until elections in two years time. Leaders of main former rebel groups 
are sworn in as vice-presidents in July. Source: BBC 2008 
This thesis deals with the dynamics of a reconstruction programme at the local level. While 
the reconstruction programme did not interact directly with the representatives of the state – 
who were not part of the implementation process – it is important to understand the local 
authority structure in place. Hence, we briefly describe in what follows how the Belgian 
system of administration looked like and what form of administration functions at local level 
in the DRC.  
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At the provincial level, the Congolese state inherited the Belgian system of administration 
that consists of a governor of province in each province, a chief of district in each district and 
a territory administrator in each territory. At the local level; however, there was an hybrid 
type of administration that combined the state to the traditional system to the extent that kings 
as expressions of custom and popular will occupied an important position in the local 
administration. 
Since 1906, the royal system was incorporated to the colonial administration despite the 
fact that kings who were not obedient to the colonial rule were substituted by those who were 
kind (Ngoma-Binda, Otemikongo  et al. 2010). Nonetheless, in the post-independence regime 
even nowadays, kings and chiefs who come to power according to the customary law 
constitute the heart of local administration below the territory level. In fact, every territory 
consists of multiple chiefdoms and groupements, whereby traditional rulers are associated 
with the state administration because they have a certain control of the local administration 
and land.  
According to the 18 February 2006 constitution, the customary authority has responsibility 
to promote cohesion and national unity as well as to link up the central administration to the 
population. Each chiefdom or sector is led by a King (Mwami) or a chief of sector, each 
groupement is led by a chief of groupement and each village or locality is led by a chief of 
village or locality. Except the chief of sector, all other chiefs are sworn according to the 
customary law meaning by inheritance. At the same time, the Mwami is also recognised by 
the national government through a decree of the Minister of Interior (Ngoma-Binda, 
Otemikongo et al. 2010). Once in power, the King has authority on chiefs of groupements 
and villages who depend on him. Next to the traditional powerholders, every territory is 
governed by the Territory Administrator who is nominated by the president of the country by 
decree. In chiefdoms located far from the chef-lieu of a territory–such as in Burhinyi, 
Luhwindja and Kaziba–a representative of the Territory Administrator is nominated by the 
central administration as the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif (CPEA). The CPEA 
administratively leads the entity in close collaboration with the traditional authority (i.e., the 
King), and military officials based in the area. In short, at territory level, there functions a 
hybrid type of administration consisting of both state administrator and traditional leaders 
who are recognised by the customary law, since colonial time up today. 
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Although violence persisted, the area was not in a vacuum of power holders. Each 
chiefdom is headed by a king (the Mwami), who is a traditional authority enthroned by the 
local people themselves according to the custom law and then,  
1.5.2. Geographic setting 
The maps of the DRC and of the South-Kivu province show that the current research took 
place in three chiefdoms—Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba—situated in two territories 
(Mwenga and Walungu). The first two chiefdoms are part of the Mwenga territory on its 
north-eastern side, whereas Kaziba is located in the Walungu territory on its south-western 
side. Each of the entities is populated by inhabitants, who belong, in the vast majority of 
cases, to the same tribe or ethnic group. The people of Burhinyi are called the Barhinyirhinyi, 
whereas the people of Luhwindja are known as the Bahwindjahwindja, and the people of 
Kaziba are named the Bazibaziba. Nonetheless, in September 2008, some 6,000 Hutu people 
(including their families) estimated at 14% of the entire population of Burhinyi were reported 
to live in nine foothill groupements until the Kimia II operation, that took place in 2009. This 
operation, which was led by the Congolese army (i.e., the FARDC) was backed by the United 
Nations peace keepers in the DRC, when the Hutu combatants were driven into the bush of 
the Mwenga territory. At the same time, 1% of inhabitants representing other Congolese 
ethnic groups such as the Bafuliro and the Balega were reported to live in the Burhinyi 
chiefdom.  
As for the history of the conflict in the area, these three chiefdoms were heavily affected 
by the violence that the whole country experienced between 1996 through 2003; that is, from 
1996 through 1997 with the first war led by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération (AFDL) and from 1998 through 2003 by the rebellion movement led by the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), which was based in Goma in the 
North-Kivu province. In fact, the area of the study was particularly vulnerable because of the 
prolonged presence of the Hutu combatants, who were targeted by a variety of forces such as 
the Mai-Mai, rebellion movements, and government military forces. Indeed, these waves of 
fighting contributed to enormous loss not just in terms of human capital but also in terms of 
other capitals such as physical, financial, material, and social. 
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Why did the researcher select this area for the current study? First, this is among the 
settings heavily affected by the violence and therefore, it offers opportunity to study how the 
local people interacted in the reconstruction effort in the conflict affected areas. Second, it 
was interesting to conduct a research about the CDR in both areas, which were targeted by 
the Tushiriki programme; that is, Kaziba, Burhinyi and Luhwindja. Nonetheless, because the 
project implementation at the village level was more participatory than at community level, 
this research focused more on the first level than on the second. 
1.5.3. Post-war vulnerability 
Post-war vulnerability is likely to occur after conflict, where there is loss of capitals including 
human beings (Haug 2000; De Vita, Fleming et al. 2001; Longley & Maxwell 2003; Korf 
2004). For example, Humphreys (2008:2) has reported that 11% of the sample population 
suffered from severe sickness over the two weeks before the survey, 42% of schooled kids 
lacked access to education, and for the majority of residents, there was a long distance (more 
than a half an hour) to access clean water. In addition, in terms of human loss, there have 
been 5.4 million excess deaths that occurred between August 1998 and April 2007 in the 
DRC (Coghlan, Ngoy et al. 2007). Last, consequences of the war in terms of loss of capitals 
(i.e human, social, natural, financial, and physical), especially in the eastern DRC were 
devastating (Balemba 2004). All of this, in the sense that, the conflict was termed as the ‘First 
African World/International War’(Reyntjens 2001:311; Lemarchand 2002; Marysse 2003; 
Reyntjens 2005:587; Reyntjens 2007:308). 
1.5.4. Other reconstruction actors operating in the area 
Like Tushiriki, other interventions took place in the same area, either by the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC), by other international and national agencies, or by government-
based or church-based agencies. 
Firstly, four IRC programmes had a history of intervening there, namely Ushirika (former 
programme that aimed to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations partners), 
Tuungane (the CDR pilot programme implemented in Kaziba in 2006 and 2007), PAGE (the 
programme that supported capacity for better management of schools) and Tushiriki. 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
30 
 
Secondly, among other international agencies, some have been active in relief aid, such as 
World Food Programme (WFP) and 
1
AVSI in providing food and relief kit to returnees. 
Others such as UNICEF/AVSI, 
2
ICCO/Comité Anti-Bwaki (CAB) were active in school 
reconstruction in Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba. There were other schools reconstructed 
by the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD/COMREC), and Caritas for catholic 
schools. None of these agencies that operated in the reconstruction sector applied a 
methodology like CDR’s Tushiriki programme. Though diverse, they had all more a typical 
community-based development approach, meaning that they involved local people only at the 
stage of project execution through manual labour. Furthermore, other international agencies 
were reported to be active in the health sector, particularly Malteser International in assisting 
the district hospitals and health centres to provide primary health care either at lower cost or 
for free for a certain period of time. Similarly, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) supported the 
Mwana Health District, which is under the management of the Bureau Diocesain des Oeuvres 
Médicales (BDOM) of the Catholic Archdiocese of Bukavu. It is worth to mention that like in 
other parts of the country, churches dominate the management of schools while the State 
organizes them in Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba (Titeca & De Herdt 2011). 
In addition to the IRC and other international agencies, one of the powerful private actors 
who is based in 
3
Twangiza in Luhwindja is the 
4
Banro mining company. This is a Canadian-
based gold exploration company that started the exploitation of gold in 2010 at the site 
initially discovered by the Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL) in the 1950s under the Belgium 
                                                          
1 AVSI: Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale, an Italian international agency funded by 
UNICEF. In Burhinyi, it has reconstructed the Budaha and Bwishasha primary schools, while in Luhwindja, 
AVSI has reconstructed the Makala and Lubanza primary schools. 
2
 ICCO: is the interchurch organization for development cooperation. Retrieved 1st October 2010, from 
http://www.icco.nl/delivery/main/en/ 
3 The Twangiza gold deposit was discovered by Minière des Grands Lacs (MGL) in the 1950s. The company 
followed the occurrence of alluvial gold deposits upstream from the Mwana River to the present-day Twangiza 
deposit. MGL tested the deposit through 8,200 metres of trenching and 12,100 metres of adits on seven levels, 
collecting a total of 17,400 samples. In the mid-1970s, Charter Consolidated undertook detailed exploration, 
including the excavation of numerous close-spaced adits into the mineralized zone. In 1996, Banro acquired 
control of the Twangiza Property, and during the following year, undertook a US $9 million exploration 
program, which included 10,490 line-kilometres of airborne geophysics, 1,613 samples from 16 adits, and 8,577 
drill core samples from 9,122 metres of core drilling along 800 metres of strike. This represented less than 20 
per cent of the identified mineralized trend.  
Retrieved 21
st
 September 2010, from http://www.banro.com/s/Twangiza.asp?ReportID=307249 
4 Banro is a Canadian-based gold exploration and development company with four wholly-owned properties, 
each with mining licenses, along a major gold belt of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Company is 
constructing a "phase one" gold mine at its Twangiza project, which is designed to process 1.3 million tonnes of 
ore per year and is scheduled to begin operations in late 2011. Banro has to date identified 6.72 million ounces 
of Measured and Indicated Resources, plus Inferred Resources of 4.46 million ounces. Retrieved 21
st
 September 
2010, from http://www.banro.com/s/Home.asp 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
31 
 
colonial rule. Banro has been active in both the water and education sectors in its social 
services for the population.  
But the international agencies and the Banro mining company were not the only to operate 
there. There were also government-related and church-related organizations as well as 
national agencies. For instance, the Fonds National, which was said to be under the 
management of the presidency of the country, was actually supported by the World Bank 
funding to the Government of the DRC. Many other national organizations such as Laissez 
l’Afrique Vivre, GEADEBU, etc. implemented some activities with subsidies from 
international agencies. Even though some of their actions were reported, most of them were 
rarely visible in the area.  
Lastly, among the church-based institutions, one of the well-known and the oldest in the 
area is the 
5
5e CELPA protestant church, created in 1922. It has a variety of departments such 
as health and education that contributed enormously to initiate, construct, and manage a 
number of existing hospitals, health centres and posts, maternities, as well as a huge number 
of primary and secondary schools. For example, Kaziba has a prestigious school of nurses, 
which was founded by the Norwegian missionaries, and which is well known across the 
entire province of South-Kivu. Another popular church institution is of course the Roman 
Catholic church that has a parish in each of the three chiefdoms. While the Kaziba health 
district and its Referral District Hospital is managed by the 5e CELPA, the Mwana health 
district and its Ifendula referral District Hospital based in Luhwindja is managed by the 
BDOM, which is under the administration of the Catholic Archdiocese of Bukavu. Other 
churches that initiated, constructed, and administered some schools in the area are the 
6
8e 
CEPAC, the 
7
21e CNCA, and the Pentecostal Church of God (PCG). 
Indeed, many schools were (re)built alongside the main road to the extent that the more an 
area was remote, the less schools existed there. One of the reasons is that, unlike Tushiriki, 
other NGOs favoured areas accessible by car. In short, IRC-Tushiriki was not alone, other 
agencies were active in the area. But the uniqueness of the Tushiriki programme lies in the 
                                                          
5 5e CELPA: Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en Afrique, meaning Free Pentecostal Churches in 
Africa initiated by Norwagian Missionaries in the 1920s. It ranks 5 in the classification of Christian Churches of 
the DRC. 
6 8è CEPAC : Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale, Pentecostal Churches in Central 
Africa initiated by Swedwish Missionaries in the 1920s. It ranks 8 in the classification of Christian Protestant 
Churches in the DRC 
7 21e CNCA: Communauté Nations du Christ en Afrique, Nations of Christ in Africa. 
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fact that it was the only programme that promoted governance through reconstruction. Other 
programmes operated in either the relief mode or a community-based reconstruction mode.  
1.6 Methodology 
This section outlines four aspects related to the methodology of the current study: the 
defintion of concepts, the social reality of the programme and its assessment, the study design 
and unit of analysis, and the different phases of the field work. 
1.6.1. Concepts, indicators, and related practices 
Table 1.1 summarizes a number of the key concepts that are being used in community-driven 
reconstruction, their indicators and related practices. As these are concepts that are common 
in social science and development studies I will also use these concepts in my discussion of 
the practices of CDR. At the same time, I have been observing how the actors in and around 
the CDR programme interpret some of these concepts in practice. 
Table 1.1: Broad definition of concepts 
Concepts Indicators  Related practices 
Community-
Driven 
Community 
participation 
- Degree of participation/involvement, stakeholders, steps (decision 
making and community work), nature of labour (managerial, 
technical and manual), motivation 
Reconstruction Project activities - Type and quality of the infrastructure building, whether achieved or 
not, reconstruction sectors (education, health, road/bridge, water); 
- reconstruction refers to development (future, building new 
infrastructure) 
Good 
governance 
Transparency and 
accountability 
- Information provision/dissemination and access to information, 
answerability, possibility of sanctions (control of 
corruption/enforcement), inclusion, partnership, equality and social 
inclusion (gender, age, religious, ethnicity); 
- governance refers to administration (the activities that are done in 
order to plan, organize and run an institution) and government (the 
activity or the manner of controlling a country) 
Mechanisms of 
local 
governance 
Means through 
which spread out 
information related 
to a project 
- Public meetings (committee election, project identification, project 
approval, general assembly report), report postage, watch dog role 
(CBOs, Requa) 
Power relations Power holders / 
drivers of the 
process 
- Persons/positions (traditional, intellectual elite, church leaders), 
group of people (traditional, intellectual or religious networks), 
source of legitimacy, interest/motivation (individual, group, 
community), modus operandi (informal talks) 
Social 
dynamics 
Interface, 
perceptions and 
people’s behaviour 
with regard to 
projects 
- Factors that influence the processes of people’s involvement in 
project activities : trust and distrust, power relations 
(competition/confrontation, domination or synergy of power 
holders/negotiation/consensus), views/representations towards the 
project;  
- Interface elite and non-elite (power relations);  
- Interface trainees and committee members (capacity building);  
- Interface field staff and residents (labour and incentive structure), 
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local perceptions of democratic accountability, interface between the 
intervention and residents (local ownership). 
Meanings / 
perceptions 
attached to 
CDR 
Representations - Difference in views (people, officials at local-provincial-national 
levels, CDR staff, other NGO staff), nature (project’s objectives, 
outcomes), similar approach (past, current or parallel), capacity 
building. 
Capacity 
building 
Trainings, 
management and 
technical 
assistance 
- Content of trainings, training of trainers, training of committee 
members/local authorities, quality of managerial and technical 
support, effects of capacity development inside and outside the 
project. 
Incentive 
structure 
Benefit/reward/rec
ompense 
- Types of incentives (social/immaterial/ soft; 
economic/material/hard; and political). 
Manual labour Physical work / 
unskilled work 
- Less harder (carrying out sand, rocks, bricks, etc. at shorter 
distance.), more harder (road construction or carrying out materials at 
longer distance or in a mountainous area). 
Other types of 
labour 
Technical, 
managerial 
- Skilled work (of masons, carpenters, etc.); 
- Organisational skills (leading meetings, supervising community 
work, managing funds, reporting on community project, etc.).  
Ownership Beneficiaries of a 
certain project 
feeling that it is 
theirs 
- Control over a project or a program and the commitment of the 
beneficiaries to the success of the undertaking; 
- Abilities and power of stakeholders to set and take responsibility for 
a development agenda and to muster support and sustain it. 
Local In contrast to 
national 
- Grassroots communities, stakeholders or beneficiaries in contrast to 
the Ministry or to the Central Government.  
 
1.6.2. Social reality of Tushiriki programme and assessment  
Participative approach to development/reconstruction needs more of qualitative research to 
understand the contextual realities in which programmes take place. In this regard, Pottier 
mentioned:  
The participative approach to development has in recent years provided several openings for 
qualitative, contextual research which aims to gauge the impact and acceptability of programmes 
already implemented and to gather information relevant for the design and management of future 
interventions (Pottier 1993). 
As a qualitative research, this research is concerned by the social realities within the 
Tushiriki programme. As such, social realities cannot be understood without paying attention 
to meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their activities (Guba & Lincoln 
1994:106). 
Having said that, to assess these realities, I stayed extensively in the field where I 
participated (as a researcher rather than an implementing agency staff) in both public 
meetings and community work undertaken by the local people in the Tushiriki programme. 
Also, I took part in training, workshop, and sensitization sessions about the programme, 
which were held either by its community development component or by its civil society 
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component. The main questions that are related to the thesis research, subquestions, and 
guided interviews and participant observations are as follows: ‘Who drives the process? How 
does the process work? For what purposes and based on what legitimacy do power holders 
act? What are the perceptions of officials, CDR staff, trainees, and the population about the 
training, workshop, and sensitization sessions? What are the types of projects selected by the 
residents? What is the nature of labour involved in project execution? What are people’s 
perceptions vis-à-vis the intervention as governance programme? These questions and other 
related questions were articulated in semi-structured interviews that I undertook in the field. 
1.6.3. Data collection techniques 
I used several techniques to collect data. First, participant observation that is defined as the 
evidence through the eyes. Metcalfe (2007) describes it as the mainstay of science. In social 
science, observational evidence usually involves a researcher personally observing peoples’ 
actions, behaviours, or artefacts through his/her own eyes or through some instrument that 
helps their eye in the way that a microscope or video does. In this research, I am concerned 
by peoples’ actions, that is, behaviours in the CDR programme implementation (Metcalfe 
2007). Nonetheless, one of the problems of participant observation is the change in a 
behaviour of persons or groups, attributed to their being observed, which is well known as the 
Hawthorne Effect (Kumar 2005). I have been among the villagers, dressed as a villager and 
talking ‘Kiswahili,’ working with them, and discussing with them the issue of reconstruction 
in each particular case. In my view, this has reduced the bias which could be attributed to this 
effect. A good ‘rapport’ was built between the interviewees and me before every interview.  
Furthermore, I have stayed extensively in the areas of interest and have lived there, 
sharing people’s everyday life. This has engendered trust and distinguished me from the 
NGO staff who normally stay briefly to implement a predefined activity rather than collect 
data for a research purpose. As pointed out by Malinowski, time is necessary for the people to 
get used to the researcher, but time also allows the researcher to begin to feel as a part of 
happenings and to understand them from the point view of those being researched (O'reilly 
2005). 
Another technique used for data collection is in-depth interviews, which were, at the same 
time, semi-structured interviews. The face-to-face interview, coupled sometimes by repeated 
interactions between the informants and me, sought to understand the perspectives of the 
informants in relation to this research at its different steps (Kumar 2005). 
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To state emphatically, I did interviews at different steps of the Tushiriki project execution 
with the local people, authorities, CSOs, and the CDR staff (senior and field) about the topic. 
Some of the interviews took the form of a ‘focus group’ when I interviewed a group of 
people, who were VDC members, residents working in a field, on road construction, or after 
a Sunday church service. Others were in the form of an individual interview. 
As ‘ethnography’ stands for, some of the semi-structured interviews took the form of oral 
stories about the programme being implemented there asking the narrator what happened 
exactly, who participated, how, and why. To do so, I collected information about issues 
related to power relations, transparency and accountability, motivations of participants to 
contribute to both decision making and project execution and other related issues. For 
example, an open-ended question concerning corruption within an on-going project could not 
provide enough information about what was going on within it. In a story hearing, however, 
about how funds allocated to a project was being managed, I got more and valid insights 
about the issue. Some of these oral stories took place while walking on a foot road with the 
informants, while the residents worked their fields or while staying at their homes.  
In addition, reflexivity means thinking through what one is doing, specifically on how the 
researcher–interviewee relationship influences data collection processes (Mauthner & Doucet 
2003:223; Alversson et al. 2008:497). To perform this, I had time to reflect every day on 
stories and semi-structured interviews of the day. Additionally, I took the advantage of 
triangulating data by comparing information gathered by observation of the participant, the 
information collected by semi-structured interviews, and the information gathered through 
oral stories (Silverman 2009: 291). 
Finally, I used desk review as a source of secondary data. That is, monitoring and 
evaluation reports, baseline, midterm review, and end evaluation reports about the Tushiriki 
and similar programmes, which were implemented by the IRC in the DRC. As pointed by 
Kumar (2005), by using documentation, one has to extract the required information for the 
purpose of the study. For example, I reviewed 16 modules of training, workshop, and 
sensitization sessions to assess their content with regard to governance principles applied 
within the Tushiriki programme. 
1.6.4. Study design and unit of analysis 
Table 1.2 describes the target communities, population, and the project selected referring to 
34 target villages in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms as well as the 15 communities in 
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the Kaziba chiefdom that were targeted by the current research. These three chiefdoms are 
the three areas of the study, which are separate but similar in some instances, and from which 
numerous case studies (villages) discussed in the current research were selected. On the one 
hand, they were separate in the sense that each constituted a distinct administrative entity 
with its own king, people, and settlement. At the same time, while Kaziba has already 
experienced the CDR approach before 2008, in Burhinyi and Luhwindja, this was the first 
time the CDR was implemented. On the other hand, they were similar in the sense that the 
three chiefdoms were neighbours, had the same culture, and were affected by the conflict 
during the same period of time and in the same way. As Sneddom and Fox (2007) have 
pointed out, I see the case study approach as an especially apt methodology for examining the 
notion of participation. From a case study, knowledge production is possible in relation to 
issues, such as power relations, capacity building, accountability, labour, ownership, etc. 
As the current research was focused much more at the village level, the unit of analysis 
was a village or a set of villages that belonged to the same community, such as school 
reconstruction in Luduha community of Luhwindja. Relevantly, Gray (2006) notes that 
within a single case study, there may be a number of different units of analysis, which may 
present several entry points.  
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Table 1.2 : Target Communities, population and selected projects  
 
*VDC : Village Development Committee; ** CDC : Community Development Committee (small communities of Kaziba). 
1.6.5. Different phases of field work 
Diagram 1.1 depicts three phases of the research fieldwork. First, the preparatory phase 
which took place from August through September 2008 consisted of contacting with the IRC 
senior staff, the provincial authorities, as well as local people in the form of exploratory visits 
and the preparation of the logistics. In fact, meetings were held with the senior IRC staff 
based in Bukavu and two conference calls, which were held about the research proposal, 
involved the IRC’s Director of Research based in New York, the office of Stichting 
Vluchteling based in the Hague (The Netherlands), and the Humanitarian Aid and 
Reconstruction Groupof Wageningen University (The Netherlands). Then, I got the 
permission to start the fieldwork within the SV-IRC targeted communities. At the same time, 
I did a desk review about the geographic setting at the library of the Institut Supéreur 
Pédagogique of Bukavu. In terms of logistics, I bought a motorbike, Yamaha 125, which was 
Chiefdom Community Village Population * 34 VDCs projects and **15 small CDCs
Birhala Ier 1500 2 kms road reconstruction and guest-house chiefdom rehabilitation
Bwishasha 2156 2 classrooms reconstruction
Ciriri 1089 2 classrooms reconstruction
Muli 1712 3 classrooms reconstruction
Budaha Ier (Kakwende) 1559 2 classrooms reconstruction
Budaha II (Mbogo) 1659 1 water reservoir and 3 water points construction
Kanyimba 1082 2 kms road and office chief of groupement reconstruction
Karwera 953 2 kms road construction and office schoolmaster reconstruction
Busherega 726 3 classrooms reconstruction
Cishagala 1031 3 classrooms reconstruction
Kalambo 1322 3 classrooms reconstruction
Karhala 1034 3 classrooms reconstruction
Mulungu 1072 3 classrooms reconstruction
Citudu 763 3 classrooms reconstruction
Kalambagiro 1540 3 classrooms reconstruction
Lurhala 1950 3 classrooms reconstruction
Namashongo 1800 3 classrooms reconstruction
Cibanda II 1765 1 km road construction
Cishali 1883 2 classrooms reconstruction
Kabingu I 1489 1 classroom construction and classrooms equipment
Kabingu II 758 2 kms road construction
Bujiri 1375 2 classrooms reconstruction
Ishogwe 1577 1 bridge reconstruction
Lukaya 1150 3 classrooms reconstruction
Mubone 1300 3 classrooms reconstruction
Mushugula 936 Extension of water system and 3 water points construction
Byazi 1185 2 classrooms reconstruction
Chonga Ier 1000 2 classrooms reconstruction
Chonga II 1394 3 classrooms reconstruction
Mujindi 1001 1 schoolmaster office
Lwonga 972 1 classroom and 1 schoolmaster office
Mulama Ier 1550 2 classrooms reconstruction
Mulama II 850 2 classrooms reconstruction
Mulama III (Kalambo) 1040 Water system and 3 water points construction
Kaziba 15 communities 38834
VDC projects did not exist in Kaziba, projects were selected only at 
community level: road, school, maternity, water system, 
equipment meeting room, bridge, chiefdom's office, polyvalent
Total 83007
Burhinyi
Birhala
Budaha
Itudu
Ntondo II
Luhwindja
Chibanda II
Karhundu
Luduha
Mulama
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appropriate for field visits both in rainy and dry seasons. With regard to provincial 
authorities, I got a clearance letter that allowed me to undertake the current research in both 
the Mwenga and Walungu territories and through which I introduced myself and the research 
to local authorities before I began the observation of participants and interviews in a village.  
Second, the data collection period started effectively from November 2008 through April 
2010. During this period, I was mainly based in the area conducting participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews in this ethnographic study. As I have shortly mentioned in 
subsection (d) of this section, interviews were held either with the residents who participated 
in the programme activities or with field staff of the programme. Similarly, I interviewed the 
field officers from the partner organisations of Tushiriki project, that is, Arche d’Alliance, 
AFEDEM, ADMR, and CEDAC, as well as the field staff of other organisations that operated 
in the area such as the CAB. In addition to interviews with the local authorities based in the 
chiefdoms (namely the King and the CPEA), I visited the capital city Kinshasa in March 
2010, where I had interviews at three national ministries, specifically with the Secretary 
General at the Ministry of Relations of the Parliament, the Minister’s Advisor at the Ministry 
of Decentralisation, and the Chef de Division of action research at the Ministry of Rural 
Development. Then, I did interviews with the minister’s advisor at the provincial Ministry of 
Interior, Justice and Relation of Parliament in South-Kivu, as well as with the senior 
Tushiriki staff, who was the Territory Supervisor of the community component of the 
programme. 
Finally, during the last phase, that included the whole period of data collection, I was 
involved in four types of evaluations as one of the team members. These evaluations were all 
related to the CDR programmes, that is, the midterm review of the Tuungane programme, the 
midterm review of the Tushiriki programme, the final evaluation of the Tushiriki programme, 
and the ethnographic component of the Tuungane programme (Ferf & Kyamusugulwa 2009; 
Ferf, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2009; Klerk, Kyamusugulwa et al. 2011).  
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Diagram 1.1: Showing the phases of fieldwork 
 
Phase one Preparatory phase: August –September 2008 
- Introduction of study to 
1
IRC Senior Staff and Conference calls  
- Collect literature on geographic setting 
- Introduction of study to provincial Minister of Interior, Justice, Decentralisation and 
Relation with the Parliament in South-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
- Obtaining research clearance from the above Ministry 
- Establishing rapport with local people, local leaders (chief of village, chief of groupement, 
IRC staff and 
2
CSOs staff) 
- Prepare logistics 
 
Phase two  Documentation, Participant Observations, Semi-structured Interviews, Oral 
stories: from November 2008 to April 2010 
- Visit all three sites Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba chiefdoms 
- Participate in activities of Village Development Committee (Public meetings, community 
work, training sessions) 
- Interview with local people, officials at local, provincial and national levels and with 
3
CDR 
staff  
- Desk review about reports, training modules and different evaluations related to CDR 
programmes  
- Collect data through stories  
- Return to the area to complement information or gather new information 
 
Phase three  Participation as team member in evaluations of the Tushiriki programme or 
related programme: From October 2008 to May 2011 
 
- Mid Term Review 
4
Tuungane programme in Katanga, Maniema and South-Kivu: October 
to December 2008. 
- Mid Term Review 
5
Tushiriki (South-Kivu, DRC) and 
6
PADM (Muyinga, Burundi): 
September to October 2009 
- Tushiriki End of Programme Evaluation (South-Kivu, DRC) and PADM (Muyinga, 
Burundi): November to December 2010  
- Ethnographic component of Tuungane Programme in Mwenga and Kalehe territories 
(South-Kivu): January to May 2011 
 
1IRC; International Rescue Committee; 2CSO: Civil Society Organization; 3CDR:Community-Driven Reconstruction; 4Tuungane: similar programme to Tushiriki, 
implemented at the same time by IRC in South-Kivu (Kalehe, Mwenga and Uvira), Katanga and Maniema provinces. Unlike Tushiriki, Tuungane is funded by 
DFID (UK Department for International Development); 5Tushiriki: CDR programme implemented by the IRC on which the current study has been undertaken; 
6PADM: Programme d’Appui à la Décentralisation à Muyinga (Programme to Support Decentralisation in Muyinga), which was a similar programme to 
Tushiriki in Burundi, funded by the same donor (Stichting Vluchteling). 
 
1.7. Relation with IRC 
This section briefly describes my relationship with the IRC staff and the ways we interacted 
during this PhD project both positively and negatively. Firstly, as I was a former staff of the 
IRC, I could familiarise easily with the field of Burhinyi, Luhwindja and Kaziba chiefdoms 
as with the programme field staff. Secondly, there were mutual interactions between the 
researcher and both the senior and field staff informally and formally either during the field 
or in different workshops/conference workshop. For instance, in the workshop held by the 
Tushiriki programme, both field and senior staff played a role game of power relations, in 
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which I was one of the key facilitators. Finally, under the collaboration Wageningen 
University–International Rescue Committee–Institut Supérieur de Développement Rurual, the 
conference-workshop was held in Bukavu in January 2010 on development initiatives and 
rural transformation in South-Kivu. This culminated in the publication of a special Cahier du 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches pour la Promotion Rurale that comprised mainly scientific 
articles discussed in the abovementioned forum.  
On the negative side; however, there were instances at the beginning of this project where 
the management of the programme gave less attention to what I presented as findings from 
the field because they still regarded me as an IRC staff. With time, more consideration was 
given to his findings, which were shared in one or another way within the programme. In 
short, we can see that interactions between the researcher and the programme as a whole went 
well in the sense that facilitated data collection and discussion of the research findings, 
despite some drawbacks at the beginning. 
1.8 Thesis outline 
In order to study the social dynamics of the CDR programme, and analyse the role of 
different actors, I have on the one hand focused on factors internal to the design of the 
programme, and on the other on processes at the interface of the programme with institutions 
and actors in the communities. 
Chapter two presents a literature review on participatory development/reconstruction. It 
analyses the main trends of both strengths and weaknesses of the approach over the last 
decade. 
Chapter three focuses on the staff of the CDR programme, as main implementors of the 
programme. It analyses the types of training they receive to be capacitated for their job, and 
how they deal with the implementation of the programme in practice. It introduces the notion 
of the chain of capacity building and analyses its effects both inside and outside the Tushiriki 
programme.  
Chapter four starts from the assumption that the methods of intervention are important to 
co-determine the effects of the intervention. As the interventions aim to enhance local 
institutions of accountability, the chapter deals with institutional engineering in the eastern 
DRC. The chapter presents the general assembly report, the display of reports, and the watch-
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dog role of civil society as techniques for transparency and accountability and how residents 
viewed them in relation to the existing types of (informal) accountability in the area. The 
chapter also brings out how IRC staff dealt in practice with the ongoing realities of 
accountability, rather than relying on the mechanisms prescribed by their programme. 
In chapter five, I shift examines the issue of power relations within the Tushiriki 
programme by emphasising on the existing institutions that influence the exercise of power 
during the programme dynamics. The Tushiriki programme did not want to give a role to the 
existing power structures in the community, but I assumed from the start that they would 
nonetheless play a role. I analyse in this chapter, how they performed a role in the programme 
and use this to ask whether elite capture is always negative for development, and which o fthe 
prevailing elites (government/ chiefs or churches) were more powerful in determining 
development. 
Chapter six analyses the issue of labour mobilization in this programme. It departs from 
the idea that people’s involvement in reconstruction takes several labour forms, varying from 
managerial to manual and to technical labour. While the Tushiriki programme assumes that 
people feel ownership over the public goods they produce, and hence want to provide 
voluntary labour to realise these goods, the paper takes issue with both these assumptions. It 
analyses the labour question in relation to the long history with forced community labour in 
DRC, and questions the notion of public good in the context of DRC. 
Chapter seven outlines local ownership in the CDR in the DRC. It describes cases and 
analyses the conditions where the residents felt or not felt ownership of the Tushiriki village 
project. Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis. 
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Photo 1.1: Author visiting a household in Karhala village, Itudu groupement, Burhinyi 
 
 
 
Photo 1.2: Author with informants in Kabalole groupement, Luhwindj 
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ABSTRACT 
In the past decade researchers and development experts have been preoccupied by 
participatory development and reconstruction. Despite criticisms of its potential, it 
has been at the centre of development practices. This review of both published and 
unpublished literature aims to assess the importance of participatory development 
and reconstruction, especially its positive and negative characteristics. The paper 
shows that, despite its potentially transformative role, its main drawback rests in the 
power relations between elites and non-elites and that creating comprehensible ways 
through which non-elites can deal with these relations is one issue that needs 
additional research. Other issues that need more research are related to how to 
sustain the participatory development and reconstruction outcomes by increasing 
local ownership, and how to better involve existing structures and institutions (both 
state and non-state actors) in development and reconstruction efforts for poverty 
alleviation. 
2.1. Introduction 
Despite the emergence of ‘participation’ as one way to contribute to development in the 
poorest areas in the 1980s, in the 1990s it has been claimed that it is associated with power 
relations that undermine its potential. Nonetheless, the mounting criticisms have not affected 
the wide use of participation practices for development or reconstruction.
1
 Similarly the 
literature suggests that grasping the relationships between participation and existing power 
structures may lead to progress on how participatory development or reconstruction 
functions.
2
 It must be noted that participatory development is also used to signify 
participatory reconstruction, because ‘reconstruction’ must be seen as a transition phase from 
an immediate post-conflict situation to development; that is, from relief aid to development 
aid. The latter sometimes coincides with the reconstruction phase.
3
 
This literature review is based on a computerised search of the literature on this topic, 
using numerous bibliographic databases. The short-listed literature consisted of 60 peer-
reviewed journal articles, eight books and 22 reports. Most of the reports, also comprising the 
unpublished literature, are from the World Bank and concern community-driven development 
(CDD), one of the well-known methodologies of participatory development. The main 
criteria for selecting the documents were as follows: they had to have been published between 
1995 and 2010 and to reflect the main trends about participatory development and 
reconstruction or related terms in the developing world in general. The focus was placed on 
issues such as the benefits of participatory development and reconstruction, its possible 
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transformative role, and risks and critiques. Several databases were used to gather 
information from the selected articles. One was Google Scholar, which facilitated the search 
for academic publishers and development agencies across many disciplines and sources. The 
other was the Wageningen University and Research Digital Library (formerly AGRALIN). In 
addition, Scopus was used for scientific information and other literature about the topic, as 
well as Medline, a clinical and medical database maintained by the US National Library of 
Medicine. Finally, I used the Thomson Reuters (formerly ISI) Web of Knowledge, also 
known as Web of science, and the Health InterNetwork Access to Research Initiative 
(HINARI) for journals relevant to community development. For each selected article, it was 
interesting to look at the related articles as well. Endnote X4 was used either to classify 
documents or to present the bibliography of this study. The aims of the study were to review 
the value of participatory development and reconstruction and to describe its potentially 
transformative role, its benefits and the risks and criticisms associated with it. 
As we will show, despite the potential of participatory development and reconstruction, 
one of its main challenges remains the imbalance in power relations between those who lead 
communities and those who are led. Understanding the ways through which changes may 
occur when poor people negotiate space within these power relations and politics is one way 
that needs further investigation. 
The remainder of the paper consists of nine sections. The next section briefly describes 
similar and related concepts of participation. It is followed by sections outlining the brief 
history of community participation and highlighting participation and other associated terms. 
The factors making for effectiveness in participatory development approaches are examined 
in the subsequent section, which is followed by a presentation of the areas of participation 
that apply to development and a section discussing participation and its potentially 
transformative role. The next two sections describe the benefits of participation, its risks and 
the criticisms made of it, while the final section concludes the paper. 
2.2. Similar and related concepts 
The literature suggests other related terms used to signify the idea of working together. These 
are public participation,
4
 popular participation,
5
 collective action or collective management,
6
 
social capital,
7
 community-based/community-driven action,
8
 and stakeholder or civic 
engagement.
9
 Nevertheless, even if these concepts conceal some nuances, it appears that they 
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have all have in common ground people’s involvement for a common objective or public 
goods activities regarding either economic or social life. 
2.3. Brief history of community participation 
The history of ‘community participation’ has changed with time, context, and circumstances. 
Commons played a crucial role in European history, particularly from 1000 CE onwards. 
Commons and other forms of collective action evolved as responses to the social dilemmas of 
the times.
10
 During colonialism measures were taken to prevent diseases, which are now 
considered community participation.
11
 In the 1930s the Antagonish movement in the east of 
Nova Scotia, Canada was an inspired and new initiative to solve the social and economic 
difficulties of farmers, fishers and miners.
12
 
In the 1970s Julius Nyerere set up the Ujamaa in Tanzania, which was a form of 
community participation.
13
 At the same time the idea of community participation became 
popular in a range of areas of life. In 1987, at Alma-Ata, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) articulated the concept that became the heart of the strategy to achieve ‘Health for 
All’ by 2000, known as Primary Health Care.14 In the 1980s structural adjustment 
programmes for economic recovery and transformation were applied in numerous developing 
countries. When criticism built up against this policy,
15
 in the 1990s a renewed emphasis 
emerged on people’s involvement in decision making and project implementation. This is 
when the World Bank developed the concept of Community Driven Development (CDD).
16
 
Over the past 30 years governments and related agencies have implemented postcolonial 
development programmes based on Weberian bureaucracy theory. This resulted into a more 
top-down, hierarchical approach, which was widely criticized. Higher participation thus 
became a way to create democratic movements, to give power to the ‘marginalised and poor’ 
to enable them to ‘do their own analysis, to take command, to gain in confidence, and to take 
their own decision’; that is, ‘bottom-up’ systems based on participation and empowerment.17 
Since then participatory approaches to development and reconstruction have started to be 
widely applied either to post-conflict or post-disaster situations,
18
 in this way aiming to 
facilitate the setup of a community where inhabitants are respectful to each other, can make 
democratic choices, and are able to own their development. A further aim is to strengthen 
social cohesion.
19
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2.4. Participation and other associated terms  
2.4.1. Participation 
The concept of ‘participation’ is now more than 80 years old within development.20 It 
signifies people taking part in decision-making processes, or the type and level of people’s 
involvement in development planning, projects and practices.
21
 Participation takes the form 
of ‘community participation’, which may range from consultation or information to decision 
making.
22
 
‘Community participation’ is seen as an indicator of people’s involvement in either 
decision making in a project or its implementation. It is said that the more people are 
involved in decision making for a project, the more the community is driving the project. It is 
through this concept that the World Bank initiated the concept of CDD, seen as a new 
generation of the more traditional form of community-based development (CBD).
23
 
2.4.2. Community 
There is no way to situate participation without mentioning ‘community’, a problematic 
concept when it comes to development and reconstruction. In fact, ‘community’ refers both 
to geographical entities and to associations of people who share interests or who live in the 
same area with the same culture, where reciprocity and mutual concern triumph. However, 
many divisions may emerge in terms of religion, ethnicity, education or gender when 
members of the same community are invited to take part in development and reconstruction 
projects.
24
 
2.4.3. Governance 
The World Bank report, released in 1989, situated Africa’s development problems as a crisis 
of governance.
25
 Since then, promoting governance has become one of the main focuses of 
donors, even one of the conditions of aid.
26
 The idea of governance refers to its two main and 
intertwined principles: transparency and accountability.
27
 The notion of governance is related 
to ‘participation’ and ‘community participation’ because, in a given society, there is a need 
for those in high positions or those who have power to account to ordinary citizens for what 
they do. Conversely there is a need for local people to hold their leaders to account about 
decision making and actions regarding public goods; otherwise, they have the right to 
sanction them. While transparency refers to information provision, accountability refers to 
both answerability and enforcement.
28
 Other governance principles besides these two main 
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ones relate to citizen engagement, equality and social inclusion (gender, ethnicity, age, 
religion, etc.), ethical and honest behaviour, equity (fair procedures and due 
process), partnership, sustainability, and the rule of law.
29
 
2.4.4. Empowerment 
Empowerment signifies the idea of giving to somebody more control over his or her own life 
or the situation he or she is in. It is related to participation because participation is seen as the 
vehicle through which empowerment can be realised. 
30
 Similarly any mechanisms that 
provide room for what people do involve empowerment. Its success is the ability to translate 
Western knowledge locally, instead of trying to replace local by Western knowledge and vice 
versa.
31
 
2.5. Factors of effectiveness 
There are several factors that are said to influence the effectiveness of participation and its 
approaches to development and reconstruction. First, having a concrete approach, with the 
readiness of the stakeholder to act in both international and local arenas to achieve specific 
goals, are considered important factors.
32
 Second, appropriate leadership and a strong sense 
of identity are important: a small and homogeneous group has a better chance of success than 
a heterogeneous, large one.
33
 Also, a higher level of social homogeneity is needed to facilitate 
the formation of social capital (that is, the value of social relationships, trust and reciprocity 
norms), which may be conducive to collective action.
34
 
Third, there is evidence that participation is more effective when the programme in which 
it takes place provides more space for negotiation and mediation among local people and 
where the latter perceive the programme as engaged to do so.
35
 Fourth, communication and 
strong relationships in the community are important to reduce conflict between a 
programme’s goals and actors’ needs in a way that maintains a space of dialogue with 
community members, as well as in a way that engages them in the review of suggested new 
activities and projects. The four relevant ways are: facilitation, dialogue, consultation and 
partnership.
36
 Lastly, the ability to face challenges and dilemmas is crucial. This factor relies, 
in turn, on two other factors, namely money and staff leadership.
37
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2.6. Sectors of application 
There is a range of sectors within which community participation may be applied to 
development and reconstruction.
38
 The UN conference on the Human Environment held in 
Stockholm in 1972, and the UN General Assembly through the adoption of the World Charter 
for Nature held in 1982, addressed participation in the environmental field, which took some 
time before it became a major issue in the international policy arena in the early 1990s.
39
 
In the field of health community participation was presented as the main means for 
implementing primary health care, because the idea was supposedly to create people’s 
autonomy over health care.
40
 However, weak experience with community participation in 
health efforts has been reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
41
 In the field of 
education experience from Brazil has shown that school empowerment may make progress 
by weakening patronage structures, enhancing transparency of education decisions and 
leading to school administrators who are more accountable to their constituencies,
42
 while, in 
the agricultural field, participation in the community decision-making process and women’s 
involvement in running rice banks may enhance the latter’s social mobility.43 
In the infrastructure sector experience from the Amazon region has shown that, for viable 
‘road governance’, there was a need for a planning process not only involving the community 
but also the state, in order to foster transparency and accountability.
44
 In the livestock field 
(including fishery activities), evidence suggests that what counts is the combination of rural 
people’s knowledge in their context and the ways in which they manage their livestock, 
rather than just keeping animals per se.
45
 Finally, in other fields, such as micro-credit or 
income generation, the importance of social networks and means that reinforce people’s 
capacity for collective action that addresses their needs are of increasing interest.
46
 
By targeting these sectors, participation and its approaches are said to contribute to 
poverty alleviation, in the sense that beneficiaries may improve access to social services, and 
to restore natural, physical, social and human capital, which may have been destroyed during 
a conflict or disaster.
47
 
2.7. Participation and potential transformative role 
There are two main observations to make about the potential transformative role of 
participation: that related to participation per se and that related to participatory approaches. 
In the first case ‘participation’ has been used as a means through which intended beneficiaries 
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have the opportunity to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge. This means that it has 
primarily been used as a method or tool for development objectives. The common example is 
Participatory Rural Appraisal, used to identify and assess community needs and priorities, to 
monitor and evaluate the impact of these, and to inform continuous readjustment of the 
programme. This is motivated by the fact that less literate people can be fully involved in the 
process.
48
 
At the same time participation has been used as an end itself, meaning that it may play a 
transformative role by empowering intended beneficiaries, particularly by reducing the gap 
between those who have voice and the voiceless.
49
 The idea here is that reinforcement of the 
capacity of poor people to negotiate power within existing power relations, instead of 
reversing them, can be a factor of transformation in a given society. Two reasons for this 
come together here. One is that local patrons are portrayed as being of great utility to 
‘lowers’, with the former preferring to work through them rather than take their place.50 The 
concept of ‘patrons’ versus ‘lowers’ is akin to that of ‘elites’ versus ‘non-elites’ or to ‘big 
men’ versus ‘ordinary people’, ‘rulers’ versus ‘ruled’, local ‘uppers’ versus ‘lowers’, and 
‘leading lineages’ versus ‘the rest’.51 A second reason is that, in the context of developing 
countries, where people view their clans and ethnic groups representatives as the obliged way 
to access to development, the former can resist making the processes of decision transparent 
and public. This, as people stay in touch with their leaders through informal politics. This 
means that participation can only enhance this by empowering the poor so that they can 
advance their room for manoeuvre within existing power relations and increase their ability 
to hold their leaders to account.
52
 Here it must be noted that one way to move towards a more 
transformative approach to development is through an understanding of how participation 
relates to existing power structures and politics system.
53
 
The second major observation is related to the way participatory approaches operate. 
According to the distinction made previously, whether participation is used as a method or an 
end, in participatory approaches, particularly community-driven ones, it appears to be both a 
method and an end. One justification is that what makes CDD or community-driven 
reconstruction (CDR) different from other approaches to CBD is its intense community 
participation and empowerment. In fact, among five characteristics of a CBD approach, there 
are two which are typical of CDD/CDR, namely, participatory planning and design, and 
community involvement in project implementation. The latter means that residents may 
contribute directly by supplying inputs, labour or funds, or indirectly by managing or 
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supervising project operations. All the other three characteristics (community focus, 
community control and community-based action) may be common to CBD projects or not 
essential to CDD/CDR projects.
54
 Similarly, CDD/CDR is justified in situations of local 
institutional failure resulting either from omission, particularly in post-conflict or post-
disaster situations, or from commission, where local institutions are non-functional, because 
of incapacity, corruption, elite capture or lack of accountability.
55
 Lastly, one of the strategies 
through which CDD is said to be effective is by addressing the information problems between 
planners and beneficiaries, and by making resources available to the poor so that projects are 
well planned and executed in a way that takes into account cost-effectiveness and time.
56
 In 
short, participation can lead to transformation if a space is created for the poor to negotiate 
power relations and local politics within development and reconstruction, and if they can be 
effectively involved in both decision making and project execution. 
2.8. Benefits of participation 
There are two main typologies of benefits from participation and its approaches. The first 
highlights the ineffectiveness of externally driven and expert-oriented approaches to 
development, which would be called a shift from ‘top-down approaches’, known as blueprint 
approaches, to bottom-up approaches. This is said to be associated with a shift from ‘expert’ 
knowledge to people’s knowledge.57 The latter is seen as a response to the failure of the 
former, and there is evidence that it has contributed to poverty alleviation and mitigation of 
exclusion where some strict conditions have been met by permitting local communities to 
influence decision-making processes.
58
 Additionally, participatory interventions offer a space 
for promoting governance through mechanisms of transparency and answerability.
59
 It is said 
that one way to deal with power and politics in development and reconstruction projects is to 
engage with a strictly political project; where this has not taken place, one should be more 
cautious in claiming transformative effects for these approaches.
60
 Finally, participatory 
approaches offer the possibility of building close personal relationships between an agency’s 
staff and targeted communities in such a way that mechanisms for negotiating power 
relations may be found. Nonetheless, these approaches are less often recommended because 
they can have real operational limitations and may be culturally inappropriate.
61
 
The second typology of benefits from participatory approaches, particularly those said to 
be community-driven, consists of promoting equity and inclusiveness through their ability to 
tackle issues of inequality/inequity, exclusion and poverty through a process of 
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empowerment. In addition, they can promote efficiency by assigning control of planning and 
resources allocated to the project directly to the intended beneficiaries. Likewise, they can 
promote governance through devolution of decision-making and resources directly to given 
communities in such a way that local institutions become more accountable and responsive. 
One common example is decentralisation reform, where this exercise takes place between 
leaders of local communities and their populations.
62
 It is believed that this can lead to a 
citizenry who are capable of undertaking self-initiated development activity.
63
 
2.9. Risks and critiques of participation 
There are several criticisms and dangers related to participation and its methods, some of 
which are interwoven, and related to ‘power and politics’. In fact, what one would call the 
main critique of the approach is undoubtedly ‘power and politics’, which has been discussed 
in diverse ways in the literature. Participation affects social (power) relations in 
communities.
64
 Some authors have suggested focusing on developing the ‘political 
capabilities of the poor’ because local structures can limit and, at the same time, improve the 
prospects of participatory development.
65
 Others have noted that power relations are often 
less visible because they are rooted in social and cultural practices, and that those who 
believe in participatory development have been naive about the complexities of relations of 
power.
66
 Some authors have mentioned that the more participatory a project is, the more it 
will mask the power structures of local communities, and that the term ‘community’ may 
conceal power relations.
67
 Lastly, others have stated that elite capture is a serious problem for 
participatory development, although some authors have insisted that not all elites capture a 
project and that a distinction should be made between ‘elite capture’ and ‘elite control’.68 
However, power relations are not only found among those who lead a community and 
community members, but also exist between facilitators of development and potential 
beneficiaries. This is because decision making is said to be dominated by those who facilitate 
the process to the extent that it will reflect the interests of already-existing powerful people.
69
 
Similarly there may be cases of ‘supply-driven demand-driven’ development, which are 
considered rare, whereas projects selected by communities may reflect donor agencies’ 
predetermined priority sectors.
70
 
In addition to power relations, another set of criticisms focuses on the differences in 
definitions, objectives, application, and the rightness of techniques and methods used. Critics 
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have also noted the limitations of participation in terms of theory, politics and concepts. 
Likewise, it has been shown that in the name of decentralisation, participation can conceal 
continued centralisation of development policy and planning. Finally, it has been 
demonstrated that, as knowledge is a highly normative construction, associated with social 
norms, ritual and practices, it is influenced by power relations that exist in a given area.
71
 
Another set of critiques points out how ‘participation’ and its methods may lead to the 
tyranny of decision making and control, to tyranny of the group and tyranny of methods, and 
that individuals’ thoughts are influenced by collective decisions that are more uncertain than 
those they would have chosen individually.
72
 In the same vein, because of the aforementioned 
criticism, some authors are sceptical whether to compare participatory development to the so-
called bottom-up approach, seen as an alternative to top-down approach.
73
 Participatory 
development is subject to higher costs in the preparation of sub-projects, because these are 
not identified at the beginning of the process. At the same time, the idea of participation may 
be used to legitimise donors who need to incorporate such processes in their projects.
74
 
Finally, there is a concern about governance or participatory structures created within an 
intervention because they do not only run parallel to, but also compete with existing local 
structures, and the former are less sustainable than the latter.
75
 
The final set of criticisms pays attention to the idealised transformatory capacity of 
participation, which casts doubt on the idea that exposure to participation can contribute to 
social transformation, because ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ can be quite costly in some conditions.76 
Here, two reasons come together. One is that participatory systems are only occasionally an 
answer to demands from local people; rather, they are promoted in response to Western 
values imported by donors. Another reason, not the least, is that learning and practising new 
values forces local communities to overcome local opposition or social obstacles, which may 
prove difficult to change.
77
 Those who traditionally hold power may resist its redistribution, 
thereby hampering attempts at collaboration, while those who have gained new skills need to 
operate inside people’s agency.78 Similarly, committee members may be part of patrimonial 
elites, repackaged for agency purposes.
79
 Indeed, this shortcoming relates to a clash between 
new social norms based on transparency and accountability, as well as existing social 
norms that reflect how rural society in developing countries is more traditional and 
hierarchical. 
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2.10. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that participatory development and reconstruction has become one of the 
popular approaches to development and reconstruction in the past decade, despite numerous 
criticisms of it. Participatory development and reconstruction has both benefits and 
challenges. One of the alleged benefits is its transformative role as both a tool for 
development purposes and en end through intense community participation and 
empowerment of target recipients. In the form of the latter, participatory development and 
reconstruction is justified in situations of either local institutional failure such as in post-
conflict or post-disaster or non-functional local institutional because of corruption and lack of 
accountability. Other benefits range from being an answer to the failure of the blue-print 
approach to development, from promoting governance through mechanisms of transparency 
and answerability, from favouring friendships between aid workers and communities, to 
promoting equity, inclusiveness and efficiency. 
The challenges; however, range from power relations and politics between community 
elites and non-elites and between aid workers and local people, from tyranny of decision 
making, from diversity in definitions, to high costs in the preparation of micro-projects, to 
competition with existing structures. There is also doubt whether exposure to participation 
can lead to social transformation given the fact that acquiring new values may prove difficult 
to overcome social obstacles and that elected body can be part of patrimonial elite wrap up 
for agency objectives. 
On its alleged benefits of possible social transformation by improving the ability of 
marginalised people to bargain relations of power within political systems, questions that 
need further investigation emerge. These questions are how they do this and to what extent 
are they able to reduce the imbalance between them and their leaders. There is a need to 
better grasp what composes the social structure, particularly of rural societies, where 
participatory approaches take place, and to understand how social relations evolve in aiding 
target setting when an intervention takes place. Among possible ways forward, the need for 
more consideration of how participation can transform the power relations that lead to 
marginalisation and subordination has been mentioned.
80
 Similarly, the urgent need for an 
anthropology of development, that is, of development in its entire process, including 
discourses, institutions and practices, has been emphasised.
81
 It has been insisted that the 
costs and complexity of participatory approaches should be recognised, and that it is 
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necessary to find effective ways of balancing bottom-up control with top-down authority.
82
 
Finally, sharing new experiences, both positive and negative, of how participation and its 
methods can increase social accountability so that it results in more equitable and responsive 
norms in existing hierarchical societies is another urgent need. 
Other ways forward require research on how participatory development and reconstruction 
can be made sustainable by developing local ownership; how newly created participatory 
structures can be connected to existing government structures; and how all stakeholders, both 
local government officials and existing elites such as church leaders, can be involved in a 
development and reconstruction project. Finally, there needs to be more research on how to 
regularly harmonise views among state and non-state actors operating in the same area in a 
way to place potential beneficiaries at the centre of the intervention. This should, as a result, 
to some extent promote local governance, empowerment and poverty alleviation. 
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Photo 2.1: VDC general assembly for village project approval in Kanyimba village, Budaha, Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 2.2: VDC meeting on replacing one of the VDC members, by election, in Birhala, Burhinyi
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ABSTRACT 
Community-driven reconstruction has become a new paradigm in post-conflict 
development. Programmes in community-driven reconstruction (CDR) typically 
combine infrastructure restoration with introducing accountability and good 
governance at the local level. Recent evaluations show that governance objectives 
are not easily met and significant change cannot be demonstrated. This paper adds to 
this argument on the basis of ethnographic research on a Community-Driven 
Reconstruction Programme in eastern DRC. It seeks to find explanations for the lack 
of demonstrable governance impact in the content and implementation of training. It 
identifies room for improvement by better adjusting capacity building to locally 
prevailing accountability mechanisms and by coordinating capacity building with 
other development programmes in the same area. 
Key words: community-driven reconstruction, capacity building, post-conflict, governance 
programme, Democratic Republic of Congo (The).  
3.1. Introduction 
Post-conflict reconstruction programmes increasingly claim to be community-driven. 
Community-driven reconstruction programmes (CDR) typically combine objectives related to 
the restoration of infrastructure with good governance objectives. Capacity-building is a 
crucial element in CDR: at the same time as it wants to build capacities for the 
implementation of small-scale reconstruction projects, programmes want to build capacities 
for governance by teaching people the values and practices of transparency, accountability, 
representativeness, and inclusion. Community-driven reconstruction appears a powerful 
answer to conflict affected area challenges as it promises to deliver rapid and cost-effective 
reconstruction aid on the ground and build a governance structure that stresses local choice 
and accountability (Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:2). It seeks to effectively involve local 
people in decision-making, which is believed to help communities to make the transition 
from conflict to peaceful development (McBride and Patel 2007:6). Similarly, CDR is 
expected to promote reconciliation and create community cohesion (Fearon, Humphreys et al. 
2009:287). It comes as an answer to earlier criticisms of top-down, blueprint-driven 
approaches, that fail to meet needs on the ground and miss, or even undermine, local 
capacities (Cramer, 2006; Barakat and Zyck, 2009; Hilhorst et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa, 
2013).  
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Although community-driven reconstruction represents a fast growing trend in the last 
decade, the effectiveness of the approach has been questioned (Mansuri and Rao 2003:31; 
Richards, Bah et al. 2004). Recent evaluation of a major community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR)in Eastern DRC, for example, have shown that although the implementation of 
reconstruction projects was largely successful, this was not matched with significant impact 
of the programme on people’s socio-political attitudes and behaviour (Humphreys et al., 
2012). While this evaluation was robust in its findings, it was not able to provide 
explanations for the weak impact of the programme. This paper adds to this argument, 
building on an ethnographic study into the everyday practices of community-driven 
reconstruction. For two years, the research followed the implementation of the programme in 
selected villages of Eastern DRC and monitored the working of the community-driven 
reconstruction programme through participant observations and interviews with staff, 
participants and stakeholders. We concur with the findings of Humphreys et al that the major 
impact of the programme was in the realisation of projects, rather than in affecting local 
governance (Kyamusugulwa, forthcoming). While there are several contributory factors to 
this, including the working of power relations on the ground and the mismatch between the 
project initiatives and the locally prevailing norms and existing accountability mechanisms, 
this paper singles out the capacity building component of the community-driven 
reconstruction programme, and more in particular the training process. We found it to 
discourage rather than encourage the desired governance changes. 
The programme under study was implemented by the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC) and funded by the Stichting Vluchteling based in the Netherlands. The aim was to 
provide community-driven reconstruction to 83,007 people in eastern DRC. To realise its 
capacity building objectives, the programme relied mainly on training village committees, 
which was a central vehicle in the programme to enhance local capacity and governance. To 
unravel the capacity building process, this paper examines the entire chain of capacity 
building: the content of the educational messages, the way staff understands and provides the 
training, the interface between aid workers and participants, and the perceptions of 
participants and community residents on the training. In the programme examined, training 
was a key strategy, that distinguished it from programmes that happened at the same time in 
the region and were concentrated on restoring infrastructure without additional objectives 
relating to governance. 
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We will argue that the content of the training for capacity building was not consistent and 
had little relation with people’s life worlds. Training was to some extent effective, as far as 
the immediate trainees were concerned, yet had little impact beyond them.. We will also 
show that there were few incentives for staff to take the capacity building seriously, 
compared to the pressure to implement projects. We highlight some of the implications of the 
programme’s choice not to ‘work with what is there’ in terms of local institutions and forms 
of accountability but instead to create separate institutions and adopt de-contextualised rules. 
We see room for improvement in the capacity building process, particularly by better 
adjusting capacity building to locally prevailing accountability mechanisms and we argue for 
a more coordinated approach to capacity building with other development agencies.  
The first part of the article describes the International Rescue Committee (IRC) CDR 
programme, the conceptual framework that guides the programme, the capacity building and 
good governance components, and the research methodology. The second part presents the 
findings, and the final part analyses and concludes the article. 
3.1.1. The community-driven reconstruction programme of the International Rescue 
Committee 
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) gave one of its community-driven reconstruction 
programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the name Tushiriki, which in the 
local language (Kiswahili) means “let us become involved together”. The IRC is an 
international agency based in New York that has been active in eastern DRC since 1996. The 
Tushiriki is a US$ 2-million-worth programme funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, through the Netherlands Foundation for Refugees known as Stichting Vluchteling 
(SV), which is based in The Hague. The programme aims are: (i) poverty alleviation through 
the improvement of socioeconomic conditions, (ii) the development of governance and civil 
society by increasing the understanding of principles and practices of good governance, and 
(iii) increased advocacy efforts on behalf of communities and towards policy makers (SV and 
IRC, 2007:6). The Tushiriki programme strongly resembles another CDR programme also 
implemented by IRC, the Tuungane programme, which was subject to the rigorous evaluation 
by Humphreys at el (2012), referred to above (Humphreys et al., 2012:8). The two 
programmes were highly similar in design, the main difference being that Tushiriki provides 
scope for civil society partners to co-implement the programme with IRC.  
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The IRC-Tushiriki programme was implemented from 2008 through 2010 in the South 
Kivu province in eastern DRC. Specifically, it was executed in the Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and 
Kaziba chiefdoms, which in 2008 had a total population of 141,900, of which 83,007 were 
targeted by the programme (and covered in this research). In order to implement the 
programme, the IRC formed so-called ‘villages’. These one-size ‘villages’ were artificially 
designated as units of intervention for the project and did not correspond with any real 
administrative governance unit. The villages comprised population groups within a given 
territory, to amount to around 1,200 people, for example some hamlets or a neighbourhood in 
a community. Five such ‘villages’ were then grouped together in Tushiriki community. Each 
Tushiriki ‘village’ received an amount of $US 3,000, whereas each community received an 
amount varying from $US 15,000 to $US 70,000 for reconstruction projects (IRC and CARE, 
2009). 
The central idea of the community-driven approach is to put people at the heart of the 
decision making and implementation of reconstruction in order that it suits their priority 
needs, while it also allows for enhancing governance practices (McBride and Patel, 2007). 
This double objective was clearly reflected in the Tushiriki programme. In each of the 34 
target villages of the IRC programme, a committee was set up to run a selected project, with 
programme field staff providing technical assistance. The committees were part of the CDR 
governance structure, which included, at the top, a Regional Development Committee, such 
as the Kaziba Development Committee (KDC), as the intermediate echelon, the Community 
Development Committee (CDC), which comprises four to five Village Development 
Committees (VDCs).  
The programme stipulated that, village-level committees consisted of ten elected members 
who had the responsibility to meet frequently with residents. The committee members (five 
women and five men) occupied the positions of president, treasurer, secretary, mobilizer, and 
inclusion officer, respectively. In each target village, projects were selected in public 
meetings that required the presence of 40% of the adult population. The village level projects 
usually selected were: a classroom, a water system, or a road (re)construction. At the 
community level, the usual projects were a school, a community building for meetings, or a 
bridge or/and a road (re)construction., One of the main strategies of the programme was 
capacity building for the members of the village-level committees. The committee members 
were regularly trained on either the IRC-Tushiriki programme (including its protocols) or the 
project finance management of the programme (including practices of governance). At the 
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same time, management and technical assistance in the form of informal trainings by the 
programme field staff followed the formal trainings.  
The village committee was also responsible for project implementation in that it was in 
charge of recruiting local technicians for (re)constructing infrastructure. It was to mobilise 
residents to contribute to the reconstruction effort, for instance, by carrying sand, stones, and 
bricks. The committee was accountable both to the programme staff as well as to residents. It 
is remarkable that the committees that were formed did not incorporate the ruling elite. 
Generally speaking, the committees were composed of a sub-strata of elites, namely those 
that had studied, and held for example a position as teacher. 
Next to the village committee, a team composed of a woman and a man, known as Requa 
(Relais qualité), served as a liaison between the committee members and the population and 
acted as a watchdog of the project implementation by the committee. At the same time, 
agencies other than the IRC-Tushiriki (such as Catholic Relief Services, Malteser 
International, UNICEF/AVSI, etc.) have executed reconstruction projects in the same area, 
using different methodologies that do not emphasise the governance aspect. The coordination 
of the Tushiriki programme was based in Bukavu. For the community development section , 
one territory supervisor was assisted by two development officers, six development agents, 
and two technicians. In addition, a programme manager assisted by three technical advisors 
administered the civil society section. 
3.1.2. Capacity building  
Capacity building of local beneficiaries was a central strategy in the Tushiriki programme, as 
in many community-driven reconstruction programmes. For the sake of the argument in this 
paper, it is important to briefly discuss capacity building and the related concept of capacity 
development. In its essence, capacity building is forward-looking: rather than alleviating 
immediate needs, it aims to enhance problem-solving capacities for the future. Capacity 
building typically involves several types of interventions: management consultation, training, 
and/or technical assistance (De Vita and Fleming 2001:39). The popularity of capacity 
building in development programmes has also engendered criticism. It has been argued that 
capacity building is often no more than a buzzword without substantial content, a serious-
sounding alternative to “training” (Eade 2007). It has also been suggested that capacity 
building involves the (largely unacknowledged) exercise of power , where the knowledge and 
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experience of the facilitator (often an outsider) dominates the trainees, whose capacities need 
to be improved (Girgis 2007:354).  
Capacity development, is a more encompassing concept than capacity-building and refers 
to abilities that are developed by individuals, organisations, institutions and societies, both 
individually and collectively, for functions performance, problems solving and objectives 
setting and achievement. This entails that not only individuals develop skills (which is the 
main focus of capacity-building), but that the conditions and the enabling environment for 
using these skills productively are met (Godfrey et al 2002:356). Along these lines, capacity 
development would be a result of capacity building, whereby communities would transfer the 
acquired governance principles beyond the project, but into their life worlds. In the Tushiriki 
case, capacity development aimed primarily to develop the abilities of committee members to 
practice good governance, and through them, the abilities of the population at large for 
practising good governance. As we will argue below, the link between the training of 
individuals and the ambition of enhancing the problem-solving capacities of local societies, 
was not adequately considered.  
3.1.3. Good governance in CDR 
Since a 1989 World Bank report framed Africa’s development problems as a crisis of 
governance, the notion of “good governance” has been widely adopted (Mkandawire 
2007:679). In the field of post-conflict reconstruction and development, the idea of good 
governance has been firmly embraced both as an answer to the governance failures that were 
seen to underlie these conflicts and as a promising avenue for the recovery of society. 
Community-driven reconstruction programmes in Asia as well as in Africa often include 
good governance at the grassroots level as an explicit goal, with an emphasis on two main 
principles: transparency and accountability. Accountability is the obligation of those in power 
to provide information and explain what they are doing. It also implies enforcement, that is, 
the capacity of a constituency to impose sanctions on power holders who violate their public 
duties (Ackerman 2004). Transparency relates to the financial management of projects and is 
the key measure to prevent the capture of funds by individuals. Both of these measures are 
seen to limit the risk of elite capture and the deviation of funds away from locally felt needs. 
Other frequently mentioned characteristics of good governance in post conflict reconstruction 
programmes are citizen engagement, equality, social inclusion (gender, ethnicity, age, 
religion, etc.), ethical and honest behaviour, equity (fair procedures and due process), 
partnership, sustainability, and the rule of law. As Table 3.1 shows, in the Tushiriki 
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programme, as we will elaborate below, the core of good governance consisted of 4 to 6 key 
values, which were reflected to variable extents in the different training modules . 
In the context of post-conflict reconstruction programmes, “good governance” is generally 
conceptualised as something that is not already part of local social organisation, in part 
because traditional, pre-war forms of governance are understood as exclusionary or despotic. 
Also in part because the years of violence are seen to have eroded whatever functional 
governance may have been in place. “Good governance” is then introduced as an effort to 
correct these earlier wrongs and support societies in developing effective governance for the 
future, in ways they would not have been able to devise themselves. Though there is 
increasing criticism of treating post-conflict societies as a blank slate and insistence that it is 
more effective to work ‘with what is there’ (Cramer, 2006; Barakat and Zyck, 2009; Hilhorst 
et al., 2010), in practice many community-driven reconstruction programmes opt for 
introducing new institutions (such as the village level and community level committees) and 
new rules of the game (related to project selection, implementation and financial 
management). As the programme coordinator of the Tushiriki programme explained, she 
viewed the capacity development of the communities through the programme as a necessity 
to come to the right project decisions for reconstruction (a sophisticated needs analysis), and 
an opportunity for the individuals involved “to experience democratic accountability, at least 
once in their lives”.1 In the Tuskiriki programme, the creation of the committees was an 
attempt to avoid capture by traditional elites. As we will argue below, this implied creating a 
space for a sub-strata of elites, namely those that had studied and held for example a position 
as teacher. It also implied that the sustainable impact of the capacity building efforts was 
limited. 
3.1.4. Research methodology 
The research that this paper builds on consisted of an aidnography, i.e. an ethnographic 
inquiry into development relations. Stichting Vluchteling wanted to have the programme 
qualitatively monitored and facilitated this independent research project. From 2008 to 2010 
Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa was thus embedded in the programme as participant 
observer. The paper looks at capacity building in 34 Village Development Committees that 
were part of 8 Community Development Committees (4 in Burhinyi and 4 in Luhwindja). To 
analyse the content of the training and capacity building of the Tushiriki programme, we did 
a desk review of 16 training and workshop modules (see Table 3.1), which were conducted 
either by the programme’s community development team or by its civil society team (see 
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Table 3.2). In the desk review, we looked at the consistency of governance principles across 
training modules. In addition, PM Kyamusugulwa conducted extensive fieldwork during 
which he observed the processes of training sessions, workshops, and sensitisation sessions 
carried out in the course of the programme implementation, as well as participated in the 
everyday life in the area.  
Table 3.1: Modules of trainings and local good governance principles in Tushiriki programme 
 
VDC: Village Development Committee; CDC: Community Development Committee; Requa (Relais qualité): a body composed of a man and 
a woman who serve as liaison between a committee and village residents  
Table 3.2: Overview of training, workshop and sensitization sessions in Burhinyi, Luhwindja & 
Kaziba, 2008 to 2010 
 
Through participant observation and semi-structured interviews, we studied how the 
content of training modules was used by the committee members, and how they and the local 
population more in general, developed an understanding and practice of governance 
principles within and outside the Tushiriki programme. We observed 11 training sessions, 
which represented 40% of the total number of training events held in the area during the 
fieldwork period. In addition to participant observation, we did 113 individual and group 
interviews that were directly related to the capacity-building activities of the programme. 
Modules of training N=11 Labelling 'local governance' N=16 Classifying principles of good governance/meaning 
attributed to them
N=16
n(%) n(%) n(%)
For committee 
members (VDC, CDC) 6 (54.5)
Democratic governance, 
good governance 6 (37.5)
Classifications that emphasise six principles 
mentioned in the facilitator's guide (original 
document of the training)
1(6.3)
Facilitator's guide to 
the training 
workshop/introduction 
to Tushiriki
2 (18.2)
Principles guide to manage 
community funds/principles 
to follow/major principles
8(50.0)
Classifications that include transparency and 
accountability as principles of good governance
13 (81.3)
Others (for Requa, 
electoral team and 
advisory board) 
3(27.3)
Other (no specific label)
2 (12.5)
Inconsistency in classifications that emphasise four 
major principles of good governance (transparency, 
accountability, representativeness and inclusion
12(75.0)
Trainer N=11 Lieu N=11 Year N=11 Theme N=11 Duration N=11 Target group N=11
n(%) n(%) n(%) n(%) in days n(%) n(%)
Development, 
officers & 
agents
6(54.5) Burhinyi 7 (63.7) 2008 1(9.0)
Committee 
initial, finance 
trainings & 
planning
6(54.5) 3 1(9.0)
Committee 
members         
/students
7(63.6)
Civil society 
staff and/or 
partner
3(27.3) Luhwindja 3(27.3) 2009 9(82.0)
Good 
governance, 
advocacy and 
related topics
3(27.3) 2 5(45.5)
field staff
2 (18.2)
Trainer of 
trainers
2(18.2) Kaziba 1(9.0) 2010 1(9.0)
IRC-Tushiriki 
protocols
2(18.2) 1 5(45.5)
local 
authorities
2 (18.2)
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These 113 interviews were held with the programme senior and field staff, committee 
members, residents, and representatives of NGOs that operated in the area during the same 
period of time. 
This methodology allowed us to analyse the entire capacity-building chain, starting with 
the ways in which the capacity-building content was defined by the programme, how it was 
implemented in practice, and finally, how the participants from the communities viewed the 
capacity-building activities and what the main outputs and outcomes of the intervention were 
in terms of knowledge and governance practices.  
3.2. Findings  
3.2.1. Content of training, workshop, and sensitisation sessions 
Within the Tushiriki programme, training was a key strategy to achieve capacity building and 
‘good governance’ objectives. Our discussion of the capacity building process starts with a 
content analysis of the manuals that were used to train staff and committee members about 
the meaning and importance of good governance in local development (Cfr. Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Interface between aid workers and participants in trainings and workshops 
 
Governance and related practices as stated by aid 
workers
How they are viewed by 
participants
How they should be explained
If a  selected project i s  not approved by the 
majori ty of res idents , IRC-Tushiriki  wi l l  not fund i t. 
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) You are learning how to exercise democratica l ly your ci tizen rights ; (i i ) a  
selected project should reflect the need of the majori ty in order to prevent confl ict 
in the future; (i i i ) i t i s  about representativeness  and inclus ion as  governance 
principles ; (iv) i t i s  a lso about transparency and accountabi l i ty in a  publ ic meeting. 
If a  committee does  not justi fy the fi rs t amount of 
money received, the next tranche of money wi l l  
not disbursed.
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) this  i s  accountabi l i ty about money; (i i ) res idents  are learning how to better 
manage money in the programme and beyond i t, (i i i ) those who mismanaged 
funding should be punished.
If a  participant i s  absent the day of tra ining, (s )he 
should not receive $US 4 for food at lunch time.
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) i t i s  transparency on the s ide of programme regulations ; tra inees  are learning 
how to s trictly fol low regulations  (e.g s tate & other regulations); (i i ) i t i s  a lso about 
respect for rules  that i s  a  governance principle.
Every committee member should know what 
everyone is  doing in i t. 
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) could be i l lustrated as  an example of transparency and horizontal  
accountabi l i ty where information about project ci rculates  and answers  to 
questions  are given in a  committee; they learn this  practice beyond the IRC-
Tushiriki  programme as  wel l .
Every expense should fol low VDC budget l ines , 
otherwise money should be reimbursed before 
project funding continues .
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) i l lustration of enforcement when applying accountabi l i ty (i .e sanction for those 
who stole money for community project); (i i ) tra inees  learn this  va lue ins ide and 
beyond the programme; they learn how to combat corruption and mishandl ing of 
publ ic resources . 
Money of white wo(man) i s  to report for As  a  rule in the programme (i ) res idents  should be accountable about any funding, both ins ide and outs ide 
a id interventions ; (i i ) i t i s  one of the practices  tra inees  are learning in the 
programme. 
Committee needs  to hold a  genera l  assembly 
report before the next disbursement of money.
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) this  i s  transparency and accountabi l i ty about project management; (i i ) to make 
sure that everybody (including res idents) has  the same understanding that money 
received is  better managed; (i i i ) tra inees  (including res idents) are learning this  
va lue ins ide and beyond the intervention.  
Tel l ing that every target vi l lage receives  a  grant of 
$3,000  in IRC-Tushiriki  programme for reason of 
transparency and that other agencies  should do 
the same.
As  a  rule in the programme (i ) people are learning more transparency on the s ide of implementing agencies ; 
(i i ) res idents  can require this  information to other agencies  but the result depends  
on power relation between these agencies  and res idents ; res idents  are learning 
transparency about money ins ide and beyond a id interventions .
Attention to be paid to those who can hinder a  
reconstruction project such as  thieves , 
demobi l i zed soldiers  and pol i ticians .
This  class i fication is  seen as  
proper to the programme
(i ) Those who can hinder a  reconstruction project whi le applying governance 
principles  are exis ting power holders  such as  chiefs , church leaders  and other 
loca l  el i te who are used to accountabi l i ty other than the publ ic one; (i i ) they need 
to be identi fied and committee members  should know how to deal  with them; (i i i ) 
they can use pos i tively or negatively their power; (iv) they are not necessari ly 
outs iders  of a  community.
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The training, workshop, and sensitisation sessions contain three closely related themes: 
one, local good governance principles, two, their application in finance management, and 
three, complementary themes related to project execution. The major principles of local good 
governance as defined in the programme were transparency, accountability, 
representativeness, and inclusion, next to other principles, such as participation, honesty, 
respect for rules, punctuality, regularity, flexibility, collaboration, integrity, respect, and 
being mindful of rights, were defined in a variety of training modules. These principles were 
translated into rules to be followed strictly in project finance management and in the cycle of 
reconstruction projects (see Table 3.3). Finally, the modules also paid attention to a range of 
complementary themes related to general aspects of decentralisation, good governance 
principles, participatory planning and sustainability of projects, expropriation for public 
utility, mechanisms for conflict prevention, judiciary organisation and competency, etc. 
A first observation from the modules is that a multiplicity of terms is used. The number of 
principles of local good governance varied across the modules from four to five, even to six. 
When the training module mentioned four principles, these were often transparency, 
accountability, inclusion and representativeness, whereas some others replaced 
representativeness by honesty. Where a fifth principle was added, it was either participation 
or respect for rules.  
A second observation is that the modules showed variations in the meanings attributed to 
some of these principles, there was some confusion in terminology. For instance, in the 
training module about financial management for village development committee (VDC) 
members, “transparency” was described as “information provision for both other committee 
members and community members about project progress, including financial aspects, when 
necessary.” Elsewhere, the term was also defined as “the need to keep all receipts in order to 
explain to any community member who requests it about the project.” The modules describe 
the principles yet do not give advice on how the beneficiary population should get access to 
information related to the project.  
The most striking observation was that the modules made no attempt to link the principles 
of good governance to existing practices of accountability within and between citizens and 
elite in Eastern DRC. It is as if the modules assume there is no local accountability to begin 
with. As a result, the modules make no connection to existing norms and practices of 
accountability (Kyamusugulwa et al., forthcoming) and are disconnected from local people’s 
CHAPTER 3: Capacity building for governance 
76 
 
life worlds. This is a missed opportunity to enhance accountability practices and limits the 
sustainability of the interventions. 
The inconsistencies throughout the modules can be explained in relation to the way they 
were produced. Most of the modules were written by local staff on the basis of a number of 
key modules in English written by the management of the programme. Hence, they reflected 
more strongly the general policy discourse on good governance than local realities on the 
ground. The production of the modules was supervised by the management of the 
organisation, but consistency was hampered by the fact that not all of the expatriate staff were 
fluent in written French and that there was a high turnover in the international staff 
responsible for these processes.  
3.2.2. Training of trainers 
The training of the village trainers was done by the senior Tushiriki staff member, who was 
the Deputy Manager in charge of training in four areas. He holds a degree in applied 
pedagogy and has been familiar with community-based work for two years before working 
with the IRC. The training usually lasted one or two days and was held for seven field staff at 
a time. It was meant for newly recruited staff and, occasionally, for existing staff, for whom 
the protocols were substantially changed. Most of the field staff hold a college degree in rural 
development from the Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural in Bukavu. 
The training consisted of different components, starting with the methodological aspects 
of facilitation, Second, attention was given to the content of the training so that the 
facilitators could understand the choices and preferences of the programme. Third, attention 
was given to the protocols of the programme. For instance, it was stipulated that field staff 
should visit possible projects before the day of project selection and seek advice from the 
development technician about the technical and financial feasibility of the proposed project. 
Finally, the training paid attention to ways of dealing with the power dynamics of project 
interventions. For example, the trainees were advised to approach authorities indirectly in 
cases wherein they were antagonistic to the project. This could be done, for example, by first 
talking to the wife of the Mwami (king) rather than directly to the Mwami. The training partly 
relied on role plays, with the participants acting as community development committee 
(CDC) members.  
The training programme was intensive and difficult to absorb in one or two days. Training 
was not meant to be a stand-alone event. The Territory Supervisor of the programme, in 
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charge of field staff management, ensured that the training messages were often repeated 
during meetings where the fieldwork was reported. In all of these meetings, discussions about 
community development protocols were repeated. The field staff showed during interviews 
that they had indeed internalised the content of the training. Although the training was 
effective in many places, there were also instances, for example in Burhinyi where the timing 
of the training was delayed until after villages have selected projects. There was also a 
marked difference in the quality of the trainings held in the villages depending on the 
experience of the trainers. 
3.2.3. Training of the committees 
Training and workshop sessions were held with village and community committees and 
lasted from one to three days. They were usually facilitated by two field staff, one as the main 
trainer and the other in charge of the logistics. The training brought together committee 
members, men and women in equal numbers, from two or three villages of the same area. 
Participants travelled back home everyday, which shortened the training days because the 
distance to the training centre was sometimes considerable. The sessions would start with a 
prayer introduced by one of the participants, preferably a pastor. After this, the codes of 
conduct for the session were discussed and set. During the training days, the participants 
would sing a song that rehearsed the three objectives of the community development 
component (good governance, socioeconomic recovery and social cohesion). The main 
teaching aids were flip charts. There were also printed modules, but these were usually not 
enough in number for the participants, and only few could take the modules home after the 
training. The written texts were in French-Kiswahili, whereas the discussions were held in 
Kiswahili or Mashi. We observed that participation of committee members during these 
trainings was limited to asking questions and it was remarkable that most questions were 
about the practical aspects of the reconstruction projects. No attempts were made to relate the 
training to the lived-in world of the participants. 
There were specific trainings devoted to financial management: committee members had 
to learn the procedures for the management of project funds. This included, for instance, the 
strict observation of budgets, the identification of the person responsible for all monetary 
transactions, and the identification of the person responsible for reporting on all transactions 
and for keeping receipts and documents. Committee members were taught how to keep the 
books and report the finances back to the Tushiriki programme. Emphasis was placed on 
getting receipts for every expense. The participants learned that if one committee member or 
CHAPTER 3: Capacity building for governance 
78 
 
a group of members stole project funds, (s)he or they would be asked to reimburse the funds 
before the project could continue. At the community level, the training was more elaborate 
and included, for example, how to use a bank. Another important point in the training related 
to the purchase of materials for construction, how to ensure the reliability of suppliers, and 
how to manage stocks. There were strict rules to follow; for instance, committee members 
were forbidden to buy materials from their relatives. Finally, attention was given to the 
principles and practice of local contribution, which was supposed to be worth 10% of the 
budget, in the form of labour, money, or means of transportation. 
We observed that there was an emphasis on knowledge transfer regarding project 
management at the expense of discussions about good governance. The training sessions paid 
attention to the principles of the Tushiriki programme but insufficient attention was given to 
how people could apply them in their everyday life or outside the Tushiriki intervention. As a 
result, these principles were seen by the trainees as specific rules of the programme rather 
than values that could order their everyday interactions. This was reinforced by the fact that 
people were discouraged from mobilising resources through their kinship-based networks, 
which from the perspective of transparency, were suspect.  
The lack of concrete examples and discussion beyond the knowledge transfer was partly 
related to the mismanagement of time and, in some cases, a lack of understanding of the main 
concepts discussed on the side of the facilitator. Some sessions were highly dominated by 
lectures, followed by questions and answers, rather than by group discussions among 
participants. Although the participants were allowed to speak during the workshop, they were 
not very much encouraged to do so. 
In addition, it was often observed that training tended to steer away from sensitive issues. 
For instance, during a training session in Luduha about people who could potentially harm 
the project by exercising their power negatively, the facilitator did not give space for the 
participants to identify such people in their own local context. He referred to power holders, 
such as thieves, demobilised rebels, and politicians, who were not represented among the 
participants and in their villages, steering the discussion away from chiefs, church leaders, 
and educated people, who could actually hinder the project implementation. Some of these 
categories of actors were present in the training session, and the facilitator choose not to 
address or confront them directly, a point to which we will return later. 
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3.2.4. Management and technical assistance  
Beyond training, capacity building took shape in accompaniment and monitoring of project 
management. The field staff were all trained to assist committee members in the reporting, 
planning, and budgeting of reconstruction projects. An important aspect of the staff visits to 
field sites was the checking of procedures and books to correct any errors so that committee 
members ‘learned by doing’. Assistance took the form of talks or supervision two or three 
times a week. 
Tushiriki field staff also facilitated the identification of needs during meetings with the 
population and the drafting of the Community Development Plan. Although the people 
offered ideas about costs and materials, substantial technical support was provided by the 
field staff. Field staff further also assisted committee members in mobilising people for 
public meetings or in encouraging local contributions through the involvement of local chiefs 
and church leaders.  
The Tushiriki technicians regularly visited infrastructure projects during construction. For 
instance, in June 2009, when PM Kyamusugulwa visited the Mughuru primary school in 
Citudu village in Burhinyi, he met with a Tushiriki field technician monitoring the 
construction. The technician had on an earlier visit told the community to take down one of 
the newly built walls because it did not meet the programme standards. On this visit, he had 
come back to check whether the wall of the classroom had indeed been rebuilt. Local people 
could also report problems with materials or procedures during staff visits. Company 
representatives involved in the reconstruction works told us that they considered the staff and 
the committee members to be in control of the construction. On the other hand, we also found 
cases where it appeared that the contractor hired for the reconstruction project was effectively 
in control of project management. In some cases, when the programme became more 
contractor-driven than community-driven, this resulted in disengagement on the side of CDC 
members. When we look at the everyday reality of project implementation, it appears that the 
attitude of the staff and contractors was geared towards finishing the infrastructure rather than 
facilitating a process of enhancing locally driven project management. The acquired 
knowledge on project management and good governance seemed to move to the background. 
3.2.5. Perceptions on the ground  
Capacity building was experienced differently between the committee members receiving 
training and the local villagers participating in the reconstruction projects. Many committee 
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members were enthusiastic about the training because it enabled them to better manage 
projects. However, they were also motivated by the lunch allowance of $US 4, which they 
perceived as a wage. Although officially committee members did not receive any salary from 
the project, they wanted to be paid for programme activities they were involved in; whereas 
the programme considered them as volunteers they saw themselves as workers hired by the 
programme.  
Although the training activities were restricted to members of the VDCs and CDCs, there 
were some efforts to sensitise the entire community. For instance, messages and reports on 
project progress were posted in the community. However, these could not be read by many 
people and were usually torn down or blown away with the wind within hours after they had 
been put up. Some village level sensitisation sessions were organised, where teaching about 
good governance was announced through a megaphone in a public space. However, their 
effectiveness was very limited. They suffered from lack of resources, took place in less than 
10% of the target area, and they lacked professionalism, remained superficial and were not at 
all practical. These “sensitisation” sessions were useless in the eyes of most villagers and 
most respondents did not remember them. One 30-year-old woman from Kabingu I village 
expressed her discontent with the training by comparing the CDR with a different project in 
the area, implemented by the ICCO/CAB, which did not have additional good governance 
objectives:  
In Cishali, ICCO/CAB built a beautiful primary school in a few months, while IRC took one 
year. They had a lot of meetings without any achievement. CAB did not train people and 
organise meetings. In Tushiriki, only VDCs are trained and they are probably paid. The 
population is not benefiting from those frequent training sessions, how are they useful for us? 
As this quote also reveals, local people were aware of some of the dynamics of the project 
that were undertaken and that were widely communicated in the name of transparency, 
especially the fact that there was $US3,000 available for it. Because people were not well 
informed on the overall set-up, this bit of knowledge led to much dissatisfaction and many 
rumours. In a considerable number of target villages, it was difficult to mobilise people to 
provide labour because they believed that committee members should do the job, because 
they were thought to be paid within the programme. People were mainly interested in the 
projects and were not much concerned about the capacity building aspects or governance 
objectives. They valued the IRC for the reconstruction of the infrastructure rather than for 
local governance. Part of the explanation for this is that both the trainer of trainers and the 
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trainers of committee members placed more emphasis on the former than on the latter, and 
that village-level sensitization hardly took shape. Moreover, it appears that the governance 
objective was directed to a ‘need-without-demand’. Not having experienced this type of 
governance before, people had no expectations relating to the governance objectives of the 
programme.  
3.3. Analysis  
This final part of the paper analyses the governance effects of the capacity building 
component of the CDR programme examined and identifies a number of factors that 
contributed to the limited governance impact. 
3.3.1. Committee members as local governance actors 
In the course of fieldwork, it became clear that there was a varying level of uptake of the 
training. Village Development Committees usually consisted of a mix of educated people, 
like teacher or church workers, and illiterate people. We found that illiterate participants, 
often women, had difficulty with the training and did not recollect much of the content. 
Among the educated committee members, we generally found that the awareness of good 
governance principles resonated in the implementation of the projects. There were, for 
example, some cases where the mishandling of money resulted in accountability procedures, 
and the money had to be restored. However, such accountability was not enforced by the 
villagers but by the king, other committee members, and some road workers. Rather than a 
tendency towards downward accountability – as the programme had aimed for –, these were 
instances of horizontal and upward accountability. In as much as good governance principles 
were adopted in the community, this did not involve the poorest people. While this 
contributes to a widening gap between the elite and the illiterate residents (Cleaver, 2005), it 
could also be seen as positive for the community as a whole that governance principles 
became part of inter-elite negotiation processes.  
3.3.2. Avoiding governance effects 
Our observations of the everyday practices of the programme lead us to conclude that, if 
anything, governance effects are avoided rather than encouraged by local staff. There are two 
arguments in this regard: one related to the internal project dynamics and the other to the 
internal community dynamics. The effective training of the trainers was hindered by lack of 
consistency in the modules, issues of time management and teaching resources, and the 
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failure of the training programme to provide, in some instances, opportunities for discussion 
and active participation. More importantly, the programme did not provide incentives to staff 
to emphasise good governance. The training of trainers emphasised programme content 
aspects more than governance ones. Also, staff members were much more motivated to 
ensure the proper reconstruction of infrastructure. They were eager to be seen as people who 
brought projects to the area to enhance their status in the communities. And, ultimately, their 
performance was valued against the number and quality of projects they had delivered rather 
than their achievements in the less tangible domain of enhancing governance practices. 
This tendency became clear during the training, and even more during project 
implementation. Staff that were supposed to facilitate the management and technicalities of 
the projects were more often inclined to take control and direct processes rather than facilitate 
them. In other cases, it was found that contractors, who had not been part of the training, 
assumed a driving role in the project. The pressure to emphasise the completion of projects 
over the governance quality of the process was strengthened after the IRC management of the 
programme realised it was behind schedule in spending the funds, which compelled them to 
speed up the reconstructions.  
With regard to the dynamics in the community, we also observed that staff veered away 
from discussing sensitive issues. This was one reason why they would not talk about the ways 
in which elites could spoil the projects. In some cases, they were perhaps concerned about 
repercussions from the power holders in the communities. In general, we observed that staff 
members were often socially close to the traditional leaders, teachers, and pastors that make 
up the majority of the power holders and they were not inclined to confront or offend them. 
While the programme introduced ideas of good governance into the community, and had the 
ambition to curtail elite capture, in practice it did so without effectively challenging the 
existing ‘rules of the game’ or institutions (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 979). Rather than seeing 
this simply as a limitation of the programme, we argue that it invites reflection of how elites – 
and inter-elite negotiation- might be engaged in accountability mechanisms at the local level.  
The local population did not press staff members for better or more governance training. 
The programme represented a kind of needs-supply-without-demand: the ‘governance gap’ 
which the post-conflict reconstruction programme sought to fill, was not experienced as such 
by the population. Hence, the villagers did not call on the staff to meet this need. 
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3.3.3. Enhancing governance in isolation 
The Tushiriki did not operate in a vacuum. Figure 1 captures the institutional complex in 
which the programme operated. Apart from the different local authorities and power holders, 
there were numerous other interventions, such as the ICCO/Comité Anti Bwaki (CAB) and 
UNICEF/AVSI, that took place in the same area. Each of these interventions was geared 
towards reconstruction, and all had their own specific objectives, their own ways of working, 
and their own conditions for engaging with the community (Cfr. Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Capacity building and behaviour change within Tushiriki programme  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PM. Kyamusugulwa 2011 
Eade (2007) noted that training may be successful in its own terms but contribute very 
little to enabling participants to change their realities. In our observations, there was little 
evidence of the impact of the training beyond the Tushiriki programme itself. Although we 
found that the governance within the programme often largely followed the training, this did 
not mean that people changed their behaviour outside of it. The following example serves to 
illustrate this. In November 2009, while a road construction was going on in the Birhala 
groupement of the Burhinyi chiefdom under the Tushiriki programme, the same community 
was engaged in the reconstruction of the local road connecting Birhala to Tshishadu. This 
road reconstruction was initiated by a different organisation, and people witnessed corrupt 
practices in this project in the recruitment of road workers for the construction. To be hired as 
a casual road worker, one had to agree to pay back $US 1 for every working day to the chief 
of the groupement. Because the payment was only $US 4 per day, this amounted to a tax of 
25% just for the privilege of being hired. Interestingly, the same people were also involved in 
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not be allowed and would be reported. The incident illustrates that people were not inclined 
to translate the governance values learned in the training to other programmes or other 
domains of life. This, because capacity development of local communities in terms of such 
values took hardly place after the intensive programme of capacity building activities. 
Without underestimating the complexity of learning and the complex ways in which 
values are translated into behaviour in general, the Tushiriki could hope to be more effective 
if it had put more effort into enrolling local authorities and their institutions and coordinating 
with other agencies. If the rules of engagement were more aligned – and focusing on those 
institutions that are effectively there at the local level (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 990)., the 
chances that the governance training would lead to significant changes in values and 
behaviour would have been increased. 
3.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, looking at the chain of capacity building for governance through 
reconstruction, we observed that despite some hindrances, capacity building contributed to 
project implementation according to the governance values advocated by the community-
driven reconstruction approach. Most of the projects planned were executed with the strong 
involvement of residents, including 25 classrooms and a schoolmaster office, six local road 
and bridge projects, and water system projects.  
However, the second objective of the programme, concerning the promotion of 
accountable practice beyond the projects, was much less successful. There were many 
disincentives to enhance accountable practice: the training modules were not consistent and 
were disconnected from existing local practices of accountability; the staff were more 
motivated to generate projects and staff performance was measured against project outputs 
more than the intangible governance outputs. On the side of residents, our study revealed that 
because the sensitisation to governance principles was poorly executed, the population 
perceived of the governance training as a useless activity. Residents who were weakly 
informed about governance principles valued the infrastructure reconstruction, which was 
tangible, more than the governance, which was considered intangible. Therefore, people’s 
behaviour regarding existing governance practices hardly changed.  
In practice, the implementation of the projects became often more staff-driven or 
contractor-driven than community-driven. Where the governance principles were upheld and 
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accountability advanced, this was promoted within the programme rather than beyond it. In 
such programme, there is a need to find out how the staff translate these objectives in the 
field (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002). After all, capacity building depends on the quality of 
the facilitators. As it worked out, the values were considered more as specific rules of the 
Tushiriki project, than as values to be considered more broadly. This was related to the lack 
of effort to contextualise these values and was exacerbated by the fact that surrounding 
programmes in the same areas provided reconstruction projects without enhancing 
accountability, which made the Tushiriki efforts quite isolated. 
This paper underlines that capacity building processes require more attention and need to 
be more systematically evaluated. The capacity building components of the Tushiriki 
programme were weak and have contributed to the disappointing lack of evidence of 
significant change. Although capacity building is no magic bullet, there is room for 
improvement for community-driven reconstruction. Governance practices may be enhanced 
beyond these programmes when: the existing community dynamics are taken into account, 
including the prevailing accountability norms and practices; when the training content is 
consistent and adjusted to local realities; when incentives are built in to promote accountable 
project delivery in practice; and when coordination is undertaken with other actors promoting 
governance in the same area. 
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Photo 3.1: Training of trainers (Tushiriki staff) in the field, Birhala, Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 3.2: VDC initial training, taking place in Mbogo protestant church, Mbogo village, Burhinyi 
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Photo 3.3: Female participant (illiterate) slipping in a VDC training session, Mbogo village, Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 3.4: Local leaders in training on good governance by Tushiriki civil society component staff in 
Kaziba
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ABSTRACT 
A lack of accountability is often considered a root cause of conflict, and for this reason much post-
conflict reconstruction efforts aim to enhance accountability between authorities and the 
population through community-driven reconstruction programmes. This paper looks into detail in 
the mechanisms of accountability that are introduced in one such programme: the Tushiriki CDR 
programme in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. These mechanisms include public meetings, 
display of reports and enhancing the watch-dog role of civil society. Based on semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation, we found little impact of the formal accountability 
mechanisms in the programme. Nonetheless, as we argue there was accountability; yet, this was 
shaped differently. Accountability took its own context-specific meaning. For sustainable culture 
of accountability, there is a need for stronger embeddedness and a more appropriate translation of 
abstract concepts into the local context.  
Key words: – Community-driven reconstruction, institutional engineering, accountability, 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Interventions for post-war reconstruction increasingly espouse a commitment to be bottom-
up, contextual, looking beyond state institutions, and providing space for local ownership.
8
 
One of the manifestations of this trend is the upsurge of programmes for community-driven 
reconstruction (CDR).
9
 Community-driven reconstruction is promoted by the World Bank. 
One of its major proponents is the International Rescue Committee which has implemented 
large DFID-supported community-driven reconstruction programmes in, amongst others, the 
post-conflict context of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).
10
 Numerous other INGOs have developed participatory programmes for community-
                                                          
8 Hilhorst, D, I. Christoplos and G. van der Haar (2011) ‘Reconstruction from Below. Magic Bullet or Shooting 
from the Hip?’ Third World Quarterly 31: 7, 1107-1124. See also P, M. Kyamusugulwa (2013). ‘Local 
ownership in community-driven reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Community Development 
44: 3, 364–385.  
9 S. Tanaka, J. Singh and D. Songco, « A Review of Community-Driven Development and Its application to the 
Asian Development Bank », Asian Development Bank, 2006, p. 1-30. 
10 Casey, K., Glennerster, R., Miguel, E. (2012). Reshaping institutions: evidence on aid impacts using a pre-
analysis plan. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2012), 1755–1812. See also J. Fearon, M. Humphreys, et 
al., «Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment 
in Post-Conflict Liberia», American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 99, n
o
 2, 2009, p. 287-291; 
M. Humphreys, R.S. de la Sierra, P. van der Windt (2012). Social and Economic Impacts of Tuungane: Final 
Report on the Effects of a Community Driven Reconstruction Programme in Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Colmbia University. 
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based reconstruction, that follow similar working methods as community-driven projects 
even though they may not use that label to denote to their projects. 
A typical feature of these bottom-up reconstruction programmes is that they combine 
objectives of ‘hardware’ reconstruction activities for the restoration of schools, roads and 
services with ‘software’ objectives to enhance democratic values and local level accountable 
institutions.
11
 This is especially of importance in post-conflict contexts where levels of trust, 
accountability, and social cohesion are considered to be low.
12
 Programmes are based on the 
idea that people’s involvement in making decisions and democratic accountability may lead 
to change from conflict to development, by addressing some of the root causes of conflict, 
such as corruption, a lack of accountability, a lack of trust between people and their 
institutions, and weakly functioning institutions.
13
  
There have recently been a number of robust evaluations, based on large-scale randomized 
control trials, that have brought out sobering messages about the effectiveness of these so-
called software objectives. Both in DRC and in Sierra Leone, no significant differences were 
found between the ‘treatment’ areas that were part of the CDR effort and non-treatment 
areas.
14
 Findings in Liberia show that social cohesion can increase through the provision of 
post-conflict development aid, yet the mechanisms behind this increase remain largely 
unclear.
15
 Overall, the impact of community-driven development on social cohesion seems to 
be limited.
16
 
The lack of effectiveness established by these evaluations may be conclusive, but the 
question remains how this can be explained? To what extent are these programmes really 
community-driven? And to what extent are results influenced by the historical context of 
prolonged conflict? This paper wants to fill part of this gap by focusing on the micro-
mechanisms of implementation of a community-driven reconstruction in Eastern DRC: 
                                                          
11
 Casey, K. et al (2012), Reshaping institutions… 
12 S. Cliffe, S. Guggenheim, et al., Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace 
Transitions. Social Development Department: Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
Network, World Bank, 2003, p. 1-21. 
13 K. Maynard, and N. Jodi, The role of culture, Islam and Tradition in Community-Driven Reconstruction. A 
Study on International Rescue Committee's Approach to Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme. New 
York, International Rescue Committee, 2007, p.1-20.; L. McBride, and N. Patel, IRC’s Approach to 
Community-Driven Reconstruction, A basic primer for first generation programmeming designed for contextual 
adaptation, Version 2, 2007, p. 1-36. 
14 Casey et al. 2012, Reshaping institutions…; Humphreys et al. 2012, Social and Economic Impacts 
15 Fearon et al. 2009, Can Development Aid Contribute…? 
16 King, E. C. Samii, and B. Snilstveit (2010), ‘Interventions to promote social cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa’, 
Journal of Development Effectiveness 2(3), 336-370. 
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general assemblies, the display of reports and watchdog civil societies. The paper is part of an 
aidnography into the so-called Tushiriki
17
 programme that was implemented by IRC in 49 
sites between 2008 and 2010. Our research has focused on dynamics of the programme that 
are internal to the organization of the project and dynamics in the villages of implementation. 
The effectiveness of community-driven reconstruction is influenced by many different 
dynamics, such as local power relations, the availability of labour, or mechanisms of 
accountability.
18
 In this paper we focus specifically on the mechanisms of implementation in 
regard to accountability. The paper is based on the simple premise that whichever noble 
intentions of development inspire programmes and whichever amount of resources are 
devoted to them, their effect crucially depends on the mechanisms of implementation that are 
used. This paper thus asks through what mechanisms specifically a big word like 
accountability gets translated in the implementation of projects in the villages, and how these 
mechanisms work in practice. We show that concepts such as accountability have their own 
context-specific meaning and that their implementation is not neutral. Whereas Science and 
Technology Studies have for some time now been arguing for an understanding of 
technological interventions within their social context,
19
 we here argue that the same goes for 
institutional engineering and the way in which the ‘software’ of an intervention should be 
understood and implemented.
20
 We do this by setting out how accountability was 
implemented in the programme, and how this was perceived by various stakeholders, 
showing that the concept needs to be ‘read’ and understood differently at different levels. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we highlight the background of 
democratic accountability in development aid. In section 3, we briefly outline the history of 
accountability and conflict in DRC. In section 4, we describe the setting of the Tushiriki 
programme, and the methodology used in the current study. In section 5, we illustrate the 
three accountability mechanisms used in the programme with case studies, each followed by 
a brief analysis. In section 6, we present agency staff perceptions of accountability. In the 
final section, we conclude the paper and outline some implications of the research. 
                                                          
17 Tushiriki: a Kiswahili word meaning ‘let us all be involved in it together’. 
18 Please see Kyamusugulwa, PM. (2013), ‘Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review’, 
Third World Quarterly 34: 7, 1265-1278.. 
19
 See for instance Pinch, T.J. and W.E. Bijker, 1984. ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How 
the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’, Social Studies of Science 
14(3): 399-441; Jansen, K. and S. Vellema, 2010. ‘What is technography?’, NJAS Wageningen Journal of Life 
Sciences 57: 169-177 
20 Fanthorpe, R. (2005). ‘On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war 
Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 105(418), 27–49. 
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4.2. Background of democratic accountability in development aid 
Enhancing accountability is a major objective of community-driven reconstruction. Rather 
than aiming for accountability through formal democratic institutions such as elections,
21
 
accountability is sought in the everyday relations between authorities and populations: 
transparency and accountability. Transparency is part of accountability which obliges those in 
power to provide information and to explain what they are doing. In its most literal sense, 
accounting is after all to make something ‘tell-a-story-aboutable’. Accountability goes 
beyond transparency, as it also refers to responsibilities. Authorities have to take 
responsibility and can be held responsible. In a situation of accountability, a constituency has 
the capacity to enforce and to impose sanctions on power holders who violate their public 
duties.
22
 Increasingly, people are supposed to be active participants rather than merely 
passive beneficiaries of aid and accountability is considered a precondition for genuine 
participation.
23
 
The literature suggests three reasons for enhancing accountability in improving 
governance and deepening democracy.
24
 Firstly, accountability provides a way of 
discouraging and penalizing corruption, by strengthening the demand-side of governance.
25
 
Secondly, accountability can be used as a goal in itself, or as a device to improve project 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy.
26
 Thirdly, the major potential of democratic local 
governance is that, by building popular participation and accountability into local 
governance, local government and even other local institutions will become more responsive 
to the desires of citizens and more effective in service delivery.
27
  
                                                          
21 R. Grant and R. Keohane, « Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics », American Political 
Science Review, vol. 99, n
o
 1, February 2005, p. 29-43. 
22 J. Ackerman, « Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond ‘‘Exit’’ and ‘‘Voice’’ », World Development, vol. 
32, n
o
 3, 2004, p. 447-463. 
23 D. Cronin, and J. O’ Regan, Accountability in Development Aid: Meeting Responsibilities, Measuring 
Performance, A Research Report for Cómhlamh, 2002, p. 1-113; See L. Wenar, « Accountability in 
International Development Aid (draft) », Ethics and International Affairs, 2006, p. 1-35. See also J. Rubenstein, 
« Accountability in an Unequal World (Forthcoming) », The Journal of Politics, 2007, p. 1-43. See also R. 
Eyben, « Power, Mutual Accountability and Responsibility in the Practice of International Aid: A Relational 
Approach », Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper, 2008, p. 1-51. 
24 C. Malena, R. Forster, et al., Social Accountability: …, op cit, p. 6  
25 J. Ackerman, State-Society Synergy for Accountability: Lessons for the World Bank, Washington, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2004, p. 1-54. See also K. McLean, , 
R. Serrano, et al., Exploring Partnerships between Communities and Local Governments in Community Driven 
Development: A Framework. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network. Washington, 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005, p. 1-91. 
26 S. Cavill, and M. Sohail, « Increasing strategic accountability… », art. cit., p. 232  
27 H. Blair, « Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries 
», World Development, vol. 28, no 1, 2000, p. 21-39. 
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Literature about accountability makes a distinction between formal and informal 
accountability. Formal or rational accountability constitutes reporting mechanisms to make 
performance transparent and controllable. Informal or moral accountability is geared to 
creating trust and commonality through everyday practice. Interventions of community-
driven reconstruction aim to introduce more formal forms of accountability into the 
interactions between duty-bearers in a community and the poor or vulnerable people targeted 
by humanitarian or development agencies.
28
 One way to do so is through public meetings. 
Bringing information and findings into the public sphere, and generating public debate 
around them, is considered a key element for accountability.
29
 Another mechanism through 
which accountability is exercised comprises enhancing countervailing powers by encouraging 
civil society to hold state authorities answerable on public affairs, or the so-called watch dog 
role.
30
 The people’s demand for accountability may not be in line with the one prescribed in 
the programme and people’s prospects vis-à-vis accountability are generally low after a long 
period of country maladministration. Interventions that focus on promoting accountability 
can then be seen as unsolicited interventions.  
The engineering of local accountability in the framework of a development programme, 
may bring about increased knowledge and transparency, and create conditions that foster 
empowerment, efficiency, assurance, and honesty.
31
 However, it has also been observed that 
they bring the risk of conflict between local power holders and newly empowered, waste of 
resources, turn-away attention, enhancement of mistrust, and difficulty to manage multitude 
of accountabilities.
32
 This chapter will explore how the introduction of accountability 
mechanisms in community-driven reconstruction worked out in the IRC programme in 
Eastern DRC. 
4. 3. A brief history of accountability in DRC  
The accountability context of DRC is complex, given the prolonged conflict that especially 
affected the eastern part of the country. It is here that large scale displacements of people 
                                                          
28 Lily L. Tsai. Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China. 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 101, No. 2 May 2007, 355-372; Hilhorst, D., 2003. The Real World of 
NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and Development, London: Zed Books. 
29 C. Malena, R. Forster, et al., Social Accountability: …, op cit, p. 9 S. Cliffe, S. Guggenheim, et al., 
Community-Driven Reconstruction…, op cit, p. 11 
30 R. Eyben, « Power, Mutual… », op cit, p. 13 
31 See D. Cronin, and J. O’ Regan, Accountability in…, op cit, p. 18; L. Wenar, « Accountability in… », op cit, 
pp. 7-9 
32 See D. Cronin, and J. O’ Regan, Accountability in…, op cit, pp. 2 & 99; L. Wenar, « Accountability in… », 
op cit, pp. 6-7; J. Rubenstein, « Accountability in… », op cit, p. 14  
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took place, resulting in uprootedness and changes in the way in which people relate to each 
other.
33
 Having said that, the complexity of the conflict in DRC, especially during this period, 
cannot be grasped if the pre-conflict period is not also considered, i.e. the Mobutu era (1965-
1997). Coming to power through a coup d’état, Mobutu soon became one of the worst 
dictators in the history of post-independence regimes in Africa, characterized by personal 
enrichment.
34
 His regime can be described as one of patronage, corruption, maladministration 
and fraud, and Zairianisation. He built up an institutional structure through patronage 
networks that permitted him, his family and his political allies to accumulate wealth. 
Corruption, maladministration and fraud were institutionalized; soldiers were allowed to 
predate on the population, the state bureaucracy was encouraged to be unaccountable, and the 
president saw little difference between the nation’s resources and his own personal wealth. 
The state apparatus was encouraged to be self-financing, by exploiting its own people without 
any sense of a social contract-like responsibility.
35
 In 1974, Zairianisation was a policy that 
meant nationalization of schools, hospitals, and foreign-owned business by the regime.
36
 The 
result was catastrophic in the sense that the president and his political allies benefited even 
more from their governance system, by securing an effective monopoly in key sectors of the 
Zairian economy, rather than serving the national interest, in a way that became difficult to 
reverse. Briefly, this lack of state accountability was the context in which the wars of 1996–
1997 and 1998–2003 occurred. 
Additionally, this lack of state accountability has strongly influenced the way people, 
including officials, behave. Until today this influence can be felt; officials at both provincial 
and national governments adopt the vocabulary of accountability, influenced by international 
donor discourse. Yet when it comes to their behavior, it is hard to notice any change in this 
sense. For instance, it is easy for them to state that training about transparency and 
                                                          
33 F. Reyntjens, « Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to Kabila », African Affairs, vol. 
100, 2001, p. 311-317. See R. Lemarchand, « The tunnel at the end of the light », Review of African Political 
Economy, vol. 93/94, 2002, p. 389-398; S. Marysse, « Regress and war: The case of the DRCongo », The 
European Journal of Development Research, vol. 15, n
o
 1, 2003, p. 73–98. Please see also F. Reyntjens, « The 
privatisation and criminalisation of public space in the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region », J. of Modern 
African Studies, vol. 43, n
o
 4, 2005, p. 587–607; F. Reyntjens, « Briefing: Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Political Transition and Beyond », African Affairs, vol. 106/423, 2007, p. 307-317. 
34 L. Ndikumana, and J. Boyce, « Congo's Odious debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaire », 
Development and Change, vol. 29, 1998, p. 195-217. 
35 B. Weijs, D. Hilhorst, et al., Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: Country evidence paper. Wageningen, Wageningen University, Disaster Studies, 2011, p. 1-68. 
36 L. Ndikumana, and J. Boyce, « Congo's Odious debt……», art.cit., p. 208; K. Vlassenroot, and H. Romkema, 
Local Governance and…, op cit, p. 9 
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accountability is a good idea and that governance is key that cannot be neglected. But in 
practice, accountability remains far from being an everyday reality in government offices.  
4.4. Setting, programme description and methodology 
4.4.1. Setting 
The geographic setting for this research was the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms, located 
in the north-east of the Mwenga territory, in South-Kivu province in eastern DRC. Both 
chiefdoms belong to the Shi tribe. In 2008, next to the indigenous population, 14% of the 
population of the Burhinyi chiefdom consisted of Hutu combatants who fled from the 
Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994. The Hutu presence in the area is one of the 
reasons why these chiefdoms were heavily affected by the conflict from 1996 to 2003. In the 
aftermath of the war, this also made these chiefdoms into obvious targets for development 
interventions. 
With regard to potential beneficiaries, the programme targeted about 44,173 people from 
eight randomly selected communities out of 103,066 inhabitants of the Burhinyi and 
Luhwindja chiefdoms. Each Tushiriki community was populated by nearly 6,000 inhabitants, 
the Tushiriki village was inhabited by only about 1,200 residents. Small but adjacent 
communities were sometimes clustered and approached as single entities in the programme as 
long as cooperation existed between these communities. 
4.4.2. Programme description 
The CDR programme was called Tushiriki; ‘let us all be involved in it together’. It was 
implemented by the American-based IRC through its office in Bukavu, South-Kivu province. 
It has been operating in this province since 1996. The Tushiriki programme is one of two 
CDR programmes that IRC implemented from 2008 to 2010, with Dutch funding from 
Stichting Vluchteling (SV).The other CDR programme by IRC was Tuungaane.
37
 
One of the objectives of the SV-IRC CDR programme (as it is sometimes called) was 
strengthening the capacity of civil society by increasing the understanding of good 
governance principles and practices, and promoting advocacy efforts on behalf of 
                                                          
37
Macartan Humphreys, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, Peter van der Windt. Social and Economic Impact of 
Tuungane : Final Report of the Effects of a Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Columbia University, June 2012, p. 1-78. 
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communities and towards policy makers.
38
 To achieve these objectives, the programme 
focused on both community development and civil society. For community development, 
Village Development Committees (VDC) were set up to design and plan local reconstruction 
projects, such as classrooms, schoolmasters’ offices, and local roads. The population was 
involved in the processes of committee elections, project identification, management and 
execution, training and regular general assembly reports (GAR), to familiarize them with 
accountability (in the programme translated as redevabilité).
39
  
The 10 Members of the VDCs were chosen during election meetings for different roles; 
president, treasurer, secretary, mobiliser and inclusion officer. Equal participation of men and 
women was required in the VDCs. Each of the 34 target villages in the two chiefdoms was 
allocated a block grant of $US 3,000. A block grant varying from $US 50,000 to 70,000 was 
allocated to each of the 8 target communities.
40
 It was up to the communities and villages 
themselves to decide on the allocation of the grant within the parameters of the programme. 
Next to the VDCs, the civil society section was in charge of supporting the activities of non-
governmental organization (NGO) and community-based organization (CBO) partners 
through training on local governance and advocacy in the target villages.
41
 Besides, the 
VDCs were checked by a specific control mechanism: the Relais de Qualite (Requas), 
consisting of one man and one woman elected locally as well, to act as the eyes of the 
population. 
4.4.3. Methodology 
In order to assess how people view service delivery by international agencies in conflict-
affected areas, one needs to understand local perceptions vis-à-vis an intervention. ‘How did 
participating beneficiaries view the Tushiriki’s type of accountability?’ Specifically, how did 
they view the strategies initiated within the Tushiriki programme in order to foster 
democratic accountability practices in the target villages? Democratic accountability as a 
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SV and IRC, Annual Plan 2008: The First year of Rebuilding your Future, Community Driven Reconstruction 
in Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo: A framework towards poverty alleviation in post-conflict 
countries, The Hague, Stichting Vluchteling, 2007, p.1-15. 
39 Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwaa, Dorothea Hilhorsta and Gemma Van Der Haar. Capacity builders for 
governance: community-driven reconstruction in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Development in 
Practice (forthcoming). 
40
 IRC and CARE, Les Protocoles de TUUNGANE en République Démocratique du Congo, Version de Janvier 
2009, Bukavu, 2009, p. 1-72.  
41 SV, Annex-Activity Plan 2008. The Hague, 2007, p. 1-3. 
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social phenomenon can be shaped differently by beneficiaries, depending on their 
understanding of the process and the context in which they live. 
Data are based on ethnography, conducted by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa from 2008 
to 2010 in the course of the Tushiriki programme. He participated in observations and in-
depth semi-structured interviews about the project activities for both the intangible and 
tangible processes, using a case study approach at a village level. Interviews sometimes took 
the form of oral histories about what had happened in the village with regard to project 
activities. We talked to informants at reconstruction sites (of schools/roads), at public 
meetings, alongside a footpath or at their households. They were farmers, students, wives of 
soldiers, assistant masons, evangelists, chiefs of the locality, groupement, and their wives, 
head teachers, teachers, masons, traders and wood workers.  
At the same time, some of them were committee members, elected team members, or 
members of Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Some people were interviewed 
several times. At the chiefdom level, we interviewed the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement 
Administratif (who represents the territory administrator in the chiefdom) based in 
Luhwindja. Finally, We also interviewed eight field staff and their territory supervisor who 
runs the Tushiriki programme in the current study area. The processes outlined in this paper 
were followed in 29 of the 34 target villages in the Tushiriki programme. The other five 
villages (Itudu community, Burhinyi chiefdom) were not accessible because of insecurity. In 
this paper we present four cases, which reveal the working of the three mechanisms of 
accountability applied within the Tushiriki programme in the area. We embed the cases into 
their local context. We see the case study approach as being the appropriate method for 
analyzing participatory methodology for reconstruction and the meanings given to 
intervention and democratic accountability.
42
  
4.5. Democratic accountability mechanisms in the Tushiriki programme 
In the following we will present three mechanisms that were requested by the Tushiriki 
programme in order to promote democratic accountability; General Assembly Reports, the 
display of reports and the CBO watchdog role. These mechanisms were meant to ensure 
accountability within the programme. We will show how these mechanisms were taken up 
                                                          
42 C. Sneddom, and C. Fox, « Power, Development and Institutional change: Participatory Governance in the 
Lower Mekong Basin », World Development, vol. 35, n
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and implemented in the respective programme sites, and how they fitted within the local 
context. 
4.5.1. A General Assembly Report in Karwera village 
Public meetings are considered a powerful component of accountability initiatives. Malena 
and colleagues
43
 have recognized that bringing information and findings into the public 
sphere, and generating public debate around them, is a key element for most democratic 
accountability initiatives. Also, Cliffe and colleagues
44
 have acknowledged that mandating 
open meetings is a common way of encouraging accountability. In this section we will 
analyze a public meeting in one of the villages of the Tushiriki programme: Karwera village. 
Karwera village belongs to the Budaha groupement in the Burhinyi chiefdom. It is a 15-
minute walk from Kakwende, one of the suburbs of the chiefdom, where missionaries from 
Norway settled in 1928 and where one of the main Communauté des Eglises Libres de 
Pentecôte en Afrique (5e CELPA) bible schools still operates today. The village does not 
have a school, so children have to go to either the Budaha primary school situated in the 
neighboring village of Kanyimba or the Kakwende primary and secondary schools. Karwera 
is led by a village chief and has one 5e CELPA local church. The values of these two 
institutions strongly influence people’s behavior. The village is inhabited entirely by 
Barhinyirhinyi (i.e. people of Burhinyi), with an estimated population in 2008 of 953, and is 
accessible by car. In the past a number of self-initiated associations were set up, organizing 
people into groups for either agriculture activities or bee-keeping. To subscribe, a person had 
to pay US$ 5. As one resident said, these associations generally were not very serious 
regarding the outcomes and dividends of the group activities. Accountability was low. As a 
result, the associations were not very popular in the village and membership numbers 
declined. 
Before the Tushiriki programme came to the village in 2008, people already obtained 
experience with the functioning of an international programme through the reconstruction of 
the Budaha primary school by the Associazione Volontari per il Servizio 
Internazionale/United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund (AVSI/UNICEF) 
between May and August 2008. For this project, residents of the two villages contributed 
through labor and local materials; carrying water, stones and sand from the river. One reason 
why this school was selected by AVSI was accessibility of the area by car, which made it 
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easy for the officials of the implementing agency to visit the school. It made residents to 
realize the importance of a road network. Hence, when people were given the possibility to 
select their own village project as part of the Tushiriki programme, they soon decided to take 
the local Kakwende–Karwera–Kanyimba road as the village project. This idea was initiated 
by local leaders, including the chief of the groupement, and then became popular among the 
residents of the two villages; as one of the residents put it: ‘a road facilitates commercial 
activities, access to health services and schooling’. 
After the first and second disbursement of Tushiriki funds to the Karwera VDC via the 
local bank (the Coopérative d’Epargne et de Crédit /COOPEC Tulime), a General Assembly 
Report (GAR) was required to give feedback to the residents about the on-going project. 
Only then would the next funding tranche be released. The GAR was held on April 19, 2009 
by the committee at a Sunday church service. Otherwise it would be difficult to mobilize the 
required minimum of at least 40% of the residents for this special public meeting. Committee 
members and church leaders were closely related and therefore it was possible to give a 
prominent place to the GAR during the service. Tushiriki field staff also participated. Around 
200 attendees of the church were present, including children. Even then, the 40% attendance 
requirement was not even met in this setting.  
The male president, a development technician with a 3-year-university degree in 
development, informed participants that the Tushiriki had released two tranches of money, 
i.e. $US 1,315 from a total of $US 3,000, which had been spent on a trip to the provincial 
capital to buy materials for the road rehabilitation, such as trowels, forks, and wheelbarrows, 
and on wages for road workers, who were selected from among the Karwera residents. 
During the report, three questions were raised, all by men; about how much VDC members 
received as wages, about reconstructing the church building, and about the next step at the 
community development committee (CDC) level for the project. Very quickly, the male 
president answered those questions by mentioning that the VDC members were not paid, 
otherwise the realization in terms of road upgrading could hardly be achieved, that nothing 
was planned for the church reconstruction and that there would be an election for the project 
at the CDC. His responses evoked no discussion, but at his back, Patrick Milabyo 
Kyamusugulwa heard some youth quietly discussing among them that some of the costs were 
too high. After this special announcement, the senior pastor asked somebody for a final 
prayer to end the service.  
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This case epitomizes how difficult it was to really discuss the progress of a project within 
a public meeting. First of all, people were not really used to this type of accountability. The 
AVSI/UNICEF project for instance did not require any reporting back to the population, nor 
did people expect this to take place. What mattered most to them, was the actual realization 
of concrete results; the vast majority of the residents appreciated what they saw when the 
school was completely rebuilt; walls of burnt bricks, roofs, floors, blackboards and six 
classrooms equipped with solid tables. In contrast, the Tushiriki programme did have the 
obligation of a GAR, but it was difficult to interest people in turning up at the meeting, as it 
did not provide direct and concrete benefits. Secondly, it was a smart move to embed the 
meeting in an existing social institution, where participation is relatively high; the church 
service. At the same time however, the church service is a setting in which people are not 
used to open discussions, let alone to discuss money matters. Besides, people might be 
inclined to follow the opinion of the leaders organizing these meetings, in this case the church 
leaders. Thus, the GAR mainly served as an obligatory passage point, but without much 
critical reflection. 
Does it mean public meetings such as the GAR have little to contribute to development 
interventions? When analyzing the place of public meetings in fostering accountability, the 
literature suggests that the relevance of public meetings is not new in developing countries, 
especially in the context of rural areas, nor is it without any effect. Also in the framework of 
the Tuungane programme in eastern DRC, which is very similar to the Tushiriki programme 
analysed here, Humphreys
45
 has shown that the greatest individual initiative was expressed at 
a community meeting. While the mechanism of public meetings thus has its merits, local 
residents may have a different idea about this. In the case of the Tushiriki, people quickly lost 
their interest in these meetings that failed to produce tangible results. This was resolved in the 
case described above by embedding the public meeting in the already existing social life of 
church services, even though this had the unfortunate effect that it inhibited discussion. The 
Tushiriki programme design asks for separate meeting with a strict quorum, but this was 
adapted locally. In the case of agriculture technology and other technical interventions in 
development, it has been amply shown how these tend to become appropriated locally into 
adapted technologies. In a similar vein, we see here that the social technology to enhance 
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accountability through meetings was adapted in local use and transformed in a question and 
answer session during a church service. 
4.5.2. Displaying reports in Cibanda II, Kanyimba and Mubone villages 
Apart from the General Assemblies, the Tuungane/ Tushiriki protocol, section 11, also 
contained a procedure to display reports with updates of the finances and implementation of 
the project in the community. We observed this mechanism in several communities. It states 
that the VDC should post a report about the project activities, including a financial report, i.e. 
the amount received and the amount spent when released.
46
 Cibanda II and Mubone are 
villages in the Luhwindja chiefdom, Kanyimba is a village in the Burhinyi chiefdom. These 
were target villages in the Tushiriki programme in which reports of the expenditures made 
within each project village were displayed, as required by the programme. However, 
residents indicated that, despite the public display of the reports, nobody was willing to read 
them because it was not something they were used to doing, and many of them, especially 
women, were illiterate. For instance, when a report was attached to the door of the Mubone 
5e CELPA church on March 6, 2009, a group of masons who were constructing a school near 
the church never read it. When asked about it, they said they were not aware of any 
expenditure report, because they did not read the attachment. Interestingly, they argued that 
they trusted the VDC members because they were able to talk to them easily about the 
project. 
Similarly, on March 25, 2009, when PM. Kyamusugulwa visited Cibanda II village, a 
VDC report was being displayed at a junction of two local roads, alongside the main road for 
the Referral Ifendula district hospital and for the Luduha groupement in the Luhwindja 
chiefdom. The report mentioned one decameter,
47
 40 trowels, 20 forks, 15 pickaxes, one 
piece of string and two machetes bought. Other materials were mentioned as still needed, 
especially two wheelbarrows, seven trowels and three forks. These materials were for a local 
road reconstruction to connect Cibanda II village with the suburb of Luhwindja. However, 
the report did not mention the exact amount of money received and the amount spent for 
these materials, which information remained unclear. What was striking about this report was 
that it contained some crossings-out about the exact number of materials bought, as they were 
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 An instrument used to measure the distance of daily manual labour for residents on the local road construction 
site  
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uncertain. Before people had been able to read the report, it was taken away by young people 
of the village.  
In Kanyimba village in Burhinyi, the experience of displaying reports was similar to the 
stories from Mubone and Cibanda II in the neighboring chiefdom. Here a report about the on-
going project in the village, providing details about the amount of money received by the 
VDC, was pinned up on display. The male VDC secretary witnessed that 10-year-old 
children soon took it, arguing that it was for a football match. In fact, the young people in the 
village thought that every poster was a football advertisement, because this was the only 
activity for which they ever saw a poster.  
The examples in the preceding sections all show that the display of reports did not 
contribute much to accountability; not only did reports lack detailed information, but also did 
people not read them; either because they simply did not care, because they were illiterate, or 
because the announcements were quickly taken away. An alternative form of accountability 
however comes clear in the words of the mason; if the VDC members are well trusted, people 
do not have problems in talking to them about the project. People believed in oral narratives 
given by committee members about the project and they preferred this to be done in an 
informal way rather than through public meetings. Although it has been argued that 
displaying council decisions, budgets and expenditures on public notice boards is a way of 
encouraging accountability,
 48
 people’s perceptions of this may be different, especially in 
areas dominated by the oral tradition. In the Tushiriki programme, people could obtain 
information in more informal ways, if they felt the need to get this. As long as trust was 
maintained, most people were not interested in obtaining more information. 
4.5.3. CBOs as watchdog in Ishogwe village 
An important aspect of democratic accountability in CDR is to strengthen the 
countervailing power of civil society actors and encourage them to hold authorities 
responsible. In the Tushiriki programme, this meant that local civil society was trained to act 
as a watchdog to ensure that the VDC was accountable to residents about the project that was 
selected by the community. This aspect is exemplified with the case of Ishogwe village. This 
village belongs to the Bujiri groupement in the Luhwindja chiefdom and is located near the 
main Kaziba–Luhwindja road, just on the other side of the Namnana river, facing the 
Lubanda suburb of the Luhwindja center. In 2008, it was populated by 1,577 inhabitants, the 
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vast majority of who originated from Luhwindja. The village has only one primary school, 
the Makala primary school, that was initiated by 5e CELPA, and is still under protestant 
church management. It has no secondary school, nor a health center. The protestant church 
and the chieftaincy are the most prominent institutions; the village is headed by a chief who 
was acting, in 2008, as chief interim of the Bujiri groupement.  
In 2008, when the Tushiriki programme came to the village, a series of public meetings 
was held for VDC elections, identifying needs, project selection and project budget approval. 
Following this process, Ishogwe residents selected the reconstruction of the Namnana bridge, 
although the amount of grant available (i.e. $US 3,000) was not sufficient. Residents were 
motivated by the fact that this bridge would connect three groupements (Bujiri, Burhembo 
and Idudwe) and that people could cross the river even during flooding. The previously 
existing bridge collapsed during a flood more than 5 years ago. In the eyes of the Ishogwe 
inhabitants, this was a crucial project for them and the area. In 2008, 36 out of 70 CBOs in 
the chiefdom were selected for the Tushiriki programme. The local CBOs were partnered to 
NGOs, which were in turn partners to Tushiriki. These NGOs represented the local civil 
society at programme level e.g. the Centre d’Etudes de Documentation et d’Animation 
Civique, CEDAC, and the Action pour le Développement en Milieux Ruraux, ADMR. The 
CBOs (e.g. Groupe de Sauvetage des Vies Humaines) were supposed to watchdog VDCs in 
managing project funds on behalf of the population. To do so, the NGOs provided a number 
of trainings for both VDCs and CBOs so that they could familiarize themselves with the 
watchdog idea. Governance, bookkeeping and advocacy are among topics developed by 
CEDAC and ADMR in the training session. Yet, both NGOs did not have any previous 
experience about a watchdog role nor about advocacy activities on behalf of local 
communities. While the CEDAC was well known for awareness raising regarding the duties 
of a citizen, ADMR was well known for its tree-planting activities in the area.  
During the training, ADMR and CEDAC distributed items such as paper, pens, pencils, 
etc., to every target CBO for reporting its activities to the NGO, and one copy of the training 
module was given to the president of each VDC and CBO. So, within the setting of the 
community, the CBOs were said to play the role of a check and balance on the VDC project 
management, and to check regularly whether there was progress in executing the project (or 
otherwise remind the VDC about it. If the VDC was proven to be less than accountable to its 
constituency, participants were told that they had the right to ask questions of the VDC 
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members about the project activities. Also, when no progress was noticed in the 
reconstruction, CBO members were told to ask the VDC members about this. Yet, the aim of 
the training was not always reflected in what people reported to have learnt. One attendee for 
instance said that he remembered two main things, (i) democracy and avoiding a dictatorship 
and (ii) working together to include disabled people. More generally, when recalling the 
training, residents reported that this was done quickly, with big groups of trainees, and 
sometimes the main concepts of the teaching were taught in French (some of the educated 
attendants spoke French, but even for them the abstract concepts of the training were difficult 
to grasp). Concepts such as democratic accountability, governance and advocacy were 
explained in French (but without/with limited translation in the local language), while one 
training session comprised 100 participants including 52–56 CBO members and VDC 
members.  
In addition to the training provided by the NGOs, the community development component 
of the programme trained VDC and CBO members on democratic accountability. The 
message of the training was believed to be that residents should collaborate, work together 
and protect the infrastructure rebuilt under the project. For example, trainees recalled that 
CBO members were asked to complain to the local chiefs so that anyone damaging the school 
would be punished by having to repair it. People were also encouraged to take complaints to 
the local police, the King (i.e. the paramount chief) and the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement 
Administratif, who represented the territory administrator in the chiefdom. VDC members 
were asked to account for how much of the grant was allocated to the bridge reconstruction 
and materials bought and how much of the materials were contributed locally.  
In general, what complicated the checks and balances of the CBOs’ watchdog role is that 
social relationships between people in small communities are often multiplex and there is 
little distance between them. Members of the two committees were both residents of the same 
village and saw themselves as the same people, because they belonged to relatively close 
families or clans. For instance, the chief of the village, who was adviser to the vice-president 
of a CBO (at the same time the VDC male president), was also a member of the VDC. The 
same was true for the Requas, formally supposed to control the VDC, which made it more 
difficult for them to take up a critical position against the VDC. When setting up an 
intervention, it is easy to hear complaints about preferential treatment from people that are 
not part of the direct beneficiaries. This was also the case in Ishogwe with another CBO, 
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focusing on teenage mothers. People said all beneficiaries belonged to the clan of the 
manager’s wife. In the end however, both beneficiaries and the decision takers have an 
interest in maintaining relations workable. 
In terms of accountability within the existing institutions, neither the chieftaincy nor the 
church (or even the CBO) used to be transparent to people about the management of funds. 
However, the chieftaincy and the local church used to inform local people about contributions 
to a village project, either by shouting through a megaphone or by delivering the message 
during a church service. The Tushiriki programme used the same means of informing people 
about their contribution to the village project; what appeared to be new was the message of 
Tushiriki to be transparent about project funding, including details about expenditure and 
creating an arena where the VDC’s decisions were more open for discussion. In the eyes of 
residents, this was a sensitive issue as the public discussion of financial matters would go 
against local culture. The training on accountability did not overcome this sensitivity. 
Besides, the message of the training was not well understood by all participants, due to 
language barriers, but also because it was not enough tailor-made to the local context and did 
not provide people with the adequate tools at hand to take up the role of watchdog.  
Our observations led us to question the extent to which the collaboration NGOs/CBOs 
contributed to incorporate in their focus the watchdog role while VDCs implemented village 
projects. Two factors are worth mentioning here. Firstly, there is a lack of analysis of the 
organizational capacity of CBOs before they are selected by NGO partners to engage in the 
Tushiriki programme. Organizations were not necessarily selected for their watchdog 
capacities, but simply for their presence in the area. Secondly, the partnership between NGOs 
and CBOs was based only on training about ‘accountability and advocacy’, i.e. on the 
theoretical aspect of the function, rather than on its practical aspect. These observations are 
supported by others
49
, who have acknowledged that a group’s willingness to embrace change 
can obstruct the organizational capacity to serve the community. Hence, Borren
50
 emphasizes 
the importance of both defining beforehand how to engage with a particular partner, and of 
empowerment and emancipatory learning. Only this will really take partners on board. Lastly, 
                                                          
49 De Vita, C, C. Fleming, et al.(2001), ‘Building Non-profit Capacity: A Framework for Addressing the 
Problem’, in C. De Vita and C. Fleming (ed.), Building Capacity in Non-profit Organizations, Washington, p. 5-
30. 
50 S. Borren, « Development agencies: global or solo players? », Development in Practice, vol. 10, no 3 & 4, 
2000, p. 408-419. 
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Eade
51
 has stated simply that one cannot build capacities in others that he/she does not have 
him/herself. Clearly, the failure in technical assistance of CBOs by NGOs was one of the 
problems. Providing adequate training could help CBOs and Requas to take up a more critical 
role.  
4.6. Practices of Tushiriki staff on democratic accountability  
Figure 4.1: Democratic accountability as one of good governance principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the place of democratic accountability as one of the local governance 
principles promoted by the Tushiriki programme, the three mechanisms by which these 
principles are promoted and the expected outputs of the intangible part of the programme. 
Having set out the functioning of the accountability mechanisms in practice, we will now turn 
to the practices of the Tushiriki staff on accountability. How did they interpret and shape the 
expectations and instructions of the Tushiriki protocol? Already, we saw in the above that 
staff tends to adapt these instructions to the local context, in order to address difficulties that 
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came forth from the contradictions between the protocols and existing institutions and 
practices of accountability. For instance, they incorporated the required General Assembly 
into a church gathering. In this section we will show how staff – while advocating for 
downward accountability prioritised in practice that VDC were accountable to the IRC staff 
more than to their population. 
The Tushiriki field staff based in Burhinyi and Luhwindja consisted of two development 
officers, four development agents and two technicians, who were supervised by the territory 
supervisor, one of the senior staff for the community development component of the 
programme. The Tushiriki staff, including the field staff, generally believed in the 
programme’s aim to promote governance, particularly accountability through public 
meetings. In addition, in comparison with other reconstruction programmes, agency staff felt 
that this is the most appropriate in a post-conflict context, which is characterized by 
corruption. As expressed by the territory supervisor: 
This is an excellent approach, the best, the most appropriate; there is a place to deal with ‘anti-valeurs’, 
that is ‘corruption’, because the decisions are made in public meetings. However, there is a need for 
stronger facilitation to deal with the problems of ambitious project choices, project planning and 
regular follow-up. Facilitation is a key factor of success.
52
  
Staff’s general internalization and support of the programme’s aims, did not always mean that 
they translated these in practice. In training sessions, for example, they taught VDC members 
about the democratic accountability principles that should guide their work.
53
 For instance, in 
the finance management training for committee members, the trainer said: “everybody is able 
to control or to know what everybody is doing. When VDC members misappropriate funds, 
Tushiriki needs then to stop money disbursement unless money stolen is reimbursed”.54  
 At the same time, however, staff would often remind people that they were ultimately 
accountable to the IRC. For instance, in the above mentioned session, the trainer said: 
“Franka ya Muzungu ni ya kupana ripoti/ Money of white (wo)man is to report for”.55  
                                                          
52 Interview with the Tushiriki Territory Supervisor, Bukavu, April 26, 2010. 
53 Participant observation in the initial training session held in Mbogo Burhinyi for VDC members, 22 
November 2008. 
54 Participant observation in the finance management training session in Birhala Burhinyi for VDC members, 
25 February 2009. 
55 Participant observation in the same training session of 25 February 2009. 
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From numerous observations in the field, it also became clear that staff stepped away from 
the idea that power holders needed to be confronted to be held accountable, in favour of 
accommodating the existing relations and seeking informal types of accountability. For 
instance, when visiting Mulungu and Busherega community, a lunch meal was offered to aid 
workers in the senior pastor house where informal discussions took place between aid 
workers and the village power holders (locality chief, senior pastors 8è CEPAC and 5è 
CELPA local churches). The discussions were about how to mobilize more people and which 
project (school reconstruction) would be worth in Tushiriki programme.
56
 
In the same vein, during the training of trainers held on 24 March 2009, the schoolmaster 
of the Mwenda primary school reported that the 3-classroom-building of its school was 
destroyed by wind the day before. By hearing the news, the field staff said that there was a 
need to hold the re-approval public meeting in order to get it budgeted as the new village 
project. Not surprisingly, the roof reconstruction of these 3 classrooms became the village 
project executed in this area.
57
 Clearly, informal talks between aid workers and the existing 
village local elite on the one hand and between local elite and residents on the other hand, is 
how accountability worked out in this context. 
At the same time, in case of problems, staff would exercise its own accountability 
mechanisms with the VDC members rather than leaving room for local accountability 
processes. For instance, talking to the male Citudu VDC president, one development officer 
who was visiting this area said: “You should move forward, how can we explain that you 
have already received money without any progress. Look, we have been here last week, we 
need to see progress”. Also, when the VDC president and field staff disagreed on an issue 
related to a village project, the public meeting was likely held by the aid worker himself 
rather than facilitated by the VDC president
58
. Although the staff wanted to ascertain in this 
way that the idea approved in general assembly came from residents rather than from the 
committee, it also underlined that when the project was put to a test, in case of problems, 
upward accountability to the field staff of IRC was the overriding principle.  
                                                          
56 Participant observation made in Busherega, Burhinyi, 20 March 2009. 
57 Interview with 2 male development agents based in Birhala Burhinyi, 16 April 2009. 
58 Participant observation made in the Muli public meeting on project budget re-approval, Burhinyi, 24 March 
2009.  
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4.7. Conclusion 
Democratic accountability has become one of the popular themes in conflict-affected areas, 
especially regarding local governance principles, because it is connected with root causes of 
conflict in developing countries. Accountability is also a key element in the software side of 
the Tushiriki programme, one of the CDR programmes that took place in eastern DRC from 
2008 to 2010.  
This paper has analyzed people’s views about democratic accountability and its three 
mechanisms as applied in the Tushiriki programme. We have shown that the implementation 
of the three mechanisms did not have a major impact on levels of accountability within the 
programme. Just like technical development interventions, also interventions on the software 
side are not neutral, and need to be embedded into the local context to achieve the desired 
level of impact. The first mechanism presented in this paper was the General Assembly 
Reporting . The setting of the church service to organize a public meeting was well-chosen 
and turn out at the meeting was relatively high. Yet, it was not a setting in which people were 
used to discussions. Besides, according to local culture, financial matters should not be 
spoken out in public. Hence, the mechanism of public meetings to increase financial 
accountability does not seem to be adequate. The second mechanism discussed was the 
prescribed display of reports at public places within the communities. This had limited impact 
due to high levels of illiteracy. Besides, reports were often removed rapidly by people 
unaware of the message. People were clearly more used to absorbing information through 
oral narratives than in writing. 
Thirdly, we discussed the watchdog role of CBOs. We showed that CBOs often either 
lacked the capacity to fulfill this task, or were too closely connected to the VDCs to really act 
as a critical counterweight. The latter seems to be something that is difficult to overcome in 
small communities, the lack of capacity was tried to overcome through training, but with 
limited results for various reasons.  
In the latter part of the paper, we analyzed how the staff of IRC, notwithstanding their 
support for the ideas of social and community-based accountability in practice stepped away 
from this idea. To some extent, they adapted the idea of accountability to local conditions, for 
example by preferring to dialogue with power holders rather than demanding accountability. 
On the other hand, they also undermined local accountability in practice when they over-
rided this by demanding accountability to the staff and the IRC rather than to the community. 
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Can we conclude from all this that people did not care about accountability? This is 
certainly not the case. Based on our interviews, observation and participation, we are 
confident to say that people did care about it. Yet, accountability, in their perceptions took 
different shapes, and thus needs to be ‘read’ differently by development agencies to be well 
understood. This was reflected, amongst others, in the words of the mason who said that 
levels of trust between people allowed them to ask questions when needed. As long as the 
concrete results of the programme became visible and tangible to people, they did not care as 
much about the way in which the results had come about.  
For successful implementation of mechanisms of accountability, agencies need to make 
sure that the mechanisms are embedded in the local context. For example, it has been noted 
that village networks in Cambodia provided a useful and replicable method of developing 
participatory local governance in rural areas, because they take into account the values and 
norms associated with traditional forms of collective action.
59
 In the Tushiriki programme 
this was formally not yet the case. Stronger embeddedness and a more appropriate translation 
of abstract concepts into the local context might be a way forward to develop a sustainable 
culture of democratic accountability. This might lead to a more durable culture of local 
governance in DRC and similar contexts in conflict-affected areas, and thus contribute, to 
some extent, to the alleviation of poverty in this environment. 
                                                          
59 Pellini, A. and D. Ayres (2007), ‘Community participation in local governance in Cambodia: learning from 
the village networks approach’, Development in Practice, vol. 17, no 3, p. 404-409. 
CHAPTER 4: Institutional engineering 
113 
 
 
Photo 4.1: NGO partner to Tushiriki sensitising on accountability and transparency in Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 4.2: Cibanda II VDC postage on material bought for local road reconstruction, Luhwindja
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Photo 4.3: Residents public meeting in a church before project budget’s approval in Mubone, Luhwindja 
 
Photo 4.4: Residents outside a church before attending a VDC public meeting in Mujindi, Luhwindja 
 115 
 
5. Power holders and social dynamics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been submitted for publication as: 
Kyamusugulwa, P.M.
60
, & Hilhorst, D. (2014). Power holders and social dynamics of 
community-driven reconstruction in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. World 
Development.
                                                          
60 Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa is a PhD candidate working on community-driven reconstruction at 
Wageningen University. This research was funded by The Dutch Government through its agency based in the 
Hague, Stichting Vluchteling. Dorothea Hilhorst is Professor of Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction at 
Wageningen University. The authors are grateful to Paul Richards for his significant contribution to this paper 
and Carolien Jacobs for her valuable comments during the revisions of the current paper. 
CHAPTER 5: Power holders and social dynamics 
116 
 
ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, post-conflict reconstruction involves participatory programmes where communities 
select and implement small scale reconstruction projects with the double aim to restore 
infrastructure and services and to enhance accountable development politics. This paper analyses 
the types and dynamics of power relations within such a community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR) programme in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. While CDR aims to empower 
the population and by-pass local elites, deemed to be predatory, we find that village-level 
projects owe their success to the interventions in the programme by these elites. The selection 
and execution of reconstruction projects was less the outcome of a democratic process whereby 
local people freely express a preference for the public good but the outcome of existing power 
holders actions. Rather than capturing the immediate benefits of the projects, power holders that 
represent existing institutions based on kinship relations, common identity, and religion, often 
had more interest in promoting good project implementation, as a means to strengthen their 
power base in the community. Hence, some elites are better than others. The article further 
builds on the project data base to demonstrate that in current DRC churches are more powerful in 
local development than chiefs. The paper concludes that in Eastern DRC development 
programmes should bring churches into the equation of governance and invest in understanding 
better the working and accountability of churches for development. 
Key words: – Community-driven reconstruction, power holders, social dynamics, power relations, power 
over power, Democratic Republic of Congo.  
5.1.Introduction  
Post-conflict reconstruction in the 1990s was criticised for being too state-centred and top-
down
61
. In response, development agencies have increasingly sought to develop alternative 
approaches that aim to strengthen institutions at the local level. One of these approaches, 
popularised by the World Bank and international NGOs, is community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR) where democratic institutions are introduced in communities to select, manage and 
implement reconstruction projects. These programmes have the dual objective to restore 
services and infrastructure, while enhancing accountability in development. In conflict-
affected Eastern DRC, large-scale CDR programmes have been implemented by the 
International Rescue Committee. 
While building accountable development committees in villages, CDR programmes need to 
consider how to deal with established power holders, that may not be perceived by the 
                                                          
61 See, for example R. Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004). See also S. Barakat, and S. Zyck, ‘The Evolution of Post-conflict Recovery’, Third World 
Quarterly 30, 6 (2009), pp.1069–86. 
CHAPTER 5: Power holders and social dynamics 
117 
 
intervening parties as accountable or democratic.
62
 CDR programmes then face the strategic 
question whether to by-pass existing power holders or to involve them. The IRC has opted for 
the first strategy and sought to establish elected committees of men and women that would 
handle a small fund for local reconstruction. The programme is grounded in the idea that 
people’s involvement in decision making strengthens their capacity to manage the shift from 
conflict to development
63
. Involving citizens directly in governance systems would enable 
citizens to by-pass local authorities or to call these authorities to account for their duties. Our 
research has ethnographically followed the implementation of one of the IRC implemented 
CDR programme, called Tushiriki
64
 (meaning. let us become involved in together), which 
was funded by the Netherlands-based Stichting Vluchteling. 
Our research focused on the role of elites in the CDR programme. Even though they were 
not part of the design of the programme, which aimed to by-pass the elite, we assumed that 
elites would nonetheless play a role in the programme. We wanted to examine the role of 
elites to enhance our understanding of the dynamics of community-driven reconstruction. At 
the same time, we wanted to use the research to observe ‘elite in action’ and seek what this 
could tell us about local power relations in Eastern DRC. It is recognised that chiefs, religious 
leaders, or other forms of authority play a crucial role in public sector reform and 
participatory development interventions
65
, yet their actual role and interactions are under-
researched
66
. Moreover, development programmes in Eastern DRC are wary of elite capture – 
the appropriation of development for personal benefits rather than the public good – and this 
paper therefore explores how and to what effect elite interfere in the projects. As 
participatory approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and development aim to render power 
relationships inclusive, just, and pro-poor, we argue that and this should start with 
                                                          
62 P.M. Kyamusugulwa, ‘Participatory development and reconstruction: a literature review’, Third World 
Quarterly 34,7(2013), p.1272. 
63 K. Maynard, and N. Jodi, ‘The role of culture, Islam and Tradition in Community-Driven Reconstruction: A 
Study on International Rescue Committee's Approach to Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program’, 
(International Rescue Committee, New York, 2007, p. 2). 
64 The Tushiriki programme was very similar to the larger Tuungance programme, financed by the DFID. 
65 H. Blair, ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries’, 
World Development 28, 1 (2000), p. 25. See C. Sneddon and C. Fox, ‘Power, Development, and Institutional 
Change : Participatory Governance in the Lower Mekong Basin’, World Development 35, 12 (2007), p. 2162. 
66
 H. Lyne, ‘Leadership, Politics and Development: A Literature Survey. Background Paper 3, Developmental 
leadership program: Policy and Practice for Developmental Leaders, Elites and Coalitions, 62 (2008), p.1; Z. 
Scott, ‘Evaluation of the public sector governance reforms 2001-2011: Literature Review’, Oxford Policy 
Management, (2011), p. 25. 
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understanding where and how to engage.
67
 Power holders, who represent existing institutions 
based on kinship relations, common identity, and religion, may be spoilers for developments, 
yet they can also bring about the potential for development initiatives to succeed.  
Governance has in DRC historically been organized by a multiplicity of institutions, where 
the state may not play the central role next to traditional leaders, religious organisations or 
international actors of development. Churches, in particular, have developed as authorities in 
the domain of service provision, such as health and education. The practices that evolve 
around community-driven reconstruction provide a window to examine the relative power of 
these different authorities and the ways they relate, intertwine or compete with each other. 
How do these elites connect, which elite is more influential than others, and where does the 
real power lie? How do existing agencies influence the outcome of one or another 
intervention? And, importantly, is elite capture always detrimental to development? 
By analysing the role of power holders in community-driven reconstruction, this paper 
also aims to contribute to debates on governance in DRC. While it is widely recognised that 
governance in DRC is hybrid, or characterised by institutional multiplicity, the actual 
relations and everyday forms of interaction between different authorities is little understood, 
even though this is crucial in shaping governance on the ground. How does institutional 
multiplicity affect order and security, public service provision, and the regulation of access 
and entitlements?
68
 By following the processes of selecting projects for reconstruction in 34 
villages, we have aimed to establish the relative weight of elites in the governance of public 
service provision. For this, we followed in a number of cases if church leaders or local chiefs 
were the more dominant in decision-making and implementation of the project, and sought 
how this related to development outcomes. As church leaders consistently favour school 
buildings, while chiefs prefer road construction, the distribution of these projects tell us 
something about the relative power of these elites. This is consistent with the study of Titeca 
and De Herdt (2011) who found that in the DRC, while the State manages the schools, 
churches administer them. The outcome directs our gaze to churches as the most influential 
                                                          
67 See for example J. Gaventa, ‘Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis’, IDS Bulletin 37, 6, (2006), 
pp. 23–27. See also S. Hickey and U. Kothari, ‘Participation’, Elsevier (2009), p. 89. 
68 G. Van der Haar, and M. Heijke, ‘Conflict, governance and institutional multiplicity: parallel governance in 
Kosovo and Chiapas (Mexico)’. In: D. Hilhorst (ed) Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises; Everyday politics 
of crisis and crisis response, (2013), London Routledge. 
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authority for development, which raises a number of questions for development policies and 
strategies in DRC
69
. 
The next section of the paper elaborates the conceptual framework that underpins the 
analysis and is followed by a section that describes the evolution of the state, church and 
traditional authorities in the DRC and South-Kivu. Having set out this context, the paper 
presents three sections with findings from the practices of community-driven reconstruction, 
showing the pervasive influence of elites in the implementation of the programme, the ways 
in which different levels and types of power interact, and the relative power of authorities at 
the local level. The final section discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
5.2. Power, authority and elites 
The concept of power holders refers in the first place to authority, legitimacy and force. A 
figure of authority derives a certain command over others on account of his/ her knowledge 
or position. Max Weber classifies legitimate authority into three types: rational, traditional, 
and charismatic.
70
 Rational domination is based on a system of rules under which those in 
power issue commands. Traditional domination is based on a belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising commands under 
them. Charismatic domination rests on devotion to the exceptional sanctions, heroism, or 
exemplary character of an individual person and the normative patterns exposed or meant by 
him
71
. The three types of legitimation can co-incide and reinforce each other. In central 
African countries, particularly in the eastern DRC, authority is often primarily anchored in 
‘spiritual powers’, or the energy to command special healing powers.72 People believe that 
those holding positions of authority, such as kings and church leaders, are endowed with 
spiritual power, which is not only subject to control and legitimation, but can also be used for 
blessing or cursing. 
In recent years, governance in DRC – as in many contemporary African states – has been 
characterised as a hybrid political order, or a situation of institutional multiplicity. In hybrid 
                                                          
69 K. Titeca and T. De Herdt,’Real governance beyond the ‘failed state’: negotiating education in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, African Affairs, 110/439 (2011), p. 213–231  
70 J. Pakulski, ‘Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet-Type Societies’, 
British Journal of Political Science 16, 1 (1986), p. 37. 
71 S. Wolin, ‘Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory’, Political Theory 9(3) (1981), p. 
407–416. 
72 M. Douglas, ‘Powers and dangers’, Purity and Danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo, 
(1966), pp. 3–4. 
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political orders, as defined by Boege, Brown and Clements (2009), diverse and competing 
authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, 
interact and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and 
elements stemming from local indigenous traditions’73 There is institutional multiplicity in 
the sense that there are multiple sets of institutions that are each derived from different 
normative frames, building on separate historical trajectories of legitimation
74
 Authority, and 
the power commanded by authority in DRC is thus not a given but the outcome of interaction 
between these different power holders and the population. Authority and elites are closely 
connected concepts in DRC. Members of the elite find their power in their position, 
strengthened by elements of economic power and/ or education. Military commanders, NGO 
employees, and school teachers are, for example, considered part of the elite. 
Relations of power are relations of social influence in which the opinions and attitudes of 
one person affect the opinions and attitudes of another person.
75
 Power holders may use hard 
strategies by seeking obedience through intimidation and aggression, they may use rational 
strategies by bargaining and logic, or they may use soft strategies by seeking submission by 
polite, friendly, or humbler manner.
76
 Webs of power are often woven through patron-client 
relations, where ‘patrons’ in DRC are often referred to as big men. People depend for their 
livelihoods in different ways on those who lead existing institutions.
 77
 These patronage 
relations are based on complex lineages and other social ties and kindled by hope that 
investing in the relationship will result in a certain level of social protection.
78
 Local people 
can tolerate their patrons, when they abuse the power in their hands, as long as the latter can 
meet the demands of the former, which demands are related to their daily livelihoods.  
                                                          
73 V. Boege, A. Brown and K. Clements, ‘Hybrid political orders, not fragile states’, Peace Review 21, 1 (2009) 
, pp. 13-21 
74 J. Di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the 
Literature’, Working Paper no. 25, (2008), London: Crisis States Research Centre. 
75 T. Wragg, ‘Modelling the Effects of Information Campaigns Using Agent-Based Simulation. Command and 
Control Division Defence Science and Technology Organisation’, (2006), p. 4. 
76 B. Adams, J. Sartori, et al., ‘Military Influence Operations : Review of Relevant Scientific Literature’, Human 
Systems International, (2007), p. 21. 
77 J. Daloz, ‘“Big Men” in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources’, Comparative 
Sociology 2, 1 (2003), pp. 278-79. See also J. Platteau, ‘Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-Driven 
Development’, Development and Change 35, 2 (2004), p. 227, P. Richards, K. Bah, et al., ‘The Social 
Assessment Study : Community-driven Development and Social Capital in Post-war Sierra Leone’, (World 
Bank, 2004). 
78 G. Wood, ‘Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The ‘‘Faustian Bargain’’’, World Development 31, 3 (2003), pp. 
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The relation between elites and development are diverse. While the concern of elite 
capture, where power may be exercised for individual interest rather than for community 
interest has often dominated development debates
79
, we find increasing recognition that elite 
control can also be exerted for popular benefit rather than for personal enrichment.
80
 CDR 
aims to enhance the motivation of populations for the development of public goods. Ostrom 
defines public good as the one that ‘yields non-subtractive benefits that can be enjoyed jointly 
by many people who are hard to exclude from obtaining these benefits’81. In relation to 
supplying public goods, elite involvement can take the form of ‘bad elite capture’ where local 
decisions are made by powerful local elites, who can dominate participatory development 
either by choosing projects that represent their own preferences rather than community 
preferences or by misusing the funds provided to the community
82
. At the same time, 
community members can desist from complaining about a project, even when it did not 
reflect their choice, for fear of not receiving another project in the future
83
. On the other hand, 
in the context of Africa, elite involvement may take the form of ‘good elite capture’ where 
notions of moral obligation and interpersonal accountability contribute to channel energies 
into family, ethnicity, religion, and ritual, which are potential foundations on which to build a 
new development strategy. Although we often speak of power holders, power cannot be held 
but becomes manifest in its execution, and we have to establish empirically how this works 
out in practice and why certain elites are better than others. The CDR programme provides an 
opportunity to observe these processes in action. 
5.3. Power and governance in the DRC and South-Kivu 
Institutional multiplicity can encompass a range of different sets of institutions, including the 
state, non-state or rebel authorities, external interventions, social movements or religious 
orders. For service provision, the most central institutions are the state and the traditional 
authorities on the one hand, and churches on the other. In this section, they are briefly 
introduced. 
                                                          
79 See J. Platteau, and F. Gaspart, ‘Disciplining Local Leaders in Community-Based Development’ (Namur, 
2003, p. 2). 
80 A. Dasgupta and V. Beard, ‘Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in 
Indonesia’, Development and Change 38, 2 (2007), p. 244. 
81 E.Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 1990: Cambridge 
University Press. See also T. Kelsall, ‘Game-theoretic models, social mechanisms and public goods in Africa: a 
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 7’ (Institute of Development Studies, 2009, p. 2). 
82 See H. Blair, op cit, pp. 24–25; I. Munoz, M. Paredes, et al., op cit, pp.1940. 
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 For example see J. Labonne and R. Chase, op cit, p. 4. 
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5.3.1. Clans, kings, state history 
Vansina describes pre-colonial society of the Shi kingdoms, now the Kivus, as consisting of 
dispersed settlements, tied into a political tradition of centralisation based on a sacred 
kingship. The title of Mwami, or king, was restricted to the oldest son of the first wife, 
whereas other sons were princes that formed an aristocracy that was a framework of the 
state.
84
 The legitimacy of the king and chiefs in precolonial time stemmed from power over 
land and cattle.
85
 Sosne states that “each Shi kingdom is headed by a ruler (Mwami) to whom 
all the land and cattle in his region belong”.86 The personality of the king is meant to embody 
the identity of his people, and the belief that the position of the king is sacred is strongly 
attached to the tradition of the Shi culture. People owe obedience to the king and to his 
representatives who are local chiefs. The Shi proverb “Ecihugo cirhali mwo, mwami, 
cithalonge era, cirhania na nkula”, meaning “a State without a king can be neither consistent 
nor prosperous”, exemplifies the taken-for-granted respect for a king in this society since pre-
colonial era until today
87
. 
With the passage of time, however, especially when local livelihood became much more 
based on salary as a result of employment, or based on self-employment through trade or gold 
exploitation, the power basis of land and cattle has changed, gradually affecting the sacred 
power of the king. The Shi proverb “Obwami kwali mira, bunola”, or “The kingdom was 
from times gone by, nowadays a good salary is better than cows”, is illustrative. Nonetheless, 
as land continues to be important, the kingdom remains the major institution to settle land 
disputes. 
Notwithstanding the respect kings had before the arrival of the Belgians in the area, the 
institution of kingship suffered during colonial times, both in its tradition and in its power 
over its people. Starting in 1906, each chiefdom became part of the colonial administrative 
system which led to a major attrition of the royal system. Chiefs that were not loyal to the 
colonial system were suspended or replaced by chiefs without any ancestral ties to the 
                                                          
84 J. Vansina (eds), Paths in the Rainforests:Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa, (The 
University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1990), pp. 183–184. 
85 T. Kelsall (2008) Going with the Grain in African Development? Development Policy Review 26, 6 (2008) 
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86 E. Sosne, ‘Of Biases and Queens: The Shi past through and Androgynous Looking Glass’, History in Africa 
6, (1979), pp. 225–52. 
87 C. Munzihirwa, ‘Pouvoir royal et idéologie : rôle du mythe, des rites et des proverbes dans la monarchie 
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populations
88
. A similar pattern was seen in the recent wars when some rebellion movements 
forced the loyalty of the Kings to gain control over the populations.
89
 Another difference was 
that the colonial administration confiscated land to establish national parks and anti-erosion 
forests
90
. 
During the Mobutu regime in the post-independence era, the status of traditional leaders 
was partly revived when traditional leaders either became part of Mobutu’s networks to 
consolidate his power or recovered a certain place in the acquisition of land. In 1973 Mobutu 
introduced a law declaring all land property of the state, and the Bami (representing several 
Mwamis) were placed in a position to mediate between networks of customary law and state 
patronage.
91
 In the post-war constitution of 18 February 2006, customary authorities are 
given a role to link the central adminitration to the population. Article 207 of this 
Constitution states: “The customary authority is recognized. It is devolved according to the 
local custom, as much as it is not contrary to the Constitution, to the law, to the public order 
and to good habits. Every customary chief who desires to exert an elective public mandate 
should be elected, or be coopted for a mandate of five years renewable. The customary 
authority has the duty to promote national unity and cohesion’. Nowadays, among 261 
chiefdoms and 476 sectors in the DRC, 18 chiefdoms and five sectors are in South-Kivu 
province
92
. As figure 5.1 shows, official state representation reaches until the level of the 
territory, where the chef de poste d’encadrement administratif (CPEA)93 is the administrator. 
Territories comprise multiple chiefdoms and groupements, that are ruled by traditional 
leaders that are linked to the state administration. The traditional kings and chiefs exercise 
                                                          
88 See P. Ngoma-Binda, M. Otemikongo, et al., République Démocratique du Congo, Démocratie et 
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93 In fact, he is based in the administrative centre of a chiefdom located far from where the territory 
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CHAPTER 5: Power holders and social dynamics 
124 
 
power over their people by controlling the local administration and by controlling land under 
a legal pluralistic system.
94
 
Figure 5.1: Administrative Structure at Territory Level in South-Kivu province 
Source: Kyamusugulwa 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Church history and governance structure 
The Catholic Church and Protestant churches played and continue to play a significant role in 
the education and health sectors in the DRC, especially in South-Kivu province. As the 
Belgians could conquer eastern Congo only after western Congo in the late 19
th
 century, 
formal Protestant missionary activity could only reach this area in the earlier 20
th
 century. 
Seay notes that Congo is among a few countries where the government (both colonial and 
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This process will remain unchanged even in the context of decentralization, because according to the 
Constitution of 18 February 2006, the customary authority is recognized and that it is devolved according to the 
local custom, as much as it is not contrary to the Constitution, to the law, to the public order and to good habits. 
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(i) CPEA: The Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif / representative of the Territory Administrator, who 
is based in the chef-lieu of a chiefdom other than where the Territory Administrator is based.  
(ii) One Territory consists of more than one chiefdom. For instance, the Mwenga Territory comprises the 
Basile, Burhinyi, Luhwindja, Lwindi, Wamuzimu chiefdoms, and Itombwe sector. The difference between a 
chiefdom and sector resides in the fact that the former is a traditional system based on kingship; that is, 
a dynasty of one ruling family, where the chiefdom is a homogenous entity in terms of ethnic group. 
However, the latter is more consensual or democratic system of ruling the entity, whereby each ethnic 
group that composes the entity has the chance to rule it for a mandate of five years. This system is 
applied where there are more than one ethnic groups living in the same area. 
(iii) Below every king or chief of sector are chiefs of groupements, below whom, are chief of villages. In The 
case of a chiefdom, chiefs of groupements as well as chiefs of villages are appointed by the King. 
(iv) FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo/Congolese Army. In chiefdoms affected 
by conflict, some units are deployed in order to fight against enemies, who may be either the FDLR 
Interamwe; that is, the former Rwandese Army that fled to eastern DRC after the genocide of 1994 or 
other local militia such as the Mai-Mai. Although these units collaborate with the local administration; that 
is, the King and the CPEA, they depend on military officials at both provincial and national levels. 
(v) Tribunal: at each chiefdom or sector, there is a Tribunal de collectivité/chiefdom or sector tribunal, that 
rests under the authority of the King or the chief of Sector. When grievances cannot be solved at this 
layer, the plaintiff can appeal to the tribunal of peace, nowadays functioning with well-educated judges at 
territory level. Otherwise, s/he can appeal to courts at district tribunal as well as at provincial level and 
even at national level. 
 
Peace Tribunal 
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independent) allowed first the missionaries and then the national church to organise and 
administer the school system for the rest of the nation.
95
 In the South-Kivu, like in other parts 
of the former Kivu province, the Catholic Church was established alongside the colonial 
administrators for the evangelisation and civilising mission
96
. 
In 1973, during the post-independence era, the Mobutu regime took the step to nationalise 
not all schools and hospitals as well as foreign-owned businesses, a policy known as 
Zairianisation. Its effects were quickly devastating, to the extent that a clear decline in the 
provision of services by the state was visible. This was the turning point in the Mobutist state, 
which became more and more unable to fulfill the supposed functions of a state, such as the 
provision of education and health services. In 1977, nationalised education was so bad that 
Mobutu asked churches to resume their responsibilites in the administration and management 
of public schools. As the Mobutist state withdrew its responsibilities in the education sector, 
it did so as well in the health sector, leaving a space for civil society organisations to take 
over state functions. It was no surprise that in the 1990s, during the wars, and even in the 
aftermath of the conflicts, the state did not have the ability to recover its functions. If roads 
were not maintained, then schools and hospitals were not equiped and teachers and health 
professionals were not paid. 
Now, what is the governance structure in church organisations? This description is 
important because churches do not simply partner with the government to provide health care 
and education; they can also be seen as substitutes for or competitors with the state. The 
churches have always retained a certain autonomy from the state. They are part of the few 
Congolese institutions that never collapsed, and they did not become part of the patronage 
networks of the Mobutist regime
97
.  
In the main research areas for this paper, Burhinyi and Luhwindja, two churches are 
dominant: the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant church initiated by the Mission 
Libre Norvegienne, nowadays known as the 5e Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte 
en Afrique (5e CELPA). Both types of churches were initiated by missionaries from Europe 
(from Italy and Belgium for the Catholic Church, and from Norway for the Protestant 
                                                          
95 L. Seay, ‘Authority at Twilight: Civil Society, Social Services, and the State in the Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo’, University of Texas at Austin, PhD Dissertation, (2009), p. 142. 
96 See M. Ganywamulume, ‘Conflits Religieux dans la Collectivité de Kaziba (1922–1996)’, Histoire, Institut 
Superieur Pédagogique, Bukavu, Licence en Pédagogie Appliquée (1997), p. 15. 
97 Please see L. Seay, op cit. 
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church). The Catholic Church is more hierarchical, as its administration follows a strict 
vertical line from the Pope in Rome, by way of the Archbishop in Bukavu to the head priest 
at a local parish. The Protestant church is more decentralised: it has its head office in Bukavu, 
followed downward by a church district in an area where many of its local churches spread 
out into villages. Upward, the 5e CELPA is member of the Eglise du Christ au Congo, which 
is a body that represents all Protestant churches recognised by the Congolese state, with its 
head office based in Bukavu and in Kinshasa. There is one Catholic parish in every chiefdom, 
and every parish manages a variety of chapels that depend on it. The 5e CELPA has 
experienced exponential growth during the movement of evangelisation of the area, and now 
has churches in practically every village. The vast expansion resulted in ill-equipped 
initiatives to build schools and the late 1990s conflict-related violence exacerbated the 
destruction of infrastructures that were already ill-constructed. 
Both types of churches benefit from aid agencies: the Roman Catholic Church from 
agencies such as Caritas International and Catholic Relief Services, and the Protestant church 
by organisations related to Norwegian agencies. Subsidies are directed to activities such as 
education, health, and the like. In short, as Kelsall (2008) observed, one can notice how these 
churches very much affect the daily life of inhabitants of these chiefdoms in both spirituality 
and social services.
98
 Both churches are locally governed by a church committee which is 
more accountable to church leaders than to church members. In fact, neither the church 
committee nor the assembly of church members can sack a senior pastor or a priest. 
5.4. The Tushiriki as a community-driven reconstruction programme 
Community Driven Reconstruction applies the methodology of community-driven 
development to a post-conflict setting. It focuses on building a governance structure that 
stresses local choice and accountability and promotes quick and efficient delivery of 
reconstruction assistance locally.
99
 
Tushiriki is a CDR programme implemented by the US-based International Rescue 
Committee. CDR aims to work directly with citizens, rather than with authorities or elites. It 
delineates areas of intervention of around 17,177 families/households. These areas usually do 
                                                          
98 See T. Kelsall (2008) Going with the Grain in African Development? Development Policy Review 26, 6 
(2008) p.638. 
99 S. Tanaka , J. Singh, et al., ‘A Review of Community-Driven Development and Its application to the Asian 
Development Bank’, (Asian Development Bank, 2006), pp. 1–30. 
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not coincide with the regular administrative organisation of groupements, but they are 
nonetheless called ‘villages’. In every target area 10 representatives (five men and five 
women) are selected to form the Village Development Committee. There are also larger 
target areas, consisting of 34 VDCs, which are called ‘sub-communities’ and which are 
governed by committees made up of representatives of the VDCs. After a series of meetings 
– where at least 40% of the adult population must be present – each target village got an 
amount of US$ 3,000 to use for a reconstruction project of choice by the community. In 
addition, communities received an amount varying from US$ 50,000 through US$ 70,000, 
depending on the size of the community population
100
. In this paper, we focus on the village 
level, as at the time of fieldwork the community level processes became more contractor-
driven than community-driven. For instance, in Cibanda II community, committee members 
complained that they had little to say in decision making of mobilizing residents to construct 
digs for water pipes, because these were paid by the contractor without any consent of the 
CDC committee.  
5.4.1. Setting  
This research was undertaken in the DRC, South-Kivu province, in Mwenga territory, 
especially in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms, where the Tushiriki CDR programme 
that was implemented by the IRC intervention took place, from 2008 through 2010. Burhinyi 
is 94 kilometres and Luhwindja is 67 kilometres away from the provincial capital of Bukavu. 
The population belong to the Shi ethnic group. Burhinyi and Luhwindja are two chiefdoms 
populated by 103,066 inhabitants, Burhinyi has 18 groupements, and Luhwindja 9. There 
were 34 Tushiriki villages in total in the two chiefdoms, with a total of 44,173 inhabitants. 
These ‘villages’ were composed of approximately 1,200 inhabitants each, often a hamlet of a 
groupement. The 34 ‘villages’ were grouped together in 8 ‘communities’, consisting of 
roughly 6,000 inhabitants each.  
5.4.2. Research methodology 
This paper is based on qualitative research in 15 of 34 target villages by the Tushiriki/IRC 
programme in the chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja, which means on four of eight target 
communities: Budaha and Birhala in the Burhinyi chiefdom and Cibanda II and Karhundu in 
the Luhwindja chiefdom. The paper presents findings from these 15 villages, and highlight 
cases of two villages, which were purposively selected to analyse issues of power relations 
                                                          
100 IRC and CARE, ‘Les Protocoles de TUUNGANE en République Démocratique du Congo’, (International 
Rescue Committee, Bukavu, 2009). 
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and social dynamics during the programme implementation. Both villages were small in size 
and homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. In Mubone, the church played an active role in the 
project, exemplifying the role of elites observed in the research areas. Ciriri was 
simultaneously targeted by more than one international agency for reconstruction, and was 
exceptional in becoming the locus of an open contestation of local authority, providing 
insights into the interlocking layers of power that operate in DRC.  
During the period of data collection, Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa spent nearly two 
years (i.e., from 2008 to 2010) in the area, where he did both formal and informal interviews, 
some of which were repeated (i.e., done several times) as they took place at different 
moments of the project implementation. These interviews were semi-structured and coupled 
with participant observation during both project planning and execution. For instance, Patrick 
Milabyo Kyamusugulwa participated in public meetings held under the Tushiriki programme 
regarding election, and project approval and reporting, as well as Sunday church services in 
both Catholic and Protestant churches, to understand the role played by churches in the 
project. He also participated in manual work during local road reconstruction, where he 
identified the main actors in the processes of project execution. Finally, he visited the 
reconstruction sites, which were subsidised by other agencies, such as Comité Anti-
Bwaki/ICCO
101
 and Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale/United Nations 
International Children and Emergency Fund (AVSI/UNICEF). 
Participants in the interviews were local authorities (i.e., the CPEA, the chief of locality, 
the chief of groupement, and the chief of chiefdom/Mwami) and religious leaders (i.e., senior 
pastors, the head catholic priest/Curé and church elders), residents of the respective villages 
(i.e., men and women) and the educated elite (schoolmaster, teachers, and students of 
secondary school) who led most of the VDCs. In total 134 participants, some of whom were 
interviewed individually or collectively, provided their views on what occurred in their 
respective villages.
102
  
5.4.3. Mubone: the role of elites in CDR 
Mubone is a village located in the Karhundu groupement in the southeast of the Luhwindja 
chiefdom. It is reachable by a 20-minute walk from the main road Kaziba-Luhwindja. Its 
                                                          
101 ICCO is the interchuch organisation for development cooperation. See http://www.icco.nl 
102 Some interviews were recorded on tape, while others were not, because of lack of energy in this rural area of 
South-Kivu. These interviews (both formal and informal, recorded or not) were transcribed into a field 
manuscript book by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa. 
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inhabitants are originally from the same ethnic group, the Bahwindjahwindja in this rural 
area. Majority is protestant and belongs to the 5e CELPA church, some residents are catholic.  
The dominant institution in the area is the 5e CELPA local church. Its compound also 
houses the only school in the area that is built and managed by the church. The church leaders 
are highly respected in the area. They embody the power to baptize new Christians and pray 
for those who have misfortune, for marriage and for peace in the area. As in other areas 
where church leaders are initiators of schools and health centres/posts, they also symbolise 
power over the schoolmaster of the Mubone primary school. They have a say in who has 
access to school. Their position in the village also puts them in a privileged connection with 
chiefs, police and military authorities. 
The influence of the church was highly visible in the composition of the Village 
Development Committee of the Tushiriki. Two of the ten positions of the VDC were 
occupied by the senior pastor and his wife. Other influential members in the VDC were either 
members or elders of the same church. The male VDC president was one of the elders of this 
church and the schoolmaster of another 5e CELPA primary school in the neighbouring 
village. Other influential VDC members (including the female VDC president) were teachers 
at a primary school. Catholic members represented 30% of the VDC, among whom was one 
teacher at another school, which was managed by the Catholic Church.  
During the project selection meeting, which took place in the church, the Mubone primary 
school, which was in lamentable status before its reconstruction, was selected as the village 
project within the Tushiriki/IRC programme. Before the project was selected a number of 
public meetings were organised to elect VDC members, approve the project’s budget and 
others. As time passed by before the actual start of the project, residents became less 
interested in public meetings. They felt the Tushiriki/IRC was not different from other 
agencies that made promises without any concrete realisation in the village. 
As the regulations of Tushiriki required one more meeting before the money could be 
disbursed, the church leaders – still confident in the project – stepped in. During a church 
service, the VDC president and church elder announced: “Last time, the Tushiriki meeting 
was cancelled for lack of quorum (i.e., 40% of adult population of the entire village). We run 
the risk of losing the Tushiriki funding. If you say ‘yes’ the project will continue. How can 
you allow that our school, the school in which your kids are studying, to be not reconstructed 
because of your absence in a meeting!”. He then gave the instruction: “Presidents of the local 
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three choirs, please take care of your people. We would like to see everybody there, christians 
and no christians”.103 While the announcement was given, the senior pastor stood at the main 
door of the church building, paying particular attention to how participants reacted. The next 
day the meeting was held and indeed the quorum was met and the budget unanimously 
approved. Voting happened by posing a form in either the YES box or the (smaller) NO box 
(Cfr. Photo1.1). There was no confidentiality as everyone could see in which box every one 
puts the voting ticket.
104
 In the case of Mubone, the chief was present at the church service 
and the public meeting, but took no active role in the meetings or the supervision of the 
project execution. 
Photo1.1: Difference of box size for project’s budget approval in Mubone village 
 
The active role of the church continued during the implementation of the project. When 
Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa visited the village on 22 January 2009, he found the senior 
                                                          
103 Participant observation made by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa, on 16 November 2008 in Mubone 5e 
CELPA church. 
104 Participant observation made by Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa, on 17 November 2008 during project’s 
budget approval in Mubone 5e CELPA church. 
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pastor burning bricks for the school in a kiln, where a group of school children was producing 
bricks, under the strict supervision of their schoolmaster. Women were mobilized by the 
church heads to carry sand from the Namnana river to the top of the mountain where the 
school was located (about an hour’s walk).  
Residents who were not members of this church contributed less, if at all, to the 
community work seen as local participation, although they were interested in the project. One 
Catholic mother considered the school to be part of the Protestant church, and she was not 
approached to carry sand. Nonetheless, she intended to send her kid to the school once it was 
completed as it would be closer to her household. In 2010, when the project ended, the 
village got its three classrooms completely rebuilt (at least according to the standards of the 
area).  
 
 
The Mubone case illustrates the influence of the local elite, in this case the church, on the 
Community Driven Reconstruction programme. This was typical for the cases observed in 
our research. In the CDR programme, the committee members are supposed to be powerful. 
However, due to overlapping identities and networks, they lean more to the elites than to the 
people. They could even be seen as part of the elites, or the upcoming elite because they are 
linked either to chiefs (traditional authorities) or to church leaders (Cfr. Figure 5.2). In some 
areas chiefs were dominant, in others churches but invariably these authorities took control 
VDC’s:  
- co-president 
- co-secretary 
- co- treasurer 
- co- mobilizer 
- co- inclusion 
officer 
Church leaders 
Educated elite: schoolmaster, 
teachers, nurses 
Chief of chiefdom (King) 
Chief of groupement 
Young students 
(secondary school) 
Local people: literate, illiterate, men, women, young people, cultivator, wood workers, mine workers, jobless people, abandoned women, disable people, widows, etc. 
Chief of locality  
/ village 
Figure 5.2: Existing power structure and VDC election in Burhinyi 
and Luhwindja, South-Kivu province 
CPEA 
CDC’s 
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over the process in different ways. This included controlling the flow of information about 
reconstruction, bringing in their pre-existing agenda for reconstruction, getting themselves or 
their relatives elected in committees. It also included stimulating (or forcing) attendance in 
public meetings and participation in community works, by managing the intervention on the 
ground, for example in the case of road construction to give permission to use the land for the 
road.  
At the same time, the case of Mubone illustrates that elite control is not equal to elite 
capture. In the case of Mubone, the church dominated the project, yet the population felt they 
did so for the benefit of the community and they respected and appreciated the role of the 
church. Remarkably, the Tushiriki was designed to circumvent local authorities yet owed its 
success – in the case of Mubone and similar cases – to the influence of these authorities. 
5.4.4. Ciriri: inter-elite struggle  
Ciriri is a groupement located at the southeast of the Birhala groupement, the suburb and 
chef-lieu of the Burhinyi chiefdom. Given its small size and the homogeneity of its 
population, it is considered a village
105
 within the Tushiriki/IRC programme. It is accessible 
by footpath at nearly half an hour’s walk from Birhala. People originally from the same area, 
the Barhinyirhinyi, inhabit the village. They are from the Shi ethnic group that is dominant in 
this rural chiefdom.  
The existing institutions in the village include the chieftaincy, with which the residents of 
Ciriri identify themselves, and the 5e CELPA, the Protestant church
106
. The chief takes care 
of matters of security and organises regular administrative census. Chiefs are also the primary 
institution where people turn to in cases of disputes over land and livestock (Cfr Figure 5.1). 
Also and importantly, they take care of local customs and residents identity. Most of its 
residents are illiterate, and their social actions are influenced by both traditional customs and 
religious beliefs. The village has one primary school, the Ciriri primary school, which was 
initiated by the 5e CELPA local church in 1998. 
The chieftaincy and the church are particularly close in Ciriri. The current 5e CELPA 
senior pastor was the former chief of the groupement before he graduated at the Kakwende 
Bible school (a 5-year Bible study), leaving the chieftaincy to his young brother. In the eyes 
                                                          
105 Ciriri groupement is composed of 3 localities (Ciriri, Kabibi and Mulama), each of which is headed by a 
locality chief. 
106 While the 5è CELPA church is dominant in the groupement (about 367 members), there is a local catholic 
church (about 30 members). 
CHAPTER 5: Power holders and social dynamics 
133 
 
of the residents, despite the change at the top of the groupement, the senior pastor continued 
to influence decisions made at both chieftaincy and church. One female resident explained 
that he was very powerful, because he was tied to the Mwami and to 5e CELPA officials. She 
said: “We believe in what chiefs decide to do. We follow everything he decides to do”.107 The 
senior pastor was also influential in the Tushiriki process. 
The VDC in Ciriri selected the school as their reconstruction project. While the selection 
of projects should follow nominations by ordinary village people, the idea to reconstruct the 
school pre-dated the project and originated from the senior pastor: “The 5e CELPA church 
initiated this school construction. My effort, the effort of the church and of local people. My 
prayer was always how to get five thousands US dollars to rebuild it.”108 The pastor was able 
to mobilize funds from a different agency, CAB/ICCO, to rebuild 4 class-rooms, leaving 2 
class-rooms to be reconstructed under Tushiriki. At the end of the project, CAB/ICCO rebuilt 
6 classrooms, while two years later, the 2-Tushiriki classrooms were used as the local 5è 
CELPA church because its big building was under reconstruction. 
While the Tushiriki/IRC aimed to improve governance through reconstruction, CAB was 
only focusing on reconstruction of the infrastructure, or what we refer to as the hardware of 
development. There were only a few meetings and the agency provided all the material, hired 
masons and carpenters and paid the local technical labour involved. The money involved was 
kept secret, but believed to mount up to 25,000 USD. In comparison, Tushiriki only availed 
of 3,000 USD, only used local resources, and organised many public meetings during the first 
three months, for election of the VDC, for the project selection, for project approval, and for 
reporting about the on-going project. As a result, CAB was seen as a manna in the village, 
and people became reluctant to take part in the Tushiriki, especially because those who 
worked for the CAB project got regular wages. One of the residents explained: “Even if we 
transport material for reconstruction, there will not be exemption for school fees for our kids. 
So I prefer to go to my field rather than spend time for this project”. To enable completion of 
the project, the senior pastor distributed exercise books to the chiefs so that they could write 
down names of people who carried out or not everyday stones and sand. Eventually, after a 
lot of mobilization through church service and daily calls by the chief’s advisors to 
participate in the execution of the project, the school was finished in 2010.  
                                                          
107 Interview on 16 January 2009 with Giselle, female resident of Ciriri village.  
108 Interview on 20 April 2009 with Jusua, the senior pastor of Ciriri 5e CELPA church (also former Ciriri 
groupement chief) in Ciriri village. 
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The implementation of the Tushiriki was further riddled by inter-elite conflict, which had 
become prominent in earlier development interventions. When Patrick Milabyo 
Kyamusugulwa visited the area, reconstruction of the school was under the supervision of 
either the senior pastor or the chief of groupement. Residents were reluctant to talk with the 
researcher and referred him to the leaders, hinting that they would not want them to talk 
about the project. It turned out that there had been a conflict between the former headmaster 
of the Ciriri primary school and the senior pastor over the CAB school: “I have been in overt 
conflict with the Ciriri senior pastor about why I was not able to give him his percentage 
from 70 metal sheets I received (from an NGO) to construct the school. Or why I did not give 
to him or to his brother (groupement chief) a goat. He wanted his young brother to become 
schoolmaster in order to replace me. He wanted to kill me. God protected me”.109 Although 
the residents were aware of these complications and that projects were partly a means for the 
local elite to get funding from international agencies and therefore benefit from it in order to 
survive, they did not consider this irregular, as they believed that their chiefs were privileged 
because they represented the entire population.  
When the Tushiriki made its first cash disbursement to the VDC, this was misappropriated 
by the committee (a mix of chief(s) and church leaders). During their meeting, they 
distributed US$ 100, US$ 50, and US$ 10 to each other. In the case of Tushiriki, this became 
a big issue. When the Tushiriki staff heard people talking about it, he informed the Mwami 
about the misuse of funds, and the Mwami reacted promptly. He jailed the entire VDC, as 
well as the senior pastor and the chief of the groupement. They stayed in jail for up to two 
days and had to reimburse the funds. According to some local people, the male president of 
the VDC was even given a beating by the police. When Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa 
interviewed the Mwami on 31
st
 March 2010 about what happened in Ciriri village, the 
Mwami, a man in his 30s, who held a university degree and was inaugurated as a king in 
February 2008, mentioned that when he heard that news, he went to the place and decided to 
punish everyone involved. Continuing his thoughts, he said: 
You know, the value of my decision was to avoid corruption, embezzlement of Tushiriki funds 
in other villages. With that decision, I showed that the Tushiriki programme should work and 
leave signs here. What you see are the outputs, the effects of my decision implicitly. That is 
how I work. I am for the population, at the same time I punish the one who goes away! 
Otherwise we would not get the success we have now.  
                                                          
109 Interview on 20 March 2009 with Guillaume, the schoolmaster of Busherega primary school (former 
schoolmaster of Ciriri primary school).  
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In our interview, the Mwami gave different reasons for his intervention. On the one hand, he 
wanted to show that he understood the objective of the approach (governance through 
reconstruction) and that he wanted to contribute in his manner as a new type of educated 
King, holding a bachelor degree from University of Bukavu. He also explained that he 
wanted to secure the continued support of the IRC because he knew that the IRC, after 
supporting the villages, would disburse larger amounts of money to the community level. 
Last, he was motivated politically as in November 2011, he became candidate at the National 
parliament, unfortunately was elected in the second position.  
In Ciriri, the local elite attempted to capture the project. The appropriation of funds is 
regular local practice, and usually projects do not become controversial. The (larger) CAB 
project, for example, had led to inter-elite fighting over the distribution of the goods, but the 
appropriation in itself did not get challenged or sanctioned. In the case of the Tushiriki the 
handling of money became a public issue. This was not due to downward accountability and 
vigilance of the residents, but came about through inter-elite control. In particular, the Mwami 
in conjunction with the field staff of IRC intervened to avoid further elite capture of the 
project.  
While the local power-holders wanted to capture the project, we see in this case that this 
was corrected by ‘power over power’. In this case, the field staff used the authority of the 
king to undermine the influence of the particular chief of groupement. Rather that through 
downward accountability, the project comes about through a ‘game of powers’ which – 
indeed – reflected how power relations evolved in practice in this participatory development 
or reconstruction programme. 
5.4.5. Development elites: the dominance of churches 
In the above, we have demonstrated how elites have a decisive influence in the governance of 
the CDR programme. We can build upon this argument to establish who is the more 
influential authorities in South Kivu? In our sample of 34 villages, we determined who was 
the more influential stakeholder in the process: the church, the chief, or a combination of the 
two. Comparing this with the outcome of the selection process, we found clear evidence that 
the nature of the authoritative stakeholders strongly relates to the type of projects that was 
selected. Chiefs have traditionally been responsible for roads and infrastructure, and would 
naturally favour the construction of a road as the first priority. In the five cases where Chiefs 
were dominant, the selected project consisted of roads and water works. Churches, on the 
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other hand, have a vested interest in public services, in particular education and health. 
Where church leaders dominated the process, the village development committees invariably 
choose for education-related projects. This was the case in 25 villages. In our sample, the 
churches come above as the more influential authority in the domain of public services and 
development.  
The IRC has been implementing another large CDR programme, covering four territories 
of the South Kivu province (that is Kalehe, Mwenga, Uvira and Mwenga). In each of the 
villages, residents have elected a project for reconstruction. The records of the IRC show that 
an overwhelming % of these projects have focused on education (25/34 projects representing 
73,5% in Tushiriki programme (Cfr. Table 5.1). In addition, education was by was selected at 
both VDCs (44,9%) and CDCs (63,7%) in Tuungane I (programme implemented from 2008 
through 2010) and by VDCs (56,3%) in Tuungane II (programme being implemented from 
2011 through 2014). This means that churches are the more dominant authority when it 
comes to development services.  
Table 5.1: Key power holders by types of projects executed 
Key Power Holders Types of projects Villages 
N=34 
% 
Chiefs of chiefdom, 
groupement, village and 
chef de poste administratif 
Road, bridge, guest-house of 
the chiefdom, water system 
and water points 
5 14.7 
Church leaders Classrooms, schoolmaster 
office, water reservoir and 
water points, road 
25 73.5 
Combination of chiefs and 
church leaders 
Road, office of chief, office of 
schoolmaster, classrooms  
4 11.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion  
The CDR programme of Tushiriki is designed in such a way that village committee that are 
elected by the population at large govern reconstruction projects with regular meetings 
Legend: 
Churches: (i) Protestant (*5e CELPA: 5ème Communauté des Eglises Libres Pentecôte en Afrique; **8ème CEPAC : 
communauté des Eglises Pentecôtistes en Afrique Centrale, ***PCG : Pentecostal Church of God) and (ii) 
****Catholic church; to exercise power meant at least two out of three criteria of scoring (pre-existing project, 
key player in decision making and key player in execution of the project); while chiefs had pre-existing projects 
and played a key role in prioritization of them, they were not necessarily key players in execution of them. Church 
leaders, however, were much influential in decision making and execution of their pre-existed projects. 
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securing full transparency of the project, to enable downward accountability of the committee 
members to the population. 
In our analysis of the local dynamics of reconstruction we found instead an overwhelming 
role of the local authorities and elites in the project. Our findings suggest that despite the 
chaos of war and the collapse of the Mobutu state, local institutions, in particular chieftaincy 
and churches, which are based on customs and faith proved to be relatively robust. The elite 
consisting of the old generation of chiefs and church leaders and the new generation of 
educated villagers (schoolmaster, teachers, students at secondary school) who emanate from 
and are related to the old generation dominated the CDR. This group of non-elite comprises 
peasants and residents who depend on the former group in order to survive.  
Chiefs have a power base in the control of land and cattle, their relation with the local 
administration and the traditional beliefs that convey spiritual power to traditional leaders. 
Churches, on the other hand, in the context of a failed state, adopt the state function of 
initiating and running social services, such as schools, health centres, and even hospitals. This 
means that pastoral power, grounded in Christian faith, is expended through their central role 
in service delivery.  
The Village Development Committees were usually dominated by the educated elite 
(teachers, headmasters and church elders), while less educated members played a secondary 
role. In reality, the VDCs were thus an instrument of, or at least closely related to, authority 
figures from the church or the chiefdom. In the election of committee members, the two 
institutions may either compete or compromise. The selection of projects strongly depended 
on authority figures that instructed the VDCs about their preferred project, which often was a 
pre-conceived project in need of funding. Authorities were also important in the execution of 
projects, especially to ensure the labour participation of the population. In many projects, 
people were later motivated to contribute with their labour, and the pressure of authorities 
was important to enforce their contribution. Ostrom showed, the problem of free-riding in the 
production of collective benefits usually require an external authority system, an internal 
monitoring and sanctions system, and strong group consciousness.
110
 In this case, it was 
especially the authorities that made the difference. While CDR assumes that people will be 
motivated to contribute to a public good once they feel they are in control, in reality the 
                                                          
110 E.Ostrom. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 1990: Cambridge 
University Press. See also T. Kelsall, ‘Game-theoretic models, social mechanisms and public goods in Africa: a 
methodological discussion. Discussion Paper No 7’ (Institute of Development Studies, 2009, pp. 8-11). 
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pressure of the authorities was an important element in realizing the projects. Hence, and 
contrary to how the IRC wanted to operate, we found that the success of the projects in terms 
of restoring infrastructure and services, largely depended on local elites. Only when chiefs or 
church leaders made an effort for the project, it was possible to mobilize the meetings and 
labour. 
While there is a tendency to think that chiefs and church leaders may appropriate projects, 
we found that these elites are often motivated to work for the community interest. This may 
not be an expression of interest in the public good per se, but a realisation that development 
projects enhance their power. Churches are interested to have projects for their membership. 
There is also a material interest in building a good school. Once a school meets certain 
standards, it gets recognised by the central government, that will pay the salaries of the 
teachers. Church leaders then expect 10% of an employee’s salary from the government as a 
tithe to the church. Supporting projects may thus be in the interests of elites. This was also 
expressed by the Mwami when he stated that one of his reasons to intervene in the project 
was to safeguard the relation with the IRC to secure future, and bigger, projects. 
A key element of CDR is the transparency of the process. Our findings corroborate that 
transparency plays a role in CDR, but not in the way envisioned. While the population at 
large seems to be accepting a certain misappropriation of funds by authorities, correction may 
come about by competing elites rather than the population. In the case of Ciriri, the field staff 
had built up rapport with the Mwami and was able to have him intervene in the process, even 
if this meant he had to sanction his own chief. This use of ‘power over power’, in this case 
positively influenced the outcome of the project. Dasgupta and Beard state that not all 
powerful elites are corrupt and that a distinction between elite control and elite capture should 
be made.
111
 Similarly, Booth argues that Africa’s own institutional resources and historical 
legacies might be harnessed for developmental purposes, rather than be viewed merely as 
barriers to change.
112
 Lund, moreover, demonstrates that even where elites capture 
development, this may change in the course of programmes.
113
 This idea is supported by 
Kelsall who has stated that people feel act honestly and fairly within the extended family in 
                                                          
111 See A. Das Gupta and V. Beard, op cit, p. 244. 
112 D. Booth, op cit, p. 3  
113 J. F. Lund & M. Saito-Jensen. Revisiting the issue of Elite Capture of Participatory Initiatives. World 
Development 46, 2013, pp. 104-112. 
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Africa and that beyond it, religious foundation is likely the most developmental institution.
114
 
In the case of Ciriri, the field staff of IRC had adopted this strategy as a working strategy, 
based on their own knowledge of the social dynamics of project intervention, even though 
this was not part of the programme’s design. 
Our observations about the actual role played by elites in the CDR programme, whereby 
the selection and execution of reconstruction projects is less the outcome of the democratic 
process whereby local people freely express a preference for the public good and freely 
participate in its execution. It is rather the outcome of existing power holders actions where 
one form of elite is worse than another. This makes us reconsider the successes and failures 
of community-driven reconstruction. It would be important for CDR to take these into 
account and aim for a positive involvement of local power holders in CDR.  
Finally, we asked the question which authority is dominant – in the context of institutional 
development. Our findings suggest that the dominance of education-related projects in CDR 
in Eastern DRC are a token of the influence of churches over chieftaincies. Most 
development programmes seeking to improve governance focus on state institutions and are 
framed in an objective of state building. In Eastern DRC it would be worthwhile to bring 
churches into the equation of governance and invest in understanding better the working and 
accountability of churches for development. 
                                                          
114 T. Kelsall (2008) Going with the Grain in African Development? Development Policy Review 26, 6 (2008) 
p.638. 
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Photo 5. 2: 5
e
 CELPA (protestant) church in Kakwende-Burhinyi (sign of church power in the area) 
 
 
Photo 5. 3: Catholic church at Luhwindja parish (sign of church power in the area) 
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Photo 5.4: Cibanda II groupement chief supervising community local road construction in Cibanda, Luhwindja 
 
 
Photo 5.5: DRC’s flag (sign of chieftaincy-state power) at the Birhala groupement chief in Burhinyi 
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ABSTRACT 
Community-driven reconstruction (CDR) has become one of the growing 
approaches to reconstruction in conflict affected areas. Community participation in 
these programmes takes in practice the form of labour or volunteer work, which may 
be viewed differently by participants. We examined the effectiveness of the CDR 
approach, specifically the mobilization of voluntary manual labour for public works 
in the Tushiriki programme. We found that overall, people’s participation was lower 
than expected, that their motivation depended on the type of work related to the 
selected project and there was common unwillingness to perform manual labour for 
free. We argue that people’s behaviour regarding labour is influenced by repetitive 
cycles of forced manual labour in the area. In addition, people lacked motivation 
because of the contested notion of public goods such as road and education in the 
area.  
Keywords: labour; incentive; community-driven reconstruction; conflict affected-
area; Democratic Republic of Congo 
6.1. Introduction 
After post-conflict reconstruction was criticised in the 1990s for its top-down character, the 
last decade has seen an increasing trend towards so-called community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR) projects (Hilhorst et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa, 2013b:1267). In theory, CDR is 
characterised by the fact that local stakeholders are not only involved in the implementation 
of post-conflict reconstruction projects but also in the latter’s design and planning (Agrawal 
and Yadama, 1997:457; Cliffe, Guggenheim et al. 2003:2; Kyamusugulwa, 2013a:364). This 
involvement, which is often described as community participation or public participation, has 
become one of the principal conditions of bilateral and multilateral donors financing 
reconstruction interventions (Buchya and Hovermanb, 2000:15). In practice, community 
participation often takes the form of labour or ‘volunteer work’. There is a tendency among 
donors to consider this ‘volunteer work’ as the main yardstick for measuring local 
communities’ contribution and commitment to post-conflict reconstruction projects (Hickey 
and Kothari, 2009: 82; Richards, 2006:2). 
The aim of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the CDR approach in terms of 
stimulating local communities’ participation in public goods provision, with a particular 
focus on the mobilization of voluntary manual labour for public works. This will be done 
through an analysis of a CDR programme called Tushiriki, which was implemented between 
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2008 and 2010 in various communities in the province of South Kivu, situated in the eastern 
part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Our research findings show that, overall, 
the level of participation in Tushiriki was lower than expected, and that people’s 
preparedness and motivation to take part in the programme depended to a very large extent 
on the type of work they were expected to do. The greatest problem the programme faced 
was a widespread unwillingness on the part of the project participants to perform manual 
labour for free. In our view, this reluctance is probably due to eastern DRC’s labour history, 
which has been characterized by repetitive cycles of coercive labour recruitment for public 
works. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, we provide some background 
information on the context in which the Tushiriki programme was implemented. We give a 
short overview of the conflict in eastern DRC, we explain the main components of the 
Tushiriki programme, and we zoom in on the logic behind it. We argue that the assumptions 
of CDR with regard to labour mobilization are unjustified, especially because of the troubled 
labour history of eastern DRC. In the second part of the paper, we move on to discuss two 
case studies from the Tushiriki programme, paying particular attention to the way local 
people responded to calls for community participation. Finally, in the conclusion of the paper, 
we attempt to draw a general lesson for the future of CDR projects in conflict-affected 
regions with a well-known history of forced labour recruitment. 
6.2. Setting the scene: Factors influencing the dynamics of labour mobilization in 
Eastern DRC 
6.2.1. Reconstruction in a situation of no-war-no-peace 
Congo has been the theatre of fighting between rebel movements and the Government of 
Kinshasa since the second half of the 1990s, when the Mobutu regime was no longer able to 
cope with the consequences of more than thirty years of political and economic misrule. In 
the literature, a distinction is usually made between two phases in the conflict: the first and 
the second Congo war. During the first war, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Congo (AFDL), a rebel movement led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and supported 
by Rwanda and Uganda, fought against and eventually toppled the Mobutu regime in May 
1997. 
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The second Congo war, which started in August 1998 and ended in July 2003, pitted 
the Kinshasa regime against its former allies Rwanda and Uganda. In addition to sending out 
troops of their own, both the Rwandan government and the Ugandan government were 
instrumental in the creation, training and military provisioning of various Congolese rebel 
movements who were all fighting the Kinshasa government. Kinshasa, for its part, received 
military assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, three fellow members of the 
Southern African Development Community, while it was also able to secure support from 
Chad, Libya and Sudan (see Prunier, 2009; Reyntjens, 2009; Stearns, 2011).  
Although the second Congo war officially came to an end with the signing of the 
Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Sun City in December 2002, and although two 
democratic elections have been held since then (in 2006 and 2011, respectively), fighting in 
eastern DRC has continued unabated until November 2013. At the time of writing, the 
Kinshasa government has lost control over substantial parts of North and South Kivu and was 
faced with fierce resistance from the Rwandan-supported M23 rebel movement, the FDLR 
and various local militias and self-defence groups (see Larmer, Laudati et al., 2013; UN, 
2012; Verweijen, 2013).  
Despite the continuation of armed violence in various parts of eastern DRC, the 
international community has tried to promote economic development and social stability by 
injecting millions of dollars in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Trefon, 2010). This paper 
focuses on one such programme called Tushiriki, a Swahili expression meaning ‘let’s all be 
involved together. Tushiriki took place from 2008 until the end of 2010, was funded by the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Stichting Vluchteling
115
, and was implemented by the 
International Rescue Committee (SV and IRC, 2007). 
Aiming to contribute to poverty alleviation and post-conflict rehabilitation, Tushiriki 
consisted of two components: one dealing with community development and another one 
dealing with civil society. With regard to the community development component, it is 
important to note that the programme created a governance structure – the so-called Village 
Development Committee (VDC) –in every target village, in which ten members representing 
                                                          
115 Stichting Vluchteling: The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees is a Dutch agency based 
in the Hague that funded the programme, while the International Rescue Committee 
implemented it. For more information about Stichting Vluchteling, please go to 
http://www.vluchteling.org/pagina/home_nl 
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residents were democratically elected. Tushiriki adopted a participatory approach and tried to 
make sure that at least 40 per cent of the adult population of each target village was involved 
in key activities, such as the approval of the project budget, the election of committee 
members and the participation in regular meetings about the on-going project. The selected 
project per village that needed effective reconstruction was either a school, a classroom, a 
local road or a water system. 
The second component of the programme consisted of strengthening capacity of local 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) for 
good governance and advocacy practices on behalf of local communities. During the project 
execution, participants were asked by actors of both of the two components to contribute with 
labour in terms of unskilled tasks of carrying raw and local material to the reconstruction site. 
At the same time, local technicians (also inhabitants of the same area) contributed with 
skilled labour, which was reasonably paid (i.e a bit below a normal wage). The VDC 
members managing the project were at the same time involved in both mobilisation, reporting 
and community work with other villagers. 
6.2.2. The logic behind the labour contribution of community-driven reconstruction 
programmes 
People in DRC and in other post-conflict environments have become used to participate in 
food for work or cash for work schemes. In these schemes, food aid or cash relief is given to 
people in exchange for a labour contribution to public works (Clay, 1986). These schemes are 
highly popular within humanitarian programmes, with a double rationale: the public works 
can make a beginning to post-conflict reconstruction and the introduction of a counterpart for 
relief would prevent the development of a dependency syndrome. Food or cash for work 
programmes have not been without problems: they often result in roads that wash away or 
lead to nowhere, and it is the question whether poor people can free the labour to extend to 
the project (Dagnachew, 2013). On the other hand, what is important to emphasize for this 
paper is that in these schemes people get paid (in cash or in kind) for their labour contribution 
to public works. 
The CDR follows a different rationale. In these programmes it is assumed that people 
are motivated to provide labour for the production of public goods. The motivation is 
supposed to rest on two pillars. It is supposed that people will profit from the public goods 
and hence should have an incentive to contribute to their production. Secondly, it is supposed 
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that when citizens control the decisions leading to the project, this will enthuse them to 
participate in its realisation. Both these suppositions are questionable. 
The supposition that people should be motivated because they can profit from the 
public goods can be put into question. In DRC, where state institutions have been considered 
predatory for decades, the concept of public goods may not be highly developed: public 
office for example is more likely to be considered as a private enterprise than a service to the 
public. The public works that are subject to community reconstruction overwhelmingly 
concern school and roads. Roads, it can be argued, have little utility for the poor who cannot 
afford to pay fees for transportation, and schools in DRC can be considered private more than 
public, as the school fees cover all expenses incurred. 
The second supposition - that people are likely to be motivated for projects they 
control - is also questionable. As early as 1969, Arnstein introduced a ladder of participation 
that denoted that the label of community participation can hide very different realities, 
ranging from manipulation to citizen control (Arnstein, 1969). These can result from different 
project designs, where participation is built in instrumental ways or with objectives to 
transform community relations. At the same time, there is a concern that participation in 
communities is differential and that there is a risk that poor people pay the prize while elites 
enjoy the benefits. What programmes call participation can – from the perspective of local 
people – sometimes be more appropriately dubbed as ‘forced labour’. Mansuri refers to such 
a case in Indonesia, where under the guise of participation everybody was expected to 
provide free labour, or face social, political, material and even physical sanctions (Mansuri, 
2004). White points out that despite the rhetoric, it is usually women and poor men who 
provide the labour in community projects because others can call on their status or buy out 
their duties (White, 1996). The labour contribution of poor people to development is further 
complicated because of the long colonial and post-colonial history with forced community 
labour. 
6.2.3. Eastern DRC’s history of forced labour 
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, eastern DRC has witnessed several waves of 
coercive labour recruitment. Between 1865 and 1892, the Zanzibar trader Tippu Tip 
introduced a system of slavery. Large numbers of men were captured in the Congolese 
interior with the aim of forcing them to work as ivory porters for the Zanzibari trade 
caravans, or to work as servants or soldiers for the Zanzibari armed forces. Later on, 
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following the military conquest of the region by the Belgians in 1892-94, the Kivus came 
under the control of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State. Although the Belgian king prided 
himself on taking the lead in the struggle against the Zanzibari slave trade, the Congo Free 
State used the slave-labour system created by Tippu Tip as the basis of its own labour system. 
The law of 6 October 1891 stipulated that, every time an African chief was certified and 
invested by the colonial authorities, a list of so-called prestations
116
 had to be drafted, which 
gave an overview of all the goods and services the newly installed local ruler would have to 
deliver to the Free State. The services consisted mainly of the furnishing of labourers and 
labour services.
117
 
After the Belgian takeover of Congo in 1908, there was a slight improvement in the 
labour conditions for the African population. Yet, overall, the colonial administration 
preferred to continue sustaining its labour force through taxation and compulsion rather than 
through the provision of attractive wages to African workers (Northrup, 1988).
118
 Corvée 
labour remained one of the key features of Belgian colonialism. Congolese could be forced to 
work up to 60 days a year, with a distinction being made between two types of forced labour: 
on the one hand, manual labour on special projects such as the maintenance of roads, bridges 
and ferries, and, on the other hand, the forced cultivation of both food crops and export crops 
such as cotton (Callaghy, 1984:299). 
In January 1973, the population was faced with a new form of forced labour called 
Salongo. After a visit to China, where he witnessed how Mao Zedong forced the population 
to do various types of jobs to promote national development, Mobutu decided to apply the 
                                                          
116 The system of prestations was meant, on the one hand, to provide the public servants of the Free 
State with food, shelter and transport, and, on the other hand, to organize the collection of wild rubber 
and ivory for the personal benefit of King Leopold II (Northrup, 1988:46). 
117
 Faced with rising protest in Europe and growing unrest in Congo in response to the system of the 
prestations, the Free State tried to silence its critics by announcing a series of reforms, which gave the 
impression of creating a less coercive labour climate. However, in reality, people in eastern DRC did 
not see any differences in their everyday lives: they continued to be put under huge pressure to meet 
the authorities’ demands for rubber, porterage, food, building materials and labour corvées for the 
maintenance of roads and telegraph routes, amongst other things. 
118
 During World War I, the population of eastern DRC was forced to contribute to Belgium’s war 
effort. When, in 1916, plans were made for an invasion of German East Africa, the population of the 
Kivus was confronted with forced recruitment for the Force Publique and with demands for porters 
transporting ammo, supplies and food for the armed forces. While it has to be admitted that, during 
the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial authorities introduced a series of restrictions on the use of African 
labour (including, amongst other things, a refusal to authorize forced labour for railroad construction 
purposes), low-level members of the colonial administration were still under enormous pressure to 
supply African labour at low wages to colonists, missions, private companies and government 
agencies. 
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same system in Zaire. He gave orders to show the Chinese propaganda movie 'Esprit de 
Yukung' on national television and made provisions for the creation of the Zairian television 
series 'Esprit de Salongo' which was meant to illustrate the virtues of Salongo (Pype, 
2008:59-60). In theory, Salongo was supposed to be a voluntary method of civic education: 
people were expected to participate in projects of public interest by their own free will, 
cleaning up streets and repairing bridges or roads without being paid for it. Yet, in practice, 
very few Zairians were prepared to take part in Salongo on a voluntary basis, and, very often, 
Mobutu’s administration saw no other option than to call out the police and army to ensure 
active participation (Kabwit, 1979:390; Schatzberg, 1980:80). A good illustration of the 
forced nature of Salongo is a decree issued by the Kivu regional commissioner in June 1975, 
which stated that ‘all Zairian citizens living in Kivu region are obliged to respond to the civic 
work of Salongo’ (see Callaghy, 1984:300). The decree made it clear that whoever refused to 
follow the rules of the Salongo system would face sanctions of 8 to 30 days imprisonment 
and/or the payment of a fine of 5 Zaire (ibidem).
119
 
Strikingly, in some areas of eastern DRC, the salongo practice has continued to exist 
after the end of the Mobutu state, albeit in slightly different forms. A first example concerns 
the mining sector. In July 2009, the British NGO Global Witness reported that networks 
within the Congolese army had introduced a system of Salongo or forced labour in some of 
the artisanal mines under its control: 
(…) in some mines, a system has been set up in which particular days of the week are allocated for 
working for the soldiers. This is sometimes referred to as salongo (…). An activist from South 
Kivu said: ‘In Shabunda, Mwenga and Kamituga, specific days are designated. For example, every 
Saturday, people go to work in a particular commander’s plot. It is like Salongo. (…) The workers 
are not paid.’ Other days are dedicated to working for local authorities or traditional chiefs, as 
some of these civilian officials take a cut of the mineral production (Global Witness, 2009:26-
27).
120
  
                                                          
119 Similarly to the way the colonial authorities had made a distinction between two types of corvée 
labour, the Mobutu regime distinguished two basic types of Salongo: agricultural Salongo or the 
forced cultivation of crops, and, general salongo or manual labour on projects of (supposed) public 
interest. In the mid-1970s, Salongo usually took place on Saturday afternoons. Everyone – with the 
sole exception of doctors, gendarmes and foreigners - was expected to carry out the activities that 
were dictated by the local administration (see Callaghy, 1984:299-303). 
120
 Similar observations were also made by the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC. In a report that was 
published in October 2010, the Panel stated that, in the Obaye tin mine, ‘Colonel Abati Albert and his 
deputy Colonel Dido Jacques deploy a unit from the base at Obaye (….) to enforce a tax of 5 kg per 
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Another context in which the practice of Salongo has continued to exist is that of road 
maintenance. In September 2013, the Congolese newspaper La Référence Plus ran a 
remarkable story about a deal between a Mai Mai commander and local state authorities in 
the area around Lowa, a locality in the territory of Ubundu in the province Orientale. 
Apparently, the rebel commander had succeeded in mobilizing the population for ‘an 
extensive campaign of community labour’, which consisted of repairing and clearing roads. 
According to the newspaper, the state authorities were very enthusiastic about the fact that 
the rebel commander had assisted them in ensuring the population’s active participation in 
public works.
121
 If one takes into account that the commander’s Mai Mai militia had 
previously terrorized the region for several months, however, it is not really surprising that 
people thought it was necessary to participate in the rebel commander’s Salongo campaign. 
Cases like these are not exceptional. According to Oxfam, the continuing instability in 
eastern DRC has led to a situation in which ordinary citizens are extremely vulnerable to 
various types of abuse from government soldiers, armed rebels, police and civilian 
authorities. Evidence gathered by the NGO shows that there have been several cases of 
people being forced to perform certain types of labour such as carrying food, military 
equipment and goods (Oxfam, 2012:8). 
From the preceding account, it is clear there are strong continuities in the way labour 
has been mobilized in eastern DRC in the past 150 years. Ever since the arrival of Tippu Tip 
in the region, the Kivus have witnessed several campaigns of coercive labour recruitment, 
and the population has repeatedly been confronted with various forms of forced labour. One 
of the most striking features of eastern DRC’s labour history is that different generations of 
rulers have all developed the habit of using force to solve problems of labour shortage and to 
compel people to participate in projects of (supposed) public interest, which usually involved 
a considerable amount of hard manual labour. 
Given the history of forced labour, this may be easily associated with practices of 
salongo, both by project managers and labourers. A striking example of this was found in a 
project in the village of Ciriri (Kyamusugulwa & Hilhorst, forthcoming), where the senior 
pastor despaired over the lack of attendance in labour for the construction of a school. One of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pit per day as well as to enforce collective workdays, or ‘salongo’, for the military in which they can 
gather more than 100 kg per pit’ (Oxfam, 2012:8; Pottier, 2003:10; UN, 2002: 75; UN, 2011: 453). 
121
 ‘Fi des rumeurs d’un contrôle du poste de Lowa en Province Orientale par un nouveau chef Maï 
Maï du nom de Thom’s’, (La Référence Plus, 21.09.2013). 
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the residents explained: “Even if we transport material for reconstruction, there will not be 
exemption for school fees for our kids. So I prefer to go to my field rather than spend time for 
this project”. To enable completion of the project, the senior pastor distributed exercise books 
to the chiefs so that they could write down names of people who carried out or not everyday 
stones and sand. The lists were given to the chief of the groupement, but to the 
disappointment of the church leader: “The groupement chief received the list of people who 
did not the job, he did not punish them. Forced participation I think is the solution”.122 
 As the following sections will show, the long history of forced labour is probably one 
of the reasons why the Tushiriki project was not as successful as its initiators would have 
wished.  
6.3. Case studies 
6.3.1. Road and school reconstruction in the community of Birhala 
As the capital of the Burhinyi chiefdom, Birhala harbours the residence of the paramount 
chief, the headquarters of the public administration (over which the paramount chief presides) 
and the office of the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif (CPEA) of Mwenga 
territory based in Burhinyi. In addition to this, it also has a local police force and a tribunal. It 
is important to note that the chiefdom of Burhinyi already existed during pre-colonial times, 
long before the conquest of eastern DRC by Belgian colonial forces between 1892 and 1894. 
For the people of Burhinyi (the so-called Barhinyirhinyi) the paramount chief is an important 
symbol of their unity and identity.
123
 
In Birhala premier, one of the four villages in Birhala, local people took part in the 
rehabilitation of a road. Although, initially, plans had been made to build a guesthouse for the 
chiefdom, in the end, it was decided to give priority to road repair. The main reason for this 
change of plans was that many people in Birhala were impressed by the positive outcomes of 
a similar road rehabilitation project in the neighbouring community of Budaha. There was a 
lot of enthusiasm about the fact that a rehabilitated road would probably make it considerably 
                                                          
122 Interview on 20 April 2009 with Jusua, the senior pastor of Ciriri 5e CELPA church (also former 
Ciriri groupement chief) in Ciriri village. 
123
 Birhala comprises four sub-communities which are also administrative villages: Birhala premier, 
located at the heart of the Burhinyi chiefdom; harbours a population of 1500 inhabitants; Ciriri, 
situated to the southwest of Birhala, more rural by nature,1089 inhabitants; Bwishasha, situated to the 
north of Birhala, along the main road, 2156 inhabitants; Muli, situated to the west of Birhala, 1712 
inhabitants. 
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easier to transport local goods to Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu.
124
 In late 
April 2009, at the beginning of the project, there were fifteen male workers, divided over two 
sites. Using rudimentary tools such as jumpers, three-pronged forks, pickaxes, wheelbarrows 
and spades, they worked from Monday to Saturday, from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. 
Unfortunately, several factors slowed down the execution of the project: the work was 
hard and physically demanding, the number of workers was limited, and it proved to be quite 
difficult to negotiate with the owners of the land and of the trees that lay on the line of the 
road under construction. Initially planned for one month, the road rehabilitation project took 
nearly four months in total; that is, until end of August 2009. To speed up the process, it was 
decided to multiply the teams of workers and to start paying the road workers. Promises were 
made to continue the payments until the completion of the road. 
When the project money was finished, the paramount chief tried to convince workers 
to continue the task as volunteers. Nevertheless, due to a lack of payment, the workers did not 
finish the road as planned. A final strip of 500 metres, which was supposed to reach the 
building of the Protestant Church, was left unaccomplished. 
This example of the rehabilitation of a road in Birhala premier highlights the 
continued pivotal role of customary chiefs in the mobilization and motivation of labourers for 
public works. Just like his predecessors during colonial times and during the Mobutu era, the 
paramount chief of Burhinyi did his best to convince his subjects to work on the road for free, 
arguing that it would be to the benefit of the community. He soon discovered, however, that, 
similarly to what had happened in the past, people were very reluctant to perform hard 
manual labour on projects of public interest without receiving any financial compensation for 
it. Apparently, working under such conditions still had a ring of coercion to it, at least in the 
opinion of the local population. 
Volunteer work was not only used for the rehabilitation of a road, but also for the 
(re)construction of classrooms in the primary schools of Bwishasha and Muli, two other 
villages in the community of Birhala. In Bwishasha, the reconstruction of the local primary 
school took place between April and August 2009. The reconstruction project required two 
types of work: technical work, which had to be carried out by skilled technicians and which 
                                                          
124 Two segments of the road were targeted: one of three kilometres in length, situated to the southeast 
of Birhala premier, and another one of two kilometres in length, situated to the west of Birhala 
premier. 
CHAPTER 6: Labour mobilization 
153 
 
would be financially remunerated, and manual labour, for which no financial compensation 
would be offered and which could be carried out by workers without any specific skills or 
training. The group of skilled technicians consisted of two masons and two helpers, who were 
expected to build two additional classrooms.  
Although this group did not like the fact that they were sometimes faced with a 
shortage of local material such as sand, and that there proved to be strong discrepancies 
between the project estimates and the real costs, overall, they were quite motivated to 
participate in the project.
125
 Unfortunately, the same did not hold true for the group of manual 
labourers. Having been mobilized for the project through the network of the 8
th
 CELPA 
Protestant Church, they were dissatisfied with the lack of transparency and accountability on 
the part of the local leader of the Tushiriki intervention, a senior pastor who also worked as a 
schoolmaster in the school under construction. Moreover, they complained about the fact that 
parents performing manual labour for the project were not given any guarantees about the 
future reduction of their children’s school fees. Finally, there was a great deal of 
disappointment about the complete absence of any form of financial compensation for the 
manual labour carried out in the context of the project. One of the masons, a resident of 
Bwishasha, said: 
We could vote for seed distribution as a local project of farming. Project selection was done by 
them [Tushiriki staff], rather than by local people; we did not understand why that was so. You can 
really see how your family is gaining interest; therefore, you pay school fees for kids. We agree 
that the school building is for community interest. One of the difficulties we face is the shortage of 
stones and sand. What you see there was carried out by a few family members and children who 
study there, because even after transporting the stones, they will have to pay the same amount of 
school fees and construction fees as those who did not do anything. This is a sort of social 
injustice! 
Similarly, another resident who was a gold digger and farmer said, “We are aware of 
the Tushiriki project. The problem is that we are not much involved in such local 
contribution, because we often contribute to only such things as Salongo [forced work] from 
which we don’t benefit anything”. 
                                                          
125 The latter problem was a result of the fact that the technicians had not been involved in the 
approval of the project. Additionally, they faced shortage of sand in order to build walls, which 
affected somehow the duration of their work. Finally, the quantity of wood was sometimes not enough 
because of the price change into the local market. 
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The case of the construction works at the primary school of Bwishasha once again 
shows that the communities in which the Tushiriki programme was implemented were not 
happy to engage in manual labour for free. They did not understand why Tushiriki refused to 
pay them for their work, and why the program did not even consider giving them an 
alternative kind of reward. That said, the example of Bwishasha also points at a difference in 
attitude between two groups of participants in the Tushiriki programme: whereas the 
unskilled workers were highly dissatisfied with their working conditions, the skilled workers 
did not appear to have any complaints about it. This seems to indicate that it is especially 
unremunerated manual work which carries the connotation of forced labour. 
The experiences in Muli, however, were quite different, and the construction of the 
school was highly successful despite the use of free labour. In Muli, the construction of the 
local primary school lasted from April until July 2009. Most of the people taking part in the 
construction works belonged to the 5
th
 CELPA Protestant Church. They were asked to carry 
sand and stones from the river to the school two or three times a week, before leaving the 
village to work on their land (i.e. from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m.). Several factors were responsible for 
turning Muli into a success story. First of all, the Tushiriki intervention was able to build on 
an earlier effort by the local church to establish a school. Consequently, in the eyes of the 
local population, the Tushiriki intervention was an excellent opportunity to finish a job that 
had already been started. Second, local women were very much in favour of the construction 
of a school closer to their homes, because they were concerned about the risks their children 
faced when they had to travel to far-away schools during the rainy season.  
Third, there was a strong positive involvement in the Tushiriki intervention of local 
church leaders and traditional authorities. The senior pastor of the church and the village 
chief of Muli played an important role in making the local population aware of the value of 
the project, while they also supervised the construction works. In his double capacity of head 
of the village and member of the church taking the lead in the execution of the Tushiriki 
intervention, the village chief found it very important to set a good example. Expressing his 
idea on the project, the chief of Muli locality said: “I am happy with Tushiriki project 
because this school is one of the schools of my locality, although it is initiated and managed 
by 5e CELPA church. I am also 5e CELPA member”.126  Instead of limiting himself to the 
issuing and signing of authorization letters, he wanted to contribute to the project in the same 
                                                          
126 Interview on the first day of July 2009 with Gustave a 69-year-old man, the chief of Cishukwe-
Muli locality. 
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way as the other participants. So, thanks to the commitment of the village chief and the 
leadership of the local church, the population of Muli was very motivated to participate in the 
project. By July 2009, the construction of the 3-classroom building had reached the stage of 
completion. The case of Muli shows that the past history with salongo need not to be 
determinant for current development. Because the village head took part in the labour, there 
was no sense of injustice and people were indeed more motivated to contribute to a public 
good, because the project had already started earlier and because of the motivation efforts by 
the village leadership. 
6.3.2. School reconstruction in the community of Luduha 
Luduha is a groupement in the chiefdom of Luhwindja.
127
 It is a mountainous area, which is 
impossible to access by car and which can only be reached by foot. While, in the villages of 
Tchonga I, Tchonga II and Byazi, people constructed classrooms, in the village of Mujindi, 
the local population built a schoolmaster’s office. In what follows we describe sub-
communities of Byazi and Mujindi. 
The reconstruction of the primary school in Byazi, which had been established in 
1957, at the end of the colonial period, required two types of work. The technical work was 
carried out by a group of carpenters, who took care of the replacement of a number of metal 
sheets (which made up the roof of the school building), while the manual labour, which was 
carried out by other members of the local community, consisted of carrying metal sheets from 
the suburb to the construction site. During our visit to Byazi, we were able to establish that 
the local community was very enthusiastic about the project and prepared to continue 
contributing to it in the future. Parfait a 40-year-old man, who represented the local catholic 
church mentioned: “Look, we are a Catholic area. I am the leader of this church. I must tell 
you that Luduha people are very enthusiastic about their local contribution. If there is a 
donor, people here really like development”. Like in the above case of Muli, the long 
presence of the school in the area and the dedication of the leadership were instrumental in 
motivating people to contribute to ‘their’ school, where a sense of community and public 
good was fostered. 
                                                          
127 As a Tushiriki community, Luduha is composed of four villages: Tchonga I (1000 inhabitants), 
Tchonga II (1394 inhabitants), Mujindi (1001 inhabitants) and Byazi (1185 inhabitants). In the 
context of the Tushiriki project, the population of Luduha decided to rehabilitate a number of school 
buildings in the area. 
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Mujindi is a contrasting case. The Tushiriki intervention in this area was focused on the 
construction of a schoolmaster’s office. This was due to the limited level of funding: with 
only US$ 3000 available for reconstruction works, it was impossible to rehabilitate the 
classrooms, even though all six of them were in dire need of renewal. Just like in the cases we 
discussed earlier, the project in Mujindi was divided in two types of work: technical work, 
carried out by two locally recruited masons, and manual labour, carried out by the rest of the 
community. The problems in Mujindi were also similar to those witnessed elsewhere: there 
was a lack of local building material such as sand and water and it proved to be very hard to 
transport cement and metal sheets from the suburb to the construction site. 
One of the issues that deserve closer attention is the existence of different ideas and 
expectations with regard to the roles of the different groups of project participants. The 
members of the Village Development Committees who managed the project were 
disappointed about the lack of payment. Many of them had hoped to receive some form of 
remuneration for the meetings they attended and the supervision work they did. In training 
sessions organized by the Tushiriki staff, they frequently complained about this. Germain, 
who worked as a teacher in the Kamagaga primary school and held the position of treasurer 
in the local VDC, expressed his indignation over the way things were organised in a meeting 
of 29 August 2009: 
I heard that Tushiriki staff members are being paid, but we, the VDC members, are not. Why is 
that? You know, this is the negative side of Tushiriki. How can we also get paid? I never see 
anyone who works for free as a volunteer. We thought we were recruited as workers in the 
Tushiriki movement. Right now, we are really disappointed about it. 
The Tushiriki staff members tried to justify their approach by emphasizing the 
voluntary nature of the work carried out by VDC members. They did their best to convince 
committee members of the fact that it was absolutely normal and natural to do unpaid work 
for the benefit of the community, even if this work consisted of managerial tasks such as 
supervising and monitoring other workers. Several comparisons and metaphors were used to 
make this principle more understandable and acceptable. VDC members were, for instance, 
invited to compare themselves to pastors, ‘who also work for free since they know they will 
be offered a reward in Heaven’, or to the owners of a house and a plot of land, ‘who should 
be glad that someone helps them build a fence around their property’. However, the 
discourse of the Tushiriki staff failed to convince the members of the VDC. Françoise, a 28-
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year old teacher who had been elected to serve as the VDC secretary for Byazi and as female 
co-president for Luduha CDC, explained her point of view as follows: 
It is not like that. We have been elected. We received money from you. Those who are not elected 
are doing their work in the field, rather than holding meetings/getting money at the local bank, 
supervising work. We represent your organisation among the population. We are seen as Tushiriki 
(workers) here, rather than volunteers who are working for free. Of course, what we do is in the 
interest of the community. Look, we have kids, families. We should survive, but how? 
So, according to Françoise, members of the VDC distinguished themselves from the 
other participants in the project through their status as elected community representatives and 
the set of responsibilities entrusted to them. On the basis of this distinction, it would only be 
fair, in her opinion, if VDC members would receive some form of financial compensation for 
their work. 
The VDC members were not the only ones frustrated with the way things were going. 
The people performing manual labour, particularly in Mujindi village, were also dissatisfied 
with the manner in which the Tushiriki staff rewarded different groups of project participants. 
Having noticed that, every time VDC members attended a training session, they received a 
daily fee of US$4. Although VDC members did not perceive of this payment as a salary, 
residents assumed that this fee was meant as a form of payment. Labourers did not 
understand why they had never received a similar type of financial compensation, especially 
since the work they were doing was physically a lot harder than the one carried out by the 
VDC. 
Adding to the frustration was the fact that they were well aware of the money that had 
been allocated to the various villages in the context of the project: the Tushiriki management 
had made no secret of the fact that each village had received US$ 3,000. The manual 
labourers found it hard to believe that a group of people who had been asked to manage such 
a large amount of money did not earn a salary. Finally, there was a great deal of 
disgruntlement about the composition of the VDC. Some critics said that the people running 
the VDC had previously been members of the board of directors of a Community-Based 
Organization that was already working in the area before the Tushiriki intervention. They had 
the impression that these VDC members had taken advantage of the reputation of their 
previous employer to become elected and to obtain a new job (and source of income). 
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The example of Mujindi offers further proof of the fact that there was a considerable 
degree of frustration among several groups of participants in the Tushiriki programme. The 
VDC members were not highly motivated as they had hoped to earn a salary from the project 
and hence were not in a position to engender enthusiasm about the project among the 
population. The mistrust about the VDC members among the population, on the other hand, 
coupled with their assumption that the VDC was indeed paid for their work created a sense of 
injustice and thwarted their motivation to provide free labour for the reconstruction of the 
schoolmaster office. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This paper has taken issue with one of the key assumptions of the CDR approach, namely 
that people can be reasonably expected to be motivated to contribute to public goods 
provision by offering their labour for free, because, first of all, they will be able to enjoy the 
benefits of these public goods in the future, and, secondly, they are directly involved in the 
decision-making process and are thus capable of fixing their own priorities. Our research on 
the Tushiriki programme has shown that people’s preparedness and motivation to participate 
in the provision of public goods should not be taken for granted.  
The case studies presented in this paper indicate that, in eastern DRC, there is a 
widespread distrust vis-à-vis projects of public interest that are based on unpaid and largely 
manual community labour (Cfr. Table 6.1). Our case studies provide evidence that this 
distrust is caused by the long history of forced community labour in the region. Due to this 
history, some village leaders resort to forcing participation, while the population is likely to 
associate the voluntary labour with injustices from the past.  
Table 6.1: Types of labour in Tushiriki programme 
Types Manual= unskilled Technical=skilled Managerial=organizational 
Actors residents craft men Village committee 
Sub/types carry out sand, bricks, stones, 
wood, etc. 
masonry Lead public meetings 
carry out cement, metal sheets carpentry, Mobilize & supervise residents in 
community work 
road workers water connection Report back to the agency staff & 
residents on on-going project 
The case studies also illustrate that this history of forced labour does not determine 
current experiences with development. Two more elements are important: the contested 
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notion of public goods in DRC and the attitude of the local elite in charge of the management 
of the project. 
Voluntary labour for development rests on the assumption that people find an 
incentive in contributing to a public good. But what is a public good? In DRC, as explained 
in the paper, there is a history of treating public office as a private business. Moreover, it is 
the question how public the roads and schools are that people provide their labour for? In the 
case of roads, these are more in the interest of elites who can afford to use the roads than in 
the interest of the poor villagers who have not provided the back-breaking labour to construct 
the roads. In the case of schools, education in DRC is organised on the basis of complete 
cost-recovery. As a result, schools are not seen as a public good, and people complained a lot 
that their contribution to the construction of the school did not result in a reduction of school 
fees, which would have formed a form of economic incentive, where the social incentive of 
contributing to a public good was clearly inappropriate. 
The second incentive believed to underpin the voluntary labour components of 
projects is the idea of ownership: as people have selected the projects they are expected to be 
motivated to contribute. However, reality is different. As we have showed elsewhere, the 
selection of projects was much more driven by the elite than by the population at large 
(Kyamusugulwa et al, forthcoming). In the practice of project implementation, it mattered 
how the elite treated the project. When the elite was seen to restrict itself to (untiring) 
management of the project, people felt there was injustice rather than ownership. Only in 
those cases where the project had a history prior to Tushiriki and where the leadership was 
dedicated to motivate people by actually engaging in the manual labour, did a sense of 
ownership evolve and were projects successfully completed.  
The case of the Tushiriki programme in eastern DRC thus offers an important lesson 
for CDR programmes in conflict-affected areas with a troubled labour history: prior to the 
project’s implementation, thorough research should be done on local views and ideas about 
different types of work, and about the most appropriate and acceptable ways of stimulating 
people’s participation in them. 
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Photo 6.1: Author with Cishali primary school students carrying stones for classroom reconstruction 
 
 
Photo 6.2: Cironge primary school students carrying burnt bricks for classroom construction, Luhwindja 
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Photo 6.3: Author with 2 masons constructing classroom walls in Bwishasha primary school, Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 6.4: Masons performing classroom construction as technical labour in Mulama, Luhwindja 
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ABSTRACT 
“Local ownership” has taken a particular position in the policies of bilateral and 
multilateral agencies as one of the principles of effective development. It can be 
improved in community-driven reconstruction (CDR) where certain conditions are 
met. This paper analyzes whether participants within such a program developed 
local ownership during its execution. Data were collected by participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews during the project implementation. The study 
observed that where existing institutions such as the chieftaincy and local church 
played a positive role in involving residents in decision-making and project 
execution, and where transparency and accountability contributed to a relative 
success of the intervention, people felt a sense of project ownership. This article 
argues that local ownership of a CDR project can be enhanced in programs that 
create a space for it, and where existing institutions favor it. Attention is called to 
programs that use participatory reconstruction/development and that may improve 
the ability of potential beneficiaries to own a project. 
Keywords: local ownership; community-driven reconstruction; Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
7.1. Introduction 
Strategies relating to rural development have started adopting more commonly a democratic 
“bottom-up” approach following the failure of “top-down” approach (Motteux, Binns, Nel, & 
Rowntree, 1999). For augmenting the power of beneficiaries in development, there has been a 
shift since the 1980s and 1990s from community-based development (CBD) to community-
driven development (CDD). Whereas CBD tends to involve the beneficiaries in project 
execution, CDD involves them in project design also (Dasgupta & Berad, 2007; Mansuri & 
Rao, 2003; Onyach-Olaa, Namara, & Lubanga, 2003). Critiques of the CDD approach, 
however, repeatedly point out villagers’ inability for financial management and problematic 
power relations as some of the limitations of that approach (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mansuri 
& Rao, 2003; Platteau, 2004; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Richards, Bah, & Vincent, 2004). 
Concerning reconstruction, it is executed according to the Marshall tradition.
1
 In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in particular, reconstruction means rebuilding not 
only the basic infrastructure destroyed during wars, but also creating space for peace, 
reconciliation, and social cohesion (Hilhorst, 2007). 
Since the mid-1990s, “local ownership” has been positioned as a precondition to effective 
and sustainable development (Kuehne, Pietz, Carlowitz, & Gienanth, 2008; Saxby, 2003). 
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Three observations come to the fore in this regard. First, it is commonly mentioned in reports 
or policy statements that there should be “government ownership” or “stakeholder 
ownership” for the success of a development program. It is believed that the first prerequisite 
to development, and perhaps the most important one, is “ownership,” because a country must 
drive its own development, needs, and priorities (Natios, 2005). Second, the degree of local 
ownership is frequently cited as one of the factors responsible for either success or failure of 
post-conflict reconstruction or development. 
At the same time, the main weakness of structurally adjusted programs is that they fail to 
create a sense of ownership within the recipient government (Weeks et al., 2002). Finally, 
there are donors like the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency that 
commit themselves to providing program assistance by facilitating and promoting partner-
country ownership (Weeks et al., 2002). However, for most programs, even with local 
ownership in development/reconstruction, translating their concept into practice may be 
challenging (Weeks et al., 2002). 
This paper first analyzes whether the participants of a community-driven reconstruction 
(CDR) project developed a sense of ownership during its implementation. It then argues that 
such sense of ownership of a CDR project can be enhanced among local people through 
programs that create a space for it or where existing institutions favor such a sense of 
ownership. In doing so, priority has to be given to programs that use participatory 
reconstruction/development that improves the prospects of potential beneficiaries to develop 
a sense of owning a project. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the 
background of ownership, and outlines the context of conflict in the DRC. The following 
section deals with project settings, description, and methods, followed by case studies, 
including the viewpoints of officials and program staff. The last section discusses the findings 
and presents the conclusions of this study. 
7.2. Background on local ownership 
“Ownership” has been a debatable issue in development discourse, because of lower levels of 
ownership in various countries that depend on aid (Bräutigam, 2000, p. 31).  
“Local ownership” means that the beneficiaries of a certain project, funded through 
international technical cooperation, feel that the project is theirs. It also refers to the abilities 
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of different stakeholders, their power or ability to set and take responsibility for a 
development agenda and to muster support and sustain it, because development interventions 
are vulnerable, to some extent, to shaping and reshaping by local actors (Funder, 2010, 
p.1710). Local ownership also denotes control over the project or program and the 
commitment of the beneficiaries to the success of the undertaking (Hannah, 2006; Saxby, 
2003; Weeks et al., 2002). Having defined local ownership, it follows that an approach such 
as CDR, which provides a choice to the people in designing and executing a project, may 
contribute to local ownership and poverty alleviation, in terms of access to education, safe 
water, and health care, which are similar to some of the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals (UN, 2009).
2
 
Critiques of ownership repeatedly point out that: (1) ownership is a mere buzzword, whose 
meaning is unclear, and (2) it is intended to confuse those who are unfamiliar and imprudent 
(Buiter, 2004). Notwithstanding the criticism, ownership continued to be applied in a variety 
of fields: land, business, banking, security, peace building, and development assistance/post-
conflict reconstruction (Majee & Hoyt, 2010; Weeks et al., 2002). The last domain is of 
interest to this paper, considering the fact that the eastern DRC has been experiencing a 
transition from post-conflict reconstruction to development in some areas, and a period of 
conflict in other areas. 
The question that arises here is what does “local” refer to in “local ownership”? Two 
points deserve special attention. First, for the donor government, “local” refers to the 
recipient government or the counterpart government that receives aid. Other related terms are 
used, such as “country ownership,” “state ownership,” and “national ownership” to signify a 
medley of programs, processes, plans, and strategies involving both domestic and foreign 
parties (Buiter, 2004). Second, “local” ownership, in contrast to “national” ownership, refers 
to grassroots communities, stakeholders, or beneficiaries, rather than to the Ministry or the 
Central Government. This paper adopts the second meaning, as it is concerned with CDR that 
cannot be understood without paying attention to local ownership of the intervention. 
7.3. Context of conflict in the DRC 
This section briefly highlights the socioeconomic status and history of the DRC. The DRC 
can be considered as one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the 2009 United 
Nations Development Program’s report on human development index (HDI), the DRC ranks 
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176 among countries with a low rate of human development, as the following statistics 
reveal. Life expectancy is about 47.6 years; adult literacy rate (age 15 and above) is about 
67.2%; combined gross school enrollment ratio is 48.2%; GDP per capita (PPP US $) is 298; 
the human poverty index (HP-1) is 38; people not using an improved water source is 54%; 
and the gender development index (as % of HDI) is about 95.1 (United Nations Development 
Program UNDP, 2009). In rural areas, where the current study was carried out, the main 
source of livelihood for a majority of the population is agriculture and livestock production. 
As for the historical record, the DRC became independent from Belgium on 30 June 1960. 
The problems that affected the country from 1996 through 2003 had their origin in the 
conflicts that occurred in neighboring countries (the 1993 massacre in Burundi, and 1994 
genocide in Rwanda), and in the weakness of Mobutu’s regime and his army. With the 
involvement of more than five African countries in the conflict, either on the side of the 
government or on the side of the rebels, the conflict culminated as one of the most 
devastating events in the region since the end of World War II (Lemarchand, 2001; 
Reyntjens, 2005). 
Four main events are worth recalling here. (1) In May 1997, the Mobutu regime was 
overthrown by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
movement, led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, who later became the president of the country until 
his assassination in 2001. Then, his son, Joseph Kabila, took over as president. (2) From 1998 
through 2003, under Kabila and Kabila’s son, two main rebel movements controlled the 
eastern part of the country until an agreement was reached through the Sun City Dialog for 
peace and transitional government. These rebel movements were the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie, based in North- Kivu province, and the Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo in Equateur province. (3) From 2003 through 2006, the DRC was under 
the transitional government led by President Joseph Kabila, who was assisted by four vice-
presidents, among whom two represented the main belligerent movements. (4) The first so 
called democratic presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2006; that is, nearly 
after 40 years of dictatorship and chaos since independence(Merckx & Vander Weyden, 
2007). 
During this conflict in the country, eastern DRC and particularly South-Kivu province 
were the worst affected. For instance, a report by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
estimated that 5.4 million deaths occurred between August 1998 and April 2007 in the DRC 
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(Coghlan et al., 2007). Also, basic infrastructure, such as hospitals, bridges, roads, schools, 
factories, and food stocks, were destroyed by repeated assaults, particularly in the eastern part 
of the country, necessitating rapid socioeconomic recovery (Balemba, 2004). However, 
notwithstanding the peaceful conditions brought about by the elections of 2006, different 
armed groups continued to perpetrate killings, massacres, and rapes in South-Kivu, as was 
also the case in other eastern provinces of the country (IRIN, 2008). 
7.4. Project description, setting, and methods 
7.4.1. Project description 
Tushiriki, meaning “let us become involved together.” This is one of the IRC CDR programs. 
IRC is an American international agency based in New York, which has been operating in 
eastern DRC since 1996 (D'Onofrio & Sage, 2007). It received a contribution of $US 2 
million from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Stichting Vluchteling (SV), that 
is, The Netherlands Foundation for Refugees based in the Hague. This program is aimed at: 
(1) alleviating poverty by improving socioeconomic conditions, (2) facilitating the 
understanding of the principles and practices of good governance, and (3) advocacy efforts on 
behalf of communities and towards policymakers (SV & IRC, 2007). The program was in 
force from 2008 through 2010 in South-Kivu province in the DRC. 
The core idea of the approach is that by involving local communities in both decision- 
making and project execution, it is possible to promote local governance of reconstruction 
through participatory processes (Maynard & Jodi, 2007; McBride & Patel, 2007). One way to 
do this is to create a local committee in each of the 34 villages targeted to be covered by the 
program in such a way that the committee members are responsible for project management 
with technical assistance of field program staff. A village committee – consisting of five men 
and five women for the five positions of president, treasurer, secretary, mobilizer, and 
inclusion officer – organized regular public meetings to familiarize residents with the 
democratic exercise of social accountability. 
The committee received money for project execution, hired local technicians to build the 
selected infrastructure such as classroom and water system, mobilized residents to participate 
in its construction, and reported to the IRC-Tushiriki staff and the people. In addition to the 
VDC structure, another body of two members (one man and one woman), whose role was to 
watch-dog project execution by the village committee, served as liaison between the 
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committee and the people. From the grant-block’s side, an amount of $US 3000 was allocated 
per village, and an amount of $US 50,000–$US 70,000 per community (IRC & CARE, 
2009). Finally, other international and national agencies, such as Catholic Relief Services, 
Malteser International, and the United Nations International Children and Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF)/Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), adopting 
reconstruction approaches different from that of IRC-Tushiriki, were active in the area. 
7.4.2. Settings 
The study took place in the Burhinyi and Luhwindja chiefdoms in South-Kivu province of 
DRC. Barhinyirhinyi (people of Burhinyi) and Bawhindjawhindja (people of Luhwindja), 
both belonging to the Shi ethnic group, constitute the vast majority of the inhabitants of those 
areas. At the time of data collection, a smaller group of Hutu combatants lived in the Itudu 
groupement of the Burhinyi chiefdom until the Kimia II operation. The administrative 
structure of a chiefdom consists of a set of groupements, each of which, in turn, consists of a 
set of villages. Each village is headed by a chief nominated by the king, who is well known as 
Mwami (chief of chiefdom). 
Burhinyi and Luhwindja were heavily affected by war, as were other more remote areas of 
South-Kivu province. Hutu combatants fled to the area in 1996, following which a series of 
fights broke out involving the AFDL and the RCD rebel movements from 1996 through 
1997, and from 1998 through 2003, respectively. In those fights, the military forces, who 
were occupying the area, engaged militia elements formed by the former Rwandese Army, 
sometimes called the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which 
was also known as Interahamwe or Hutu combatants. As a result, if residents did not flee 
from the area during the waves of fighting, they were completely looted by armed groups, 
which included the FDLR and the Mai-Mai. The fighting ended in 2009 when the Congolese 
army engaged the Interahamwe, under the Kimia II operation, which was backed by Mission 
des Nations Unies au Congo, the UN mission in the DRC. 
As the target population for the Tushiriki program, four communities were randomly 
selected from 17 villages in each chiefdom. Random selection was chosen as it ensures 
transparency of the program, which is necessary for good governance. One of the selection 
criteria was population size, as the entities were classified into Tushiriki communities (nearly 
6000 inhabitants each) and into Tushiriki villages (nearly 1200 inhabitants each). According 
to the chiefdom’s office report of 2008, the selected communities comprised 22,948 
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residents, chosen from 55,993 people of Burhinyi, and 21,225 residents from 47,073 people 
of Luhwindja. The people in the selected communities were located similarly in relation to 
those of nonselected communities, in that they were all living closer to the main road and 
centers and in more remote areas. 
7.4.3. Methods 
As ontological position relates to nature and essence of things in the social world, it is 
proposed to first show the reality that is being dealt within this study, which is how residents 
viewed the IRC-Tushiriki project: whether the project was theirs or not. Similarly, ownership, 
unlike relief aid, has to deal with reconstruction/development in which residents are invited to 
identify the village’s priority needs and participate in project execution. However, such 
reconstruction/development may be conceived and implemented in different ways by 
different beneficiaries. As epistemological position relates to knowledge and evidence, it is 
considered necessary to highlight how to collect data and demonstrate social phenomena. 
Therefore, what follows is a description of how the data were collected from residents and 
officials in the capital city as well as from agency staff. 
This study was based on four case studies that involved four of the 34 villages covered by 
the IRC-Tushiriki program in the two chiefdoms of Burhinyi and Luhwindja. According to 
Yin (cited by Gray, 2006), a case study is an empirical inquiry into a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clear. The case study approach is considered appropriate for analyzing the 
merits of adopting participatory methodology in reconstruction, particularly the manner in 
which the residents socially construct the intervention, whether as theirs or not (Sneddom & 
Fox, 2007). Moreover, the case study method was chosen, because it was found suitable 
when confronted with “how” questions concerning the phenomena being studied (Gray, 
2006, p. 124). The cases were selected randomly using a simple random sample of four 
villages from the list of 34 target villages; that is, all the 34 villages were numbered, from 
which four villages were selected in the two chiefdoms, using a random table. However, the 
selection of the participants in the study was not random. They were residents met at the 
reconstruction sites and/or at their homes. 
The selected cases shared many of the characteristics required for the target villages. One 
was that the majority of the case study villages had their classrooms reconstructed (three out 
of four, 75%), because the residents valued children’s education as their priority. Another 
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was that the two chiefdoms were represented by selecting two villages from each region. 
Finally, the case study villages included those which were farthest from the centers of the 
chiefdom and those which were closest to the main road. For instance, while Byazi is the 
remotest in Luhwindja, Mushugula is the closest to the main road. In each case, where 
possible, a complete description is given about the location, the tribe that residents belong to, 
the administrative/political structure, the existing institutions and infrastructure, and the 
thoughts of the residents before and during project execution, especially whether they felt that 
the project selected was theirs and whether they were socially constructing it in such a way 
that motivated them to participate in and sustain it (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). These two last 
variables held the key to assessing whether the participants felt they owned the project or not. 
Similarly, where possible, it is explained why a village project was seen as a success or 
failure. The administrative and political structure of the area is that every village is headed by 
a village chief, led by a groupement chief, who is in turn led by a chief of chiefdom (that is, 
the Mwami or the king of the chiefdom). Most of the inhabitants of these chiefdoms were 
originally from such chiefdoms; for example, Barhinyirhinyi are from Burhinyi and 
Bawhindjawhindja are from Luhwindja (see Figure 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Definition of concepts that describe a village 
Concepts Location 
 
Population Ethnic group Administrative 
/political structure 
Existing 
institutions and 
infrastructure 
Definitions - Geographic 
location of a 
village in a 
groupement and 
a chiefdom.  
- Whether or 
not it is 
accessible by 
car. 
 
- Population 
size at the 
beginning of 
the data 
collection for 
this study, i.e 
September 
2008. 
- Dominant 
tribe that 
belongs to a 
dominant 
ethnic group in 
a village. In 
Burhinyi as 
well as in 
Luhwindja, 
residents are 
more 
homogenous. 
- Structure that 
governs an entity 
from a village to a 
groupement and 
from a groupement 
to a chiefdom. 
- Institutions 
such as 
chieftaincy and 
local churches 
that shape 
people’s social 
norms and 
behaviors.  
- Infrastructure 
for social 
services such as 
school/classroom
, health center, 
bridge/ local 
road, water 
system, etc. 
groupement: an intermediate entity between a chiefdom and a village or a locality. It is led by a chief of the groupement 
nominated by the chiefdom’s chief (a king or a Mwami). 
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Table 7.2: Definition of concepts that describe local ownership 
C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
Type of reconstruction 
/ of project selected 
Residents’ 
thoughts at the 
start of project 
implementation 
Residents’ 
thoughts during 
project 
implementation 
Residents’ 
participation in 
project 
execution 
Residents’ 
thoughts at the 
end of project 
execution 
Other: For 
example 
VDC’ 
thoughts on 
project 
budget 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
s - Sort of infrastructure 
for social service to 
construct / to 
reconstruct under the 
IRC-Tushiriki 
intervention. This 
includes 
classrooms/school, 
water system/water 
taps, bridge/local road, 
etc.  
- Mode of project 
selection with or 
without involvement 
of village residents.  
- Whether or not 
specific existing 
institution was 
dominant in project 
selection processes. 
This may be 
chieftaincy (village 
chief, his advisors) or 
church (Catholic, 
Protestant: 5e CELPA 
or 8e CEPAC).  
- Which institution 
initiated the selected 
project before the 
conflict. For instance, 
schools were initiated 
by churches while 
local road was initiated 
by chief(s). 
- Whether or not 
residents felt that their 
leaders were 
transparent and 
accountable in 
processes leading to 
village project 
selection. 
 
- Whether or not 
they believed in 
the effectiveness 
of the IRC-
Tushiriki as 
funding agency 
to disburse 
money to their 
village as 
promised. 
- Whether or not 
they felt that they 
were much 
involved in 
project choice 
and that it 
reflected their 
highest need. 
- Whether or not 
they felt that 
reconstruction to 
take place was 
for the 
development of 
their village.  
- Whether they 
felt ready to 
participate in 
local 
contribution in 
project 
execution. 
- Whether or not 
they felt that they 
contributed 
enough in local 
participation 
about the 
selected project.  
- Whether or not 
they felt they 
were active in 
project execution 
because the 
infrastructure 
selected was 
theirs.  
- Whether or not 
they felt they 
would gain direct 
reward once the 
selected 
infrastructure is 
rebuilt. For 
instance, 
exemption of 
school fees for 
those who 
contributed in 
classroom 
reconstruction.  
- Whether or not 
they felt that the 
allocating grant 
to their village 
was well 
managed for 
reconstruction 
project by the 
village 
committee.  
- Whether or not 
they felt that 
quality of 
construction/reco
nstruction was 
better as a result 
of better 
management of 
the project. 
- Nature of 
residents’ 
participation 
(unskilled 
work) such as 
carrying out 
sand, stones, 
bricks, cement, 
water, metal 
sheets, wood 
for classroom, 
water system, 
health center 
reconstruction 
/construction.  
- Whether or 
not the 
majority of 
residents did 
the job, i.e took 
part in 
community 
work.  
- Whether or 
not residents 
took part in 
technical 
participation 
(skilled work) 
such as masons 
to build walls 
for a classroom 
and were 
willing to do so 
because they 
were originally 
from the same 
village and 
because they 
received wages 
for it.  
- Whether or 
not local 
material such 
as burnt bricks 
was bought 
from the same 
village. 
- Whether or not 
they felt the 
intervention 
failed to involve 
residents in both 
project selection 
and project 
execution. As a 
result, residents 
felt or not 
owning the 
project processes 
and outcome. 
- Whether or not 
they described 
reasons why they 
thought so (of 
project failure or 
success). 
- Whether or not 
residents became 
more willing to 
contribute locally 
in a similar 
project or any 
village 
reconstruction 
project if another 
donor funding is 
available. 
- Whether or not 
residents felt 
proud of having 
contributed in 
project 
execution.  
- Whether or not 
residents 
witnessed the 
ability of the 
village 
committee to 
better manage 
the project.  
- Whether or not 
residents felt 
ready to 
contribute in 
project 
maintenance as 
they felt it was 
theirs.    
- Whether 
or not 
committee 
members 
felt there 
was 
difference 
between the 
project 
budget 
planned 
and the 
project 
budget 
executed. 
IRC: International Rescue Committee, VDC: Village Development Committee; 5e CELPA: Communauté des Eglises Libres de Pentecôte en 
Afrique/Free Pentecostal Churches in Africa; 8e CEPAC: Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale/Pentecostal Churches 
in Central Africa. 
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Figure 7.1: Organizational chart of different ethnic groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data for this study were collected from September 2008 through April 2010, where the 
author was viewed by some participants as a researcher seeking to understand reconstruction 
dynamics in their area, and by others as a friend or an academician living in the provincial 
capital city (Bukavu). The author’s fluency in Swahili greatly facilitated his interaction with 
the informants. The first visit, made from 23 September to 5 October 2008, was devoted to 
exploring the area’s history of conflict, its homogeneity and social and ethnic composition, 
the remoteness and closeness of target villages, the administrative structure, and interaction 
with other agencies in the area. Later, the visits were regular and devoted to participant 
observation while implementing different elements of the project. For instance, the author 
attended, as an observer, public meetings about project approval and project execution 
activities by residents, as well as church services (in which information about the intervention 
was, to a great extent, provided). Also, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
stakeholders, who were residents (male and female, young and adult, literate and illiterate, 
elite and non-elite, committee members, and non-committee members) of the area. In total, 
88 participants were interviewed either individually or collectively, and 39 participant 
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observations were conducted in regard to meetings and infrastructure reconstruction. To 
complement the data, an official at the Ministry of Rural Development in the capital city 
Kinshasa and the senior staff of the IRC-Tushiriki program were interviewed to elicit their 
opinion on whether a participatory approach to reconstruction/development can lead people 
to own reconstruction projects. To avoid possible bias, only those participants who were 
directly or indirectly involved in project execution during intervention were interviewed. This 
approach served to assure the author that the participants were talking only about Tushiriki 
program, and not any previous or parallel intervention in the same area. 
The following descriptions will address who made the decisions in the social 
reconstruction process of the project, how they were made, and how people viewed them. 
Similarly, it will be shown what people felt about their contribution during their intervention 
in the project. Finally, the factors that contributed to the success or failure of the project will 
be outlined in contrasting situations: where the residents developed a feeling of ownership of 
the project, and where they hardly developed such a feeling. For instance, where the 
chieftaincy institution was more influential in decision-making, with subdued involvement of 
the residents, as in Mushugula, residents were unlikely to be keen on making any contribution 
or fee payment for water system maintenance. On the other hand, the residents of Muli felt 
that school reconstruction, initiated and managed by a local church, was their highest priority, 
and they were ready to participate in its reconstruction. 
7.5. Case studies 
7.5.1. Bwishasha 
Bwishasha village is in the Birhala groupement that belongs to the Burhinyi chiefdom. It 
takes half an hour’s walk to reach there from the suburb of Luvungi in Birhala-center, the 
main market of the chiefdom. The village has two main churches (8è CEPAC, a French 
acronym of Pentecostal churches in Central Africa, and the Roman Catholic church), each 
having a primary school in the same village. The Catholic primary school was fully 
reconstructed in 2008 by AVSI/UNICEF, whereas the Protestant school was only partially 
rebuilt under IRC-Tushiriki funding from 2008 to 2009. As it is situated alongside the main 
road leading to Burhinyi, the village is accessible by car from both the Catholic and the 
Protestant churches. Its population in 2008 was 2156, all of which were Barhinyirhinyi. 
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In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki project was to be taken up in this village, the leaders 
thought of diverting the project to the Protestant school, as AVSI/UNICEF had by then 
rebuilt the Catholic school. However, this Protestant school was fully constructed with six 
classrooms and one schoolmaster’s office. Therefore, with this new grant, it was planned to 
build two new classrooms, one of which could serve as the meeting room or teachers’ room, 
because the existing room of the school did not satisfy the standards of the Ministry of 
Education (i.e. 5x6m, rather than 7x6 m). The schoolmaster, who was also the senior pastor 
of the church, commented thus: “Because it is for free, I will use it as the meeting room for 
teachers.” This statement shows that in executing the project, the norms of the ministry were 
not strictly followed because of disagreement between the schoolmaster and the project’s 
committee members. Before executing the project, however, the senior pastor, who was also 
one among the local elite, could swing the decision in favor of rebuilding the school, because 
the Catholic school had already benefited from AVSI/UNICEF funding. This created a sense 
of involvement at lower level of the residents in the project, because many were resentful that 
they were not involved in decision-making, despite the fact that the decision was said to be in 
the community’s interest. One of the masons, a resident of Bwishasha, said: 
We could vote for seed distribution as a local project of farming. Project selection was done by 
them [Tushiriki staff], rather than by local people; we did not understand why that was so. You can 
really see how your family is gaining interest; therefore, you pay school fees for kids. We agree 
that the school building is for community interest. One of the difficulties we face is the shortage of 
stones and sand. What you see there was carried out by a few family members and children who 
study there, because even after transporting the stones, they will have to pay the same amount of 
school fees and construction fees as those who did not do anything. This is a sort of social 
injustice! 
Similarly, another resident who was a gold digger and farmer said, “We are aware of the 
Tushiriki project. The problem is that we are not much involved in such local contribution, 
because we often contribute to only such things as Salongo [forced work] from which we 
don’t benefit anything.” Last, another resident, a secondary school student mentioned, 
“People told us about it, but I don’t know what they are doing here. I don’t know what they 
speak of.” These quotes reveal two things. One is that there was a problem with project 
selection; the majority of residents were not fully involved in it. They still had a humanitarian 
approach to distribution of seeds, because they felt that providing seeds was a better choice 
for them and it could benefit every household equitably. The space allowed for people to ask 
questions and express their ideas was not sufficient to make them think that they needed a 
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reconstruction project to which they had a right to contribute and to sustain for a long time. 
The other issue is that the people did not feel that the school was theirs. Rather, they believed 
it belonged to the 8e CEPAC church and to its pastor, who happened to be its schoolmaster 
also. This disregard for local residents on the side of the church and the school management 
explains why it was hard for the residents to feel they owned the Bwishasha village project. 
Nonetheless, the residents, particularly the masons, appreciated two things. First, 
technicians were hired from the village. Second, local materials such as burnt bricks were 
used in construction. These observations were made only in the case of IRC-Tushiriki 
project, and the residents saw no other such reconstruction project (be it AVSI/ UNICEF in 
the same village or CAB/ICCO in a neighboring village). In short, despite the construction of 
the two classrooms at the 8e CEPAC primary school, this project failed to involve enough 
residents either in project selection or in local contribution relating to it. People felt they did 
not own the project, and thus the infrastructure constructed. One of the reasons for such a 
situation was lack of social accountability on the part of local leaders, which included both 
church leaders and chiefs. 
7.5.2. Byazi 
Byazi is a village in the Luduha groupement that belongs to the Luhwindja chiefdom. It is not 
accessible by car, and one needs to walk around three hours to reach there from the suburb of 
Luhwindja (that is, Kibuti) and from the Ifendula district hospital, in the northern side of the 
chiefdom, not far from Ngweshe chiefdom. In 2008, Byazi village, also known as Kamagaga, 
had a population of 1185 residents who were Bahwindjahwindja. Byazi has one primary 
school, the Kamagaga primary school, which was built in 1957 during the Belgian colonial 
period; the school is currently under the management of the Catholic church. Recently, the 
same church established a secondary school with an agri-veterinary option, for admission into 
which one needs to go through first and second-year secondary classes. In addition to 
schools, the village has a health center initiated and managed by the Catholic church. It was 
only in 1972 that the first solid building of the Kamagaga school was built. 
In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki program was to be taken up in the village, the residents, 
led by the senior local church leader and the village chief, opted to renovate the roof of their 
primary school by fixing new metal sheets. During the public meetings, the residents could 
not believe that Tushiriki would ever provide funds for school reconstruction. Later, they 
became not only enthusiastic about it, but also confident that their village committee’s 
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representatives could judiciously utilize the funds given to the village. For example, one 
resident, a male teacher at the Kamagaga secondary school, said: 
We are happy with the Tushiriki program, because it is the first international agency to intervene 
here. Tushiriki staff took time to climb mountains to reach here. They are really committed to help 
us. Their approach placed people at the center of decision-making as we have to decide which 
project that can be funded by them is our highest priority. This is why I attend their meetings and 
involve myself in their activities. 
Another resident added: 
We are happy with Tushiriki. You know, people told us that this program can neither give money 
nor can it achieve these projects. Today, we witness just the opposite of it. Look, here, Tushiriki 
has replaced metal sheets for three classrooms and for the schoolmaster’s office. We know that the 
whole amount given for this program, that is $US 3000, was spent. 
Similarly, commenting on the same issue, the church local leader said, “Look, we are in a 
Catholic area. I am the church leader. I must tell you that the Luduha people are very 
enthusiastic about local contribution. If there is a donor, people here really like 
development.” 
One reason for the success of the project is that the residents appreciated the transparency 
and accountability of the Tushiriki village project. One resident said, “They [committee 
members] revealed the amounts of money received and spent, though I do not remember the 
figures. In general, we are happy with it.” As the project involved replacing the old roof with 
metal sheets, the local contribution required transporting metal sheets from the suburb of 
Luhwindja to the village. This was accomplished by the local church members, who were 
also residents of the village, utilizing the influence of the church leader. One of the female 
participants said, “We are happy with the Tushiriki project because it belongs to the school 
and our contribution was to carry metal sheets.” 
In short, at the end of the project, the village got its school roof partially reconstructed, and 
the people who were skeptical about the project were ultimately pleased with the project and 
were ready to contribute more to a similar project. The Byazi case shows that in very remote 
areas, if people are involved in the processes of choosing the project and its execution, they 
can develop a sense of ownership of the project infrastructure and positive feelings about 
participatory reconstruction project if their leaders are fully engaged in it. 
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7.5.3. Muli 
Muli is a village in the Birhala groupement that is part of the Burhinyi chiefdom, which is 
half an hour’s walk from the Luvungi market (that is, the suburb of the chiefdom) on the 
west. As the village chief is a believer of the local church (that is, 5e CELPA, French 
acronym of Free Pentecostal churches in Africa), the majority of the inhabitants are members 
of the same Protestant church. In 2008, Muli was inhabited by 1712 people, who were 
Barhinyirhinyi. With the idea of having a school closer to the village, particularly for kids, 
this church has been managing the Muli primary school, but it could not complete the 
construction of three classrooms, which was started just before the conflict of 1998–2003, 
and hence there is a need to complete it. The village administration is structured so that its 
chiefs and church leaders are from the local elite, including schoolmaster and teachers (that 
is, the sub-elite). For decision-making, the non-elite, that is the other residents, depend on the 
elite, as the former are socially tied to the latter by strong patronage and kinship relations. 
In 2008, when the IRC-Tushiriki program was to be taken up in Muli village, all public 
meetings were held in the church building where the senior pastor and other church elders 
influenced, to some extent, the decision about the priority of the village project. Not 
surprisingly, during the assembly of residents, a decision was taken to reconstruct two 
classrooms. However, as there were three classrooms whose construction had been left 
incomplete, the residents and their leaders seized this opportunity to have these three 
classrooms constructed, rather than only two. They felt that the block grant of $US 3000 was 
adequate to meet the construction expenses, if the funds were properly managed. Having 
known this, the program’s management held another public meeting to confirm the decision 
of the residents for reconstruction of three classrooms, instead of two. The participants 
unanimously voted for three classrooms. In fact, the leaders utilized the Sunday church 
service to marshal information and to influence their people. It was also at the Sunday church 
service where the male treasurer, one of the influential village development members whose 
duty was to collect taxes at the chiefdom level, usually sensitized residents about it. For 
instance, at one meeting he said: 
The first thing is that, next week up to 5 April, women and men are required to carry stones and 
sand from the river to the construction site to build the wall before taking up carpentry work. We 
would like to invite everybody to do it. We do it two to three times a week in the morning between 
6.00 and 7.00. The second thing is that we plan to demolish the existing two classrooms and 
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rebuild them right from the foundation. But now, we have chosen to construct three classrooms, 
and this decision will have to be approved in another GA, scheduled for next Tuesday at 7.00. 
When asked about the effectiveness of this local contribution, other residents, especially the 
women, such as the spouse of the senior pastor, who was the female relais qualité (Requa) of 
the village, answered in the affirmative. It was evident during public meetings that the 
residents were enthusiastic about decision-making and execution of the project, as they felt it 
was theirs. When compared with incompletely constructed classrooms in other villages, these 
three non-covered classrooms of Muli, known as Cishukwe village, were solidly built 
(double-burnt-brick wall), adhering to the standards of the Ministry of Education (i.e. 7m x 6 
m). During the approval meeting, residents pleaded for more classrooms, because their 
children were forced to study in the church building owing to shortage of classrooms. 
Moreover, there was no problem with local contribution, as the inhabitants were ready to 
work. They were prepared to adapt to any adjustments of project budget to achieve their 
objective. 
From Tushiriki staff’s perspective, there was a need for people to agree to this idea so that 
even the project’s budget could be revised as necessary, without changing the amount of the 
grant. This resulted in residents’ concurrence to the program. The carpentry and the roof 
construction work were supervised by either one church leader (that is, the evangelist) or the 
village chief or both of them, implying that these two institutions exist there. Nonetheless, the 
budget was underestimated to the extent that there were not enough metal sheets for 
completing the roof reconstruction work. 
Finally, even the women and the village chief were happy with the Tushiriki project; they 
were proud of having rebuilt three classrooms for the children’s first primary school in their 
village. Also, the people believed in the ability of the VDC members to manage the project, 
as they saw the building completed according to the standards of the area. Transparency and 
accountability, besides active involvement of village leaders, and thus of the residents, were 
indeed among the factors that facilitated the success of the project and its ownership. 
7.5.4. Mushugula 
Mushugula is a village in the Karhundu groupement, which forms part of the Luhwindja 
chiefdom. It takes about half an hour’s walk to reach there from the main road Kaziba- 
Luhwindja on the south-eastern side of Luhwindja. In 2008, Mushugula was inhabited by 936 
people, the Bahwindjahwindja. One of the recurrent problems of Mushugula was access to 
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safe water. There were only two water sources – wide apart – on the western side of the 
mountain, which were not well constructed and can be reached only after a long walk. The 
village does not have any school or health center and, therefore, its residents have to rely on 
the infrastructure of neighboring villages. However, it has a 5e CELPA church, though the 
villagers prefer to attend the churches in neighboring villages, either the 5e CELPA or the 8e 
CEPAC church in Cironge village. 
In 2008, when the Tushiriki project was to be taken up in Mushugula, the residents, guided 
by their village chief, opted for extension of the water supply system, constructed under the 
Banro Mining–Bureau Diocesain de Développement (Banro-BDD) project in 2008. When 
that project was implemented, the village requirements for water distribution were not given 
due consideration by the implementing agency. Therefore, the idea was to connect the 
existing water system to one of the main water tanks situated closer to the village. 
Explaining the issue, the village chief, assisted by one of his advisors, said, “When the 
Tushiriki staff arrived here, we managed to get it selected as our priority.” But, even after its 
execution, the problem of getting water to the village persisted, as no negotiations were 
carried out with the owners of the system, particularly the chief of the groupement, for 
necessary permission to go ahead. The plan was to have three water taps constructed in the 
village; one of those taps, which would be at the village chief’s place, would be connected to 
the system. However, even three weeks after the connection, Mushugula did not get safe 
water. One resident said: 
Since then, our water points did not provide any water. We, right then, returned to our previous 
non-constructed wells. They asked us to contribute 200 CF [that is, $US .241]. How can you pay 
for something that you do not get? Is it possible for us to do that? No! Look, even a non-built well 
gives the same quality of water. The only advantage is to have water closer to households. If they 
ask us money for the water point, I prefer to send my kids to a non-constructed well. We worked 
for nothing in the local contribution, carrying stones and sand. 
Two points emerge from this quote. One is that the residents were not much involved in 
decision-making of this project, and their contribution to project execution was little, 
although very few people were needed to transport sand and stones to construct three water 
taps. The second point is that the residents did not feel that they owned the project, because 
they could hardly understand the difference between water from a non-constructed well and 
water from a well-built water system. As a result, people had little enthusiasm in contributing 
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money to the project management, which could have been a solution to ensure access to safe 
water in the village. 
One month later, to the utmost satisfaction of the residents, water was available at the 
water taps. However, a closer look at the water points showed that the water taps were not 
well constructed, as they were leaking even when locked. This can be explained in two ways. 
First, the connection of the pipe to the water tap was bad; second, the cementing of the 
armature was not done properly. There was a clear difference between the water tap built 
under the Banro-BDD project (the better one) and that the one under the Tushiriki project. 
Also, water pressure was high, as the village is located alongside a mountain. This, combined 
with no regular contribution toward maintenance fees by the locals, threatened the project’s 
sustainability. Among the three water taps, only two provided water, because the third one 
broke down in no time owing to poor quality of construction. Even so, two female residents 
acknowledged the usefulness of the project, because it reduced their distance of carrying 
water. Besides, the idea of the project was that residents had to take care of the water system, 
as they felt it was a Tushiriki project. For example, someone said: 
The pipe has been damaged. We do not know who has to repair it. May be, the Tushiriki staff, 
because it is their project. In theory, each household planned to contribute 200 Congolese Francs 
monthly. It has not started yet. So we do not know. About the management of funds, we do not 
know. It would be better to talk to committee members. They might be knowing. 
This quote shows clearly that the residents, in spite of enjoying the project’s outcome, did not 
feel they owned the project. Instead, they viewed it as the program’s or committee’s project. 
In short, Mushugula epitomizes a water project that failed to involve local people in decision-
making or project execution, besides encountering many technical problems in project 
implementation. As a consequence, there was no feeling of ownership, and thus the 
sustainability of the project became doubtful. 
7.6. Officials’ viewpoint and Tushiriki staff’s opinion 
The chef de division in charge of action research and development, who was considered the 
technician in community development at the Ministry of Rural Development, stated: 
The people are the motor of development; if they refuse to see their interest in the project, they 
will decline; they will fail. You should start by identifying people’s needs; this is the basis. You 
should associate the people; you should involve them. When it is about a wanted action, aspired by 
the people, and when the people have understood their interest [in the project], it works well. 
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This statement shows that at the national level, at least at the Ministry of Rural Development, 
the generally agreed opinion is that if people’s needs are taken into account and if people are 
associated with project processes, they can contribute to its execution, as they may consider 
the project as theirs. In other words, the more the people are involved in the project’s 
decision-making, the more they may be involved in its execution. When interviewed on the 
same issue, the territory supervisor, who was one of the senior staff of the program, added: 
One of the strengths of this approach is that people, who are poor, are ready to participate in the 
program, because they do it for the development of their area. The local elite sensitizes and 
involves ordinary people in the project. The presence of outside aid such as the IRC-Tushiriki one, 
motivates residents to participate. 
This statement shows the expectation that local people will participate in a project only if 
they feel that the project is about reconstruction/development of their area. As regards the 
feeling of ownership by local people, one can infer that only when the residents feel that the 
selected project is theirs are they are likely to participate in it fully. 
7.7. Discussion and conclusion 
This research examines the Tushiriki intervention, a CDR intervention implemented by the 
IRC, in the DRC from 2008 to 2010. It analyzes if the participants of a CDR project 
developed a feeling of ownership during its execution. The findings show that in some of the 
villages, as illustrated by the Byazi and Muli cases, there has been an improvement in 
people’s perceptions vis-à-vis the intervention. Conversely, in few villages, as illustrated by 
the Bwishasha and Mushugula cases, no such improvement was observed. Several issues 
deserve attention here. 
Before the Tushiriki program was implemented in the area, people perceived development 
/reconstruction aid as a kind of help from outside, without which they would not have been 
invited to participate. They identified themselves as passive beneficiaries receiving food, 
shelter, salt, oil, etc. This mindset can be understood in the context of relief aid, which 
dominated assistance in the aftermath of conflict in the eastern DRC. Until then, most 
organizations that operated in the area provided humanitarian aid, rather than development 
/reconstruction aid. 
However, after the intervention, people viewed development/reconstruction aid, not 
surprisingly, as a combination of outside aid and local efforts to move forward. In some 
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villages, as in Byazi, there has been a shift in terms of people’s readiness (especially among 
Catholic church members) to contribute to a village reconstruction project in case of aid 
availability; indeed, the officials’ viewpoint and the Tushiriki staff’s opinion substantiate this 
impression. This change in the people’s mindset may be attributed to the role of ability 
building and facilitation by the program frontline staff, who assisted beneficiaries in ways 
that allowed the beneficiaries to be involved in all phases of intervention: identification of 
needs, planning, and execution. This viewpoint is supported by Chambers (cited by Blakburn 
& Holland, 1999, p.212), who states that, “we, the development workers, are the first ones 
that have to change for facilitating people’s participation.” Then he argues that, whether “we” 
change or not, people’s self-driven genuine participation in decision-making and 
implementation will continue to be the driving force behind their sustainable development 
(Blackburn & Holland, 1999). 
In addition to the fact that development actors have to first change, “development” as 
defined by Ngunjiri (1988) is about people becoming, or being helped to become, conscious 
about themselves and their environment, after which plans and actions are expected to follow. 
The involvement of people in the process of helping themselves, he argues, is the cornerstone 
of good development, and their awareness of this explains why development organizations 
have attached so much importance to participatory methodologies (Ngunjiri, 1998). Here, it is 
proposed to enlarge Ngunjiri’s definition by adding that people not only become conscious 
about themselves and their environment, but more importantly they can develop a feeling of 
“ownership” toward the infrastructure reconstructed through the intervention, depending on 
how it is facilitated and how it is favored by existing institutions. 
Perceptions about being involved in decision-making and community work relating to the 
reconstructed infrastructure have also changed along with intervention. People have shown 
satisfaction and happiness after the Tushiriki program, because they identified rehabilitation 
of both the school and the water system as their main priorities; they participated in the 
execution of those projects and benefited themselves by the outcome of the projects. As a 
result, people felt they owned those projects. Other authors have supported the notion, 
contrary to the orthodox view of development being primarily economic, that development is 
a process of transformation, which permeates the entire web of human life. Moreover, the key 
to influencing it is participation of the intended beneficiaries in planning and implementing 
development programs and sharing the dividends that accrue (Wanga & Chibuta, 1999). 
Along the same lines, Alasah draws attention to the emerging consensus that development is 
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best achieved if the people are intrinsically involved in the plans and objectives and when 
they can clearly see the benefits (Alasah, 2011). 
However, the findings suggest that despite the overall good impression of local people 
about the Tushiriki project, little has changed in some villages regarding people’s readiness to 
contribute by providing local materials and unskilled labor or by way of participating in 
project maintenance. One reason is lack of trust in committee members, who were considered 
more as agency staff than as people’s representatives. This view was reinforced by the fact 
that, in the areas concerned, people did not show any enthusiasm in volunteerism, because 
they believed that nobody would work for free. As a result, the elected body was not seen to 
be benevolent. Cornwall (2008) distinguishes between “exclusion” and “self-exclusion” in 
participatory activities. He argues that exclusion may result from a failure to make space for 
the participation of less vocal groups, whereas self-exclusion can result from people’s 
previous experiences, which can be associated with lack of confidence, or with experience of 
having been silenced by more powerful voices or fear of reprisals. 
Another reason for active involvement of committee members in community work is that 
they received more training than anyone else in the village and thus understood better than 
anyone else the approach based on local contribution. As a result, they carried local materials 
and were present at the construction site to supervise workers more actively than anyone else 
in the village. Otherwise, the intervention would have run the risk of failure. Also, they felt as 
if they owned the infrastructure that was being reconstructed. Similarly, a situation where 
people were reluctant to contribute to maintenance of the water system or to providing local 
materials, may be seen as the result of poor involvement in decision-making and lack of 
accountability on the part of those who were asked to manage this payment. 
Nonetheless, despite the strong appeal by the Tushiriki staff for working together in the 
reconstruction of the village, the inhabitants repeatedly claimed tangible incentives in the 
form of food or money for active participation in the work. Their demand remained 
unfulfilled, because of the insufficient money ($US 3000) granted to each village. Overall, 
this difference in the points of views between the Tushiriki frontline staff and the target 
population was undoubtedly an additional reason for poor involvement of local people in 
community contribution. 
The intervention did not affect the sense of community interest. Before and after the 
program, the participants felt they were part of the community, which needs to reconstruct 
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public utilities such as schools, roads, and water systems. Literature suggests that where 
people have little sense of belonging to community, they may have little inclination to spend 
time in community affairs (Cornwall, 2008). In most villages, residents showed a sense of 
community interest by participating, for instance in public meetings, because they believed in 
the relevance of rebuilding the infrastructure for the common good of everyone. 
The Muli case illustrates that the ability of committee members to manage funds allocated 
to the village improved under Tushiriki intervention. The committee members received 
money at the Cooperative d’Epargne et de Crédit (a local bank). They bought construction 
materials, such as metal sheets, wood, bricks, and cement, besides contracting masons and 
technicians to build infrastructure. They were accountable to local people in public meetings 
as required by the Tushiriki frontline staff. In the end, all the projects were completed as 
planned in most of the villages targeted. It is not certain, however, if the committee members 
would have been successful without any technical and management assistance from the 
Tushiriki field staff. 
Exploring how development aid contributed to social cohesion after civil war in Liberia, it 
is argued that with the creation of new local-level institutions, social cooperation patterns can 
change even after the end of the program (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009). The 
villages covered by a CDR program for this study reveal higher levels of social cooperation 
than the comparative villages. It further reveals that changes can take place in a community in 
response to outside intervention, and not necessarily to fundamental changes in structure of 
economic relations and macro-level political processes. Nonetheless, other factors, such as 
funding, duration, and the amount of space created for people to express their ideas, can 
contribute to what is labeled “the culture of development or post-conflict reconstruction 
intervention.” 
Finally, mention should be made of the connectedness between the Tushiriki intervention 
and poverty alleviation. The intervention created space that motivated local people to involve 
themselves in both decision-making and project execution. It thus empowered the 
beneficiaries, especially the committee members in rebuilding infrastructure in the areas of 
transport, education, and water. From these achievements, people gained access to transport 
by car or motorbike to school in terms of distance and finance, and to safe water closer to 
their households. While the relevant literature suggests that poverty alleviation (poverty 
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reduction to some) is a complex and multifaceted concept (Vedeld, 2003; Jutting et al., 2005), 
researchers and practitioners generally agree that it can be defined as (Vedeld, 2003, p. 162), 
(1) empowerment of the poor – understood as effective participation and voice – met by some 
degree of responsiveness on the government’s part (hence, it complements “democracy”); (2) 
social or human capacity development through, for example, better access to health, education, 
water, and infrastructure; (3) economic gains by the poor through pro-poor growth or improved 
economic opportunities; and (4) social inequality reduction through income redistribution. 
This author adopts the second dimension, as people viewed Tushiriki as a program that 
improved their accessibility to education, water, and infrastructure such as local roads. In 
each of the two chiefdoms studied here, 17 Tushiriki villages achieved small-scale projects in 
the fields of education, road/bridge, and water. As a result, an estimated 44,573 people 
benefited directly or indirectly from those utilities. Another reason for favoring the second 
dimension is that development, as a process of transformation, is more a social phenomenon 
(Wanga & Chibuta, 1999) than a merely economic one. This dimension is important in the 
context of reconstruction in post-conflict years, when millions of people returning to their 
villages badly needed access to basic necessities and public services. 
This study was motivated by the fact that local ownership plays an important role in 
formulating the policies of bilateral and multilateral agencies for effective and sustainable 
development, though it proves to be challenging in practice. It analyzes whether the 
participants of a CDR program in the DRC have developed a feeling of ownership to the 
program when it was executed in the post-conflict period, from 2008 through 2010. The 
author then argues that local feeling of ownership for a CDR project can be enhanced through 
programs that create a space for ownership and where existing institutions favor it. Indeed, 
two cases (that is, Byazi and Muli) illustrate how people felt that the village project was 
theirs, while the other two (Bwishasha and Mushugula) demonstrate the opposite. 
One of the main reasons for this is that some institutions, such as the chieftaincy in 
Mushugula village in the Luhwindja chiefdom and the Protestant church in Bwishasha in the 
Burhinyi chiefdom, influenced decision-making in such a negative manner that residents 
were not very interested in the project. Where such institutions played a positive role, 
however, the residents were much more involved in the project. Similarly, transparency and 
accountability of the Tushiriki program contributed to the relative success of the village 
project, and hence the feeling of ownership. Both officials and senior Tushiriki staff support 
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the idea that if residents are involved in all processes of the project, then they are likely to 
participate in the project’s execution and eventually to own it. What the present study shows 
is that where social homogeneity, in terms of ethnicity, exists and where good collaboration 
exists between institutions, such as chieftaincy and local church(es), and where local leaders 
are more transparent and accountable vis-à-vis the people engaged in reconstruction project 
processes, the chances of succeeding are more, and thus the likelihood of developing a 
feeling of ownership in the local residents. 
This idea supports the interaction between the people involved in participation and 
network building, and those involved in decision-making and execution of project, and 
project ownership (Majee & Hoyt, 2010). In addition, when the residents interact among 
themselves for the welfare of the community, the interaction may define the community, and 
as has been found in this study, it may lead to project ownership too (Korsching, Lasley, 
Sápp, Titchner, & Gruber, 2010, p. 458). One point that needs to be stressed here is that the 
people in the target villages have showed interest in owning only those projects that were 
identified, planned, and executed by themselves. The Tushiriki project clearly shows that not 
all international agencies operating in Burhinyi and Luhwindja in post-conflict reconstruction 
activities could promote the feeling of local ownership, because not all of them could 
generate the space needed for training and technical and management assistance. 
This author is skeptical if the local people would continue to show interest in owning those 
projects, as the intervention ended. Despite the shift in people’s beliefs vis-à-vis the 
intervention, it is not certain that people will remain attached to projects as theirs in the 
future, because other actors with different approaches would continue to operate and 
influence people’s beliefs. This divergence in the approaches of different agencies operating 
in the same area nullifies what people gained in earlier interventions. 
Finally, this author is cautious of the relationship between local ownership of Tushiriki 
intervention as a participatory reconstruction approach on one hand and poverty alleviation 
on the other. Because people looked at the Tushiriki intervention as a project that contributed, 
to some extent, to improving access to education, safe water, and transport, enhancing 
simultaneously local ownership of the infrastructure, its impact on poverty alleviation was 
positive, at least in terms of social transformation rather than economic gains. This author has 
not discussed here, though is well aware of the limitations of Tushiriki intervention in terms 
of time and budget and other issues relating to power relations, capacity building, and labor. 
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The author suggests that donor agencies promote only those programs that provide space for 
developing a feeling of ownership in local people, or providing post-conflict reconstruction 
assistance to them, and where feasible, the program must motivate more agencies (that is, 
church or government-oriented) to create such space by involving more recipients and 
institutions (chieftaincy and church institutions) in decision-making of projects, and therefore 
in their execution. Doing so improves the ability not only to own more projects and 
programs, but also to sustain them through assistance by local communities. 
Notes 
1. The Marshall tradition refers to the speech given by former US Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall on 
5 June 1947 at Harvard University. This speech initiated the post-war European aid program commonly known 
as the Marshall Plan. It was about the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. This European recovery 
program brought Europe out of the chaos, hunger, poverty, desperation, and the ashes of World War II. 
2. The Declaration gave birth to a set of concrete and measurable development objectives known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). A commitment was made to achieve these objectives by 2015, 
specifically: (1) an end to poverty and hunger, (2) universal education, (3) gender equality, (4) child health, (5) 
maternal health, (6) combating HIV/AIDS, (7) environmental sustainability, and (8) global partnership. This 
paper refers to almost all the MDGs, because projects executed under the Tushiriki program aim towards access 
to education, safe water, and health care, the involvement of women, partnership among stakeholders, and other 
similar areas of interest. 
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8.1. Introduction 
In this thesis, I have analysed the Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) approach 
implemented by the International Rescue Committee under the name Tushiriki, a programme 
that has been funded by the Dutch-based nongovernmental organization, the Stichting 
Vluchteling (SV & IRC 2007). The thesis focused on six main issues of CDR: participatory 
development/reconstruction, power relations, capacity building, labour and incentive 
structure, accountability, and local ownership. 
CDR originates from Community-Driven Development (CDD), which was initiated by the 
World Bank, and receives extensive support by both donors and those who promote 
participatory reconstruction/development. CDR/CDD has become one of the multimillion 
even multibillion dollar programs (Mansuri & Rao 2003:2; Platteau 2004:223; Dasgupta & 
Beard 2007:229; Labonne & Chase 2007:1). 
CDR has become popular because it claims to combine poverty alleviation with the 
promotion of governance. It is expected to have a positive effect on community cohesion, 
democratization, capacities for collective action, and it suits with policies of decentralization 
particularly in post-conflict settings (Swaminthan 2001:4; Tanaka, Singh et al. 2006:2; 
Dasgupta & Beard 2007:230; Labonne & Chase 2007:1; Sneddon & Fox 2007:2161; Fearon, 
Humphreys et al. 2009:291). There are, however, recurrent challenges to the approach in 
areas such as power relations, sustainability of the approach, which is interconnected to the 
inability of local people to manage financial and other inputs, the concept of ‘community’, 
and ‘parallel structures’ (Zakus & Lysack 1998; Buchya & Hovermanb 2000; Cooke & 
Kothari 2001; Dasgupta & Beard 2007; Ingamells 2007; Labonne & Chase 2007).  
In view of these concerns and the contradicting experiences with CDR, this thesis aimed to 
provide an ethnographic account of the inner working and local implementing realities of the 
Tushiriki programme. I wanted to step away from the claims of CDR and open the black box 
of outcomes to see what the underlying dynamics are that explain these outcomes. The main 
research question is: how do local people and IRC staff shape development through their 
everyday practice in the communities of Burhinyi and Luhwindja and how do social 
dynamics and power relations influence decision making and implementation of the CDR 
from 2008 to 2010? 
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From this main research question, I constructed the following sub research questions: 
1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation? 
2. How do these social dynamics play out in individual and community-level decision making? 
3. How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the 
programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) 
translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of 
the IRC? 
4. How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same 
time affect the working of CDR in the communities? 
5. What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices 
of the CDR in general? 
In seeking to answer these question I have adopted an actor-oriented approach to the analysis 
of the inner working and local dynamics of the Tushiriki intervention. I view the Tushiriki 
programme as an arena. In fact, this is an arena or sub arenas where multiple realities 
interplay, interact, and are socially constructed, and where the complexity of the field is being 
socially negotiated between actors in the project not only at field level but also at institutional 
level (Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1; Hilhorst 2003; 
Hilhorst & Jansen 2010). It is an actor-oriented approach applied to committee members as 
key actors through local institutions that were established within a typical CDR approach (i.e., 
the Tushiriki programme). 
Here, the actor-orientation approach means that people reflected upon both their past and 
current experiences, and what they saw in their setting, even as they were inclined to use their 
understanding of the intervention and their abilities to react to their environment. 
Furthermore, the actor-oriented approach means to look at interventions as social interfaces 
between the staff of the implementing agency and the beneficiary population. It is about 
understanding a reality informed by concrete experiences of actors with regard to a particular 
programme (Biggs & Matsaert 1999:237; Long 2001; Nyamu-Musembi 2002:1, Hilhorst 
2003 Hilhorst & Jansen 2010). 
The first two questions are addressed throughout the five empirical chapters of this thesis, 
and their specific contribution to these questions will be outlined in 8.2. Section 8.3 deals 
with the third question. It details the role of different groups of actors: IRC staff, VDC 
members, local elites and the recipient population, with reference to findings from the 
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different chapters. Section 8.4 highlights key findings that address question 4. After the 
general conclusions, section five outlines some limitations and ways forward for future 
research. 
8.2. Social dynamics of local decision making and implementation processes.  
1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation? 
2. How do these social dynamics play out in individual and community-level decision making? 
My first two research questions concern the social dynamics of the decision making 
processes and the implementation of the reconstruction projects in the communities.  
Chapter two has set the agenda for the study of social dynamics by providing a literature 
review on participatory development /reconstruction with a focus on the relations of power 
between elites and non-elites in a community. While acknowledging the potential of 
participatory approaches for reconstruction, it brings out that the social negotiation between 
elites and non-elites over power is a key concern for further research.  
The two questions are addressed throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter three analysed the social dynamics of capacity building, which is a major 
objective as well as an important vehicle for the CDR intervention. Capacity building for 
governance in CDR is one of the main activities of the approach (Tanaka, Singh et al. 
2006:6). The reality here is that developing a chain of capacity development may, but not 
necessarily, have long-lasting changes in the area. We argue that there were drawbacks in the 
content of training modules as well as drawbacks in knowledge transfer from trainees to other 
actors of communities, specifically to elites and non-elites. Importantly, we found that field 
staff lacked incentives to promote accountability as a value that residents could internalize 
and apply in their social life. Rather, they were more inclined to promote the hardware of 
reconstructing infrastructure. This forms an explanation of the mechanisms by which the soft 
side of the intervention reaped less results than anticipated. A more coordinated action for 
capacity building for governance among different stakeholders would have been suitable. 
Chapter four focuses on the dynamics of accountability as one of governance principles 
promoted within the Tushiriki programme. Governance and accountability have become one 
of the popular themes among donor interventions in reconstruction in conflict-affected areas 
(Vlassenroot & Romkema 2007:7). The chapter shows that the concept of accountability is 
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seen differently according to the context. Beneficiaries are more interested in concrete 
outputs such as school reconstruction than in abstract concepts such as accountability and 
there are multiple existing accountabilities that differ from the Tushiriki one. The chapter 
shows that the envisaged accountability mechanisms do not work as planned. This does not 
mean that there is no accountability. Local accountability mechanisms operate in ways that 
are informal, indirect and often between different actors than foreseen. These lack 
answerability and transparency, yet they have a role to play, and the staff often knows how to 
use them to enhance the project implementation. 
Chapter five takes up the issue of power over projects for the eastern region of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and analyses the role of elites in the social dynamics 
of the CDR in this post-conflict setting. It shows that social dynamics at individual level are 
based on relations of trust between elites and non-elites, while dynamics at community level 
are based on negotiating action among power holders around a village project. This chapter 
argues that existing institutions such as churches and chieftaincy are more influential than the 
committee members in both decision making and project execution within Tushiriki. 
Democratic processes are the emanation of these existing power holders, packaged in the 
programme governance structures. While the programme of Tushiriki tried to by-pass local 
power holders, these were often crucial in the success of projects. The chapter thus questions 
whether elite capture is always negative for development. 
Moreover, in local reconstruction project such as education and health in eastern DRC, 
churches are more powerful than chiefs and that in order to reinforce their power base in the 
community, these power holders were interested to promote better project execution 
frequently. This leads to a conclusion that attention needs to be paid to better understanding 
of accountability of churches for development. 
Chapter six, which analyses labour and incentive structure within the programme, was 
motivated by the observation that there was a lot of discussion about people’s labour 
participation in the projects. Specifically, there was the dilemma about whether to pay or not 
pay local labour, when local people contribute to the reconstruction programme. It deals with 
the reality of determining what motivates people to participate in a reconstruction project; 
that is, what are the local perceptions of costs or efforts vis-à-vis benefits they expected to 
gain from a project reconstruction. People’s responses are understood by placing them in the 
context of a history of forced labour, and by taking up the local perception of ‘public goods’. 
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Finally, chapter seven highlights local ownership in the Tushiriki programme. The aim of 
analysing this topic stems from the idea that local ownership in development/reconstruction is 
seen as a prerequisite for effective and sustainable development/reconstruction. What is 
striking is that despite this popular leaning toward local ownership, translating this concept 
into practice may prove to be difficult in development/reconstruction programmes. 
We argue that local ownership can be enhanced among local people where existing 
institutions such as churches and chieftaincy favour it and where programmes create a space 
for it. Additionally, participatory development/reconstruction programmes need to improve 
the prospects of potential development/reconstruction aid recipients to own a project. 
8.3. Findings-assumptions in CDR processes and research questions 
This section addresses the question how the objectives of the CDR (good governance and 
reconstruction) and the programme activities (formation of committees and implementation 
of projects) are translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local 
staff of the IRC? The section distinguishes three categories of community members: the 
elected members of the Village Development Committee, representatives of the elite or local 
power holders and the recipient population. 
8.3.1. CDR staff 
CDR staff both field and senior influenced the Tushiriki programme in several ways. Firstly, 
I have shown in chapter three that capacity building depended on the quality of the 
facilitators, who were mostly fieldworkers, and that there was a need to determine how staff 
translated these objectives into programme practices (Hilhorst & Schmiemann 2002). CDR 
staff took the reconstruction objective more serious than the governance objectives, partly 
because their performance was measured against the number of projects they completed 
while change in terms of governance would not be visible.  
In the remaining chapters, it has become clear that staff nonetheless plays a major role in 
the governance of the project, but often in ways that were different from the roles that the 
programme expected them to play. I have shown in chapter five that where power holders 
competed with each other over project resources, the game took the form of strong 
involvement of agency staff, both senior and field staff. Yet, in the metaphor of power 
struggle seen as a game, agency staff played the role of referee between two teams fighting 
for a championship. Rather than focusing on the interface between the VDC and the 
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population, agency staff, particularly those who were permanently in the field, knew who 
were the real players and were in touch with committee members and influential members 
such as the King, the Chef de Poste d’Encadrement Administratif, the curé of the Catholic 
parish, or the influential senior pastor.  
As a result, they found out a way to minimize the struggle either by domination, what I 
term in this thesis the ‘use of power over power’ or by synergy, that is, through negotiation or 
agreement. Because domination and synergy were used positively in social dynamics at 
community level, they fell into what Dasgupta & Beard (2007:244) have called elite control 
rather than elite capture. As I have said in chapter three, field staff, especially those who 
were originally from the same or the neighbouring chiefdom were involved in informal talks 
among power holders either to get the project properly implemented, for which they were 
judged and paid, or to contribute in their manner to the reconstruction of their terrain. 
All in all, the Tushiriki senior staff was quite positive about the approach of the 
programme. As I have said in chapter four, the agency senior staff saw it as one of the best 
approaches to development/reconstruction as it addresses issues related to corruption and 
governance, one of the main problems that the country faces since decades. Furthermore, the 
Tushiriki programme was seen as a very sensitive intervention, because the amount of grant 
per community and sub-community was announced publicly, and because field staff were in a 
position to engage with issues about power relations.  
While the staff was very positive about the programme, they often acted in accordance 
with their own knowledge of the context, instead of following the rules of the project. Instead 
of embarking on the long route of building people’s capacity to hold the leaders of the 
community accountable, they often preferred the short route and intervened – informally 
rather than in open confrontation – to ensure that the project was implemented according to 
the objectives. In short, the role played by CDR staff in influencing the Tushiriki programme 
can be seen in facilitation processes and in the ways they favoured domination or synergy 
among power holdersAs a result, they hardly changed people’s behaviour on governance in 
their daily life. 
8.3.2. Committee members 
Committee members responded in diverse ways to Tushiriki programme. Firstly, as I have 
shown in chapter three, committee members viewed positively capacity building package that 
comprised trainings, management, and technical assistance, because they learnt how to better 
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manage a project and also were motivated by knowledge gained from it. In other words, 
committee members, rather than the entire population, were empowered by the programme 
about transparency and accountability, for they had opportunity to put these principles in 
practice. This would have a positive effect in the area in terms of governance, because being 
mostly sub elite, they were likely to become the next generation of power holders in the area, 
where they will have the opportunity, one may hope, to apply these principles in their social 
life. 
With regard to motivation of committee members, there was a conflicting view between 
themselves and the agency field staff on the one hand, and between committee and local 
people on the other hand. Even as local people viewed the four US dollars given to every 
committee member at lunch time during training sessions as a wage, agency staff considered  
them a pastors or volunteers, who would not need any salary as they were seen as 
contributing to the reconstruction of their area. 
These views were completely refuted by committee members arguing that although being 
elected, they were working for the programme, and should be seen as employees who 
deserved wages or other forms of motivation. Findings are consistent with Ariely, Bracha et 
al. (2008:18), who have mentioned that there are societies where volunteering may not be 
perceived as honourable, such as in other societies like the United States of America. 
Nonetheless, committee members continued to participate in project activities despite their 
misgivings of not being paid for efforts and time devoted in these activities. 
The Tushiriki programme was based on the assumption that “the more local people have a 
sense of common identity and interest, when project funding is available, the more they are 
willing to volunteer in both decision making and project execution”. As stated above, 
however, VDC members saw themselves not as volunteers but as workers. The VDC 
members were elected from the community. That did not meant that there was a common 
interest and identity with the remainder of the population, or that the VDC members were 
prepared to do their work as volunteers just like the other members of the community were 
asked to provide their manual labour for free. It is worthwhile to recognize that even when 
people are living in one area and originally from the same ethnic group (i.e., the same 
culture), there are multiple divisions in terms of religion, social class, and literacy. Even 
among women, these differences may range from socioeconomic class to religion, from 
marital status to education, and from age to interests or priorities (Sequeira & Warner 2007). 
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These differences, as Wood (2003:457) has mentioned, result into a sort of unaccountable 
power for some and an exclusion of those who are under an institutional and relational risk 
for others. This is related to the observation made in the post-war context of Sierra Leone, 
where the rural community was typically divided between leading lineages and the rest 
(Richards, Bah et al. 2004).  
Therefore, being located in the same village and being from the same ethnic group  is not 
the only factor to obtain people’s involvement in a common-good activity. What also matters 
is the type of activity, the amount of time and effort invested, and the reward expected from 
project activity both directly and indirectly. Where people do not have experience of true 
volunteering, they tend to consider it as an employment, therefore, expecting a monetary 
payment. 
Finally, I have shown in chapter three that although men and women were in parity in a 
committee, women showed lower change in knowledge about local governance as they were 
less active than men. Indeed, their passivity was because of illiteracy and the weight of 
customary laws. This is consistent with Datta (2007), who has asserted that despite this useful 
way of empowering women, their participation remains lower, because of illiteracy and 
because of poor self-confidence. 
In short, as committee members benefited from capacity building on governance within 
Tushiriki, they were more empowered on governance than the population at large. In 
addition, committee members saw themselves as employees who deserved wages rather than 
volunteers. Last, because women were less active than men in committee processes, they 
were less empowered than men, despite the committee being in parity  
8.3.3. Elites 
The Tushiriki programme tried to exclude the elite from decision-making in the project, 
because it was feared that this would result in elite capture. Instead, the programme aimed to 
capacitate the population to execute control over the project and their leaders. The annual 
plan of Tushiriki read, for example, “CDR programme allows the empowerment of 
community impacted by conflict and enables them to be drivers and owners of their own 
reconstruction by establishing community governance structures that stress community 
priorities and accountability” (SV & IRC 2007:6). My analysis shows that in reality there is 
no doubt that existing elites played a crucial role in influencing the programme in several 
ways. Firstly, in chapter five, I have shown that two networks or institutions of chiefs and 
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church leaders were influential during the intervention, and that the intellectual elite, as an 
intermediate layer between power holders on the one hand, and between these leaders and the 
population on the other hand, played a crucial role in it. It could even be stated that where 
projects were successful, this was due to the motivation and mobilization by the elite. 
Moreover, I have shown from the same chapter that church leaders were likely more 
powerful than chiefs given the number of villages that selected schools reconstruction (25 out 
of 34, 73.5%), which were more a church-related project than road/bridge, which were 
initiated and supported by chiefs (5 out of 34, 14.7%).  
Although the project protocol did not provide space to the elite, the local staff of IRC was 
well aware of the role of the elite and actively tried to enrol them to assist in the project. The 
staff would often say things like “The more a village chief is stronger, the more he will 
sensitise his people about a reconstruction project; therefore, the project is likely to succeed 
in both decision making and execution”. This was the case for the chief, but also for the 
church leaders. Once a chief was motivated for the project, he would send his advisors to 
meet residents personally, house by house, to inform them about a public meeting to be held 
or a community work to be done. Alternatively, the message was announced during a Sunday 
church service, where it has a chance of reaching the vast majority of residents. As I have 
argued in chapter five, church leaders were committed to sensitize and to mobilize residents 
about either meetings or community work. Thirdly, in chapter six, I have mentioned that 
these power holders whose pre-existing projects were executed as Tushiriki projects were 
more active than anybody else when supervising the execution of these projects and to ensure 
that the work proceeded as expected. At the same time, I have shown in chapter seven that 
where these power holders were very committed to the project, often because they had started 
the project before IRC, residents were also likely to develop a sense of ownership over the 
project. 
We also saw the influence of the elite over the village development committee. Its 
composition by five men and five women, did not ensure that its members were disconnected 
to existing power holders. Rather, they were either part of the dominant institutions of 
churches or part of strong kinship ties, and in some cases, they were themselves church 
leaders. As a result, committee members acted according to pre-existing social norms and 
tended to have an attitude of answering to the elite more than to the general assembly. For 
instance, I have shown in chapter five that both chiefs and church heads exerted influence on 
a project getting selected, as the highest need of the village, either a pre-identified project by 
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the former, or initiated schools by the latter. Nonetheless, because projects were of public 
utility, they were accepted and voted by the majority of residents, who were in reality linked 
to the same institutions. Similarly, I have shown in the same chapter that one of the ways the 
chiefs and church heads influenced the intervention is by getting their relatives voted into the 
committee. 
In chapter four I have shown that officials, specifically at chiefdom level, had a common 
ground of being in favour of participatory reconstruction. There was much value on people’s 
involvement in the project reconstruction, both for contributing to the future of the area, and 
for earning money to survive. Even when they knew that accountability was brought in 
Tushiriki as a new value; however, they were not able to change committee members and 
people’s behavior about it, specifically outside the programme. 
In short, throughout the thesis it appeared that multiple power holders, including chiefs 
and church leaders were influential in the area. Church leaders were more influential than 
chiefs, as we have shown with an analysis of the project portfolio of the Tushiriki and the 
(similar and more large scale) Tuungane programme I found that existing elites have interest 
to have development work for strengthening their power base in the community and for the 
community interest, rather than necessarily stealing the project funding or destabilising the 
process for their own interest. The IRC-CDR-Manual states: “Where 
traditional/elite/religious community leaders are considered respected members of the 
community or members who can subvert the process, they can be given an advisory but not 
voting/signatory role on committees”(McBride & Patel 2007:22). Even though the elite was 
formally excluded from membership in the committee, this thesis has shown that a local elite 
(chief and church leader) may nonetheless be influential in a direct or indirect manner on the 
project processes, and therefore, on its outcomes. 
8.3.4. Village people 
Residents responded to Tushiriki programme in several ways. I have shown in chapter four 
that people’s views were more for concrete outputs than accountability. Additionally, I have 
argued in the same chapter that the concept of accountability had its own context-specific 
meaning and that there were multiple forms of accountability that did not match the Tushiriki 
one. This idea is consistent with Vlassenroot & Romkema (2007:10), who have noted that 
‘governance and democracy’ in the eastern DRC were seen as abstract terms and associated 
with western countries. People’s demands resonated more with the needs for reconstruction 
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than for the needs for democratic accountability. In other words, people’s demand for aid is 
more about school/road reconstruction than for democratic accountability.  
Secondly, I have mentioned in chapter three that despite the positive view and 
empowerment of committee members in local governance, efforts to change governance 
values did not have a tangible impact outside the programme, because values of governance 
of existing institutions (church-based/government-based) were not similar in the same area. 
This is consistent with Humphreys, Sanchez et al. (2012) who have found that despite the fact 
that the programme succeeded in implementing considerable number of projects, of which 
residents expressed high levels of satisfaction with the outcomes, little could be said about 
people’s behaviour change regarding governance. 
In the same vein, capacity building as one of the main activities executed within the 
programme was received differently by the local people. As I have said in chapter three, the 
population at large was not involved in training sessions. Rather, people were sensitized by 
civil society organizations, partners to the Tushiriki programme, and this sensitization was 
not practical, because it mostly took place in some suburban area for a short duration. As a 
result, most people viewed trainings and sensitization activities as useless. Moreover, some 
residents were even reluctant to engage in the project, because they thought the committee 
was paid for this activity. Information and mobilization of local people is important and 
residents can indeed actively take part in project activities. But, it is important to bear in mind 
that capacity building (whatever better it may be) cannot have lasting effects unless other 
actors operating in the same area are engaged for the same objective. As I have mentioned in 
chapter six, spontaneous or naive participation does not exist, if people do not balance effort 
and time they invest in programme activities, and if people do not weigh the payback they get 
from their project contribution in whatever form (be it material or nonmaterial). Indeed, the 
understanding of this balance is the key for people’s involvement in any reconstruction 
programme, especially in the context of the DRC or similar conflict-affected area. 
As I have said in chapter four, people’s involvement in meetings raised expectations at the 
beginning of the programme in the sense that the first meetings were more crowded than 
those held later, because people thought they would receive relief aid rather than 
reconstruction aid. Despite this perception, people participated in public meetings, often at 
the instigation or pressure of the elites (church leaders or/and chiefs). In addition, I have 
shown in chapter three that project prioritization often took the form of validation of the pre-
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existing or preselected projects by power holders of the area, rather than as a result of public 
meeting per se. 
The participation of the local population in the manual labour of the projects was more 
problematic, as I have shown in chapter six. Because of an association with forced labour 
(Salongo) and because residents did not have an idea that they were contributing to a public 
good, people were reluctant to participate voluntarily, especially when this concerned hard 
manual labour. They were only prepared to do this, when they were being paid or when there 
was a lot of pressure from the elite. Only in exceptional cases, where the elite was very well 
committed to a project which pre-existed before the IRC intervention, we found that people 
could develop a sense of ownership to the project. 
In short, people’s responses about the Tushiriki programme were more positive about the 
infrastructure being rebuilt and less about training, governance, and advocacy activities. The 
IRC programme: did empower committee members more than the community, whose 
participation depended largely on the respect they had for the elite and the motivation the 
elite had in pursuing the project. Public meetings and participation were thus influenced by 
the existing social culture and by dynamics at individual and community levels of relations of 
trustworthiness between residents and their leaders. 
8.4 The influence of other programmes in the same area. 
The fourth research question concerns other programmes that are implemented in the same 
area. There were other nongovernmental organizations operating in the area such as 
CAB/ICCO and, as I have mentioned in the introduction of this thesis,  they focused on the 
hard part rather than on the soft part of reconstruction. They engaged in rebuilding schools, 
health centres, and water systems without any training and assistance about governance. I 
have also shown in chapter four that AVSI/UNICEF did not organise any public meeting for 
accountability purpose and that it became hard for people to accommodate themselves to this 
accountability mechanism within Tushiriki, as they were not used to it in the past. These 
agencies other than IRC-Tushiriki agreed with the chief of chiefdom to choose infrastructures 
to reconstruct, and needed merely local contribution in terms of manual labour from 
residents. Yet, in schools that were targeted by both Tushiriki and CAB/ICCO such as in 
Ciriri village, this thesis has shown in chapter five that the context was more about 
competition than of synergy between actors’ objectives. That is, whereas one focused on 
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governance through reconstruction, another focused on the infrastructure reconstruction. It 
resulted in the divergence of outcomes between the past/parallel interventions and Tushiriki 
that came from divergence of agencies’ objectives. 
In chapter three, I argued that the diversity in objectives for reconstruction, and the 
parallel projects by different agencies was a major reason why the capacity building efforts of 
IRC did not result in changing attitudes on accountability. People saw accountability more as 
a specific demand or rule from Tushiriki, than as a value to be introduced in other projects or 
events. I concluded that unless development interventions are better coordinated, it is difficult 
to achieve objectives on changing attitudes towards governance and accountability.  
Overall, it can be stated that the community-driven programme failed to a large extent to 
reach its governance objectives, even though it succeeded in the construction of 
reconstruction projects. The programme’s strategies to involve different actors and the 
mechanisms to enhance accountability were little suited to the existing social relations and 
practices of accountability. The reason why the project often succeeded was that the staff 
adapted the programme to local realities. The local elite, rather than being excluded was able 
to play a large and often decisive role in mobilizing people for meetings and to contribute 
with their labour. Accountability relations that evolved were more between elites and the staff 
than directed to the population, a phenomenon which I called ‘power over power’. 
8.5. Key findings and some implications with regard to a CDR programme  
This thesis has found that: 
(a) Capacity building itself is not enough to bring about change beyond technical assistance. 
Unless capacity building is explicitly designed to meet the ultimate goal of enhancing 
governance, and takes into account external actors and factors to the intervention, change 
cannot be expected to take place. 
(b) Programme beneficiaries value concrete outputs such as rebuilding school/road more than 
accountability and other abstract concepts.  
(c) If people do not adhere to the accountability mechanisms prescribed in the programme, it 
does not necessarily mean that there is no accountability. Accountability can take its own 
context-specific shape and meaning. Development practitioners need to pay attention to this. 
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(d) Chiefs and church leaders are the main power holders in the area where the programme 
was implemented. For successful programme implementation, it is important to understand 
and take into consideration the local context of institutional multiplicity and the landscape of 
powers. 
(e) Local participation in the form of manual labour in project execution is influenced by the 
coercive history of labour and whether or not to be paid. There is a need to balance people’s 
views on cost and time invested in development and reconstruction vis-à-vis people’s 
expected motivation. 
(f) A sense of local ownership of a participatory development and reconstruction project can 
take place in a CDR programme where the existing institutions favour it, where processes of 
accountability are properly instituted and where a space is created for it. 
8.6. Limitations and future research  
With regard to limitations, the current research focused only on three chiefdoms of the South-
Kivu province in the DRC. It would be better for future research to target northern, central, 
western, and southern provinces of the DRC, and in other countries where a CDR programme 
is being implemented. This is because not only the institutional history of kingship might be 
different, but also the experience with conflict might vary from one area to another. 
Another limitation of the current study is that I did not look into the second echelon of the 
approach, that is the community level, as I noticed at first glance that it looked much more 
contractor-driven than community-driven. As such, the dynamics of power relations 
described in the current thesis (i.e., village level) might be different to those that may occur at 
this second level. Further research on CDR regarding this aspect, on tendering and 
procurement processes at the second echelon of a CDR programme would be of importance 
to complement our research. 
Once the governance cluster is established at various levels, it would be interesting to 
learn more about how they function and how they are translated into everyday practices in the 
target rural areas by various actors intervening there. In addition, it would be worthy to 
investigate how local people cope with maintenance of the infrastructures after they are 
rebuilt. 
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Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the effectiveness of a governance 
programme through reconstruction in a context of decentralization in the DRC, which is 
expected to take place in 2014. 
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Photo 8.1: Local road reconstructed under Tushirki in use, Karwera, Budaha, Burhinyi 
 
 
Photo 8.2: Roof of 3 classrooms completely rebuilt under Tushiriki project in Byazi, Luhwindja 
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Photo 8.3: Water tap damaged at one water point constructed under Tushiriki in Mushugula, Luhwindja 
 
Photo 8.4: Ciriri primary school fully rebuilt under ICCO/Anti-Bwaki, Ciriri village, Burhinyi 
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SUMMARY 
Participatory development and reconstruction has become one of the popular approaches not 
just for poverty alleviation, but for strengthening accountability in post-conflict and post-
disaster settings. It receives much support from the international agencies, donors and 
advocates of collective action. Multi-million programmes for development/reconstruction are 
supported by both the bilateral donors and the international agencies, such as the World 
Bank, the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the United 
Nations Development Programmes. Adding strength to the approach is its potential to support 
decentralization in post-conflict settings. At the same time; however, critiques of the 
approach raise questions about its effectiveness in bringing about changes in governance, the 
complexities of power relations, the tricky concept of community and challenges with regard 
to sustainability. This thesis presents an in-depth case study of one CDR programme, in 
Eastern DRC, in order to shed light on these questions. It analyses issues related to capacity 
building and its supposed outcome of capacity development of local communities; and looks 
at techniques used for accountability and how these work in practice. The thesis also 
highlights issues of power and labour and how these dynamics evolve in a CDR programme, 
and examines the level of local ownership the population felt about the projects.  
This thesis wants to contribute to the debates on community-driven reconstruction by 
offering a detailed case study into one CDR programme in Eastern DRC: the Stichting 
Vluchteling (SV)-supported Tushiriki programme that was implemented by the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC).  It unravels the realities of who drives the process, how are social 
relations constructed around the intervention, what is the source of legitimacy of those who 
drive it, what are the mechanisms to enhance local accountability in the context of post-
conflict, how capacity building has been undertaken and shaped by actors, and what are the 
types of labour and the incentive structure in the dynamics of the programme.  Through this 
case study, the black box of community driven reconstruction can be opened to reveal the 
inner working of the programme, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the 
contradicting experiences with the approach. 
The purpose of the research is to understand the social dynamics around and meanings 
attached to the Community-Driven Reconstruction programme called Tushiriki in target 
communities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This, in order 
to inform the assumptions and approaches underlying the CDR programme’s design and 
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implementation. The programme was run by SV-IRC. The main research question is how do 
local people and IRC staff shape development through their everyday practice in the 
communities of Burhinyi, Luhwindja, and Kaziba and how do social dynamics and power 
relations influence decision making and implementation of the CDR from 2008 to 2010? 
1. What are the social dynamics and power relations in the areas of implementation? 
2. How do they play out in individual and community-level decision making? 
3. How are the objectives of the CDR (good governance and reconstruction) and the 
programme activities (formation of committees and implementation of projects) 
translated in practice and responded to by the community members and local staff of 
the IRC? 
4. How do other reconstruction interventions that happened in the past or at the same 
time affect the working of CDR in the communities? 
5. What are the implications of the findings for the assumptions, policies, and practices 
of the CDR in general? 
This is a qualitative study based on ethnographic research that I undertook in two 
chiefdoms (Burhinyi and Luhwindja) in South-Kivu province in the eastern DRC. I have used 
as techniques for data collection participant observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews 
and desk review of secondary data. The study was executed at the request of Stichting 
Vluchteling, who sponsored the programme, in order to have an independent qualitative 
monitoring of their programme. Throughout the research period, I have provided feedback to 
staff and management at different occasions and I have been part of three evaluation teams 
looking into the programme. 
In chapter 2 I present a literature review on participatory development/reconstruction. I 
assess its value and show its potential to transformation, its advantages and disadvantages. I 
argue that though its leading to development/reconstruction, one of its main drawbacks is that 
the inequality engrained in power relations between elites and non-elites remains. One way 
forward for research would be to look more at the way in which changes are induced through 
negotiations taking place within the power arena of local politics. Another way ahead 
revolves around an urgent need for anthropology of development to view development 
/reconstruction as processes; that is, to look at discourses, institutions and practices and the 
way they are shaped. And, last but not least, it is necessary for practitioners to find ways to 
balance bottom-up control and top-down authority. For this, it is important to share new 
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positive and negative experiences regarding participatory development/reconstruction and its 
methods. 
In chapter 3 I discuss capacity builders for governance within the Tushiriki programme. 
We show that the lack of impact on governance, raised by the recent robust evaluation on a 
similar CDR programme, originates from the capacity building processes. There are 
significant pitfalls in the content of the educational messages, incentive of the staff delivering 
the training and the interface between trainers and trainees. Other difficulties are related to 
existing power relations on the ground and the existing types of accountabilities in the areas, 
that do not match with the types of accountability prescribed in the CDR programmes. 
These findings lead us to argue that there was inconsistency in the content of the training 
for capacity development. Training was little connected to people’s social life. Yet, training 
was to some extent effective, but was not transferred to the most powerful actors who could, 
in turn, transfer it to local people. It means there is considerable room for improvement to 
enhance governance practices in the Tushiriki and similar programmes, but existing 
community dynamics need to be considered as well as existing accountability norms and 
practices. Additionally, training content needs to be adjusted to local realities, including 
better translation into local language of the main concepts of the training message. Besides, 
there is a need to better coordinate with other actors promoting governance practices in the 
same setting. 
Chapter 4 deals with the institutional engineering in the eastern DRC. It discusses the 
general assembly report, the watch-dog role of civil society and the display of reports as 
techniques for accountability and how these mechanisms are viewed by residents. We argue 
that programme beneficiaries are more interested in concrete outputs than in abstract concepts 
such as accountability, which has its own context-specific meaning. Also, locally existing 
types of accountabilities are conflicting with the democratic accountability prescribed by the 
programme. As ways forward, we suggest that attention has to be paid to how beneficiaries 
regard the demand side of both accountability and reconstruction. Additionally, as public 
meetings are embedded in the local culture, a particular place should be given to these 
meetings as a mechanism to boost public and downward accountability. 
Chapter 5 examines the concept of ‘power relations’, often described as a key variable 
responsible for the ineffectiveness of participatory approaches. We aim to understand the 
dynamics between power holders and others in the target communities of the Tushiriki 
Summary 
238 
 
programme. We argue that the implication of chiefs and church leaders in reconstruction adds 
to its achievement in the context of inter-elite competition to control external funding where 
one form of power holder is worse than another. Also, we show that project selection and 
execution is more dependent on the existing institutions rather than the result of democratic 
processes. Chieftaincy and churches are existing institutions that are based on the same 
identity and culture. They are networks to which one can connect a development 
/reconstruction action in a conflict-affected area or similar context of the rural DRC. Lastly, 
as churches replaced the state in education and health provision, they are often more powerful 
than chiefs. 
Agencies that use participatory development/reconstruction such as CDR need to better 
identify and understand existing institutions through which relations of power operate. They 
also need to work with them and -when feasible-, perform what we term “power over power” 
through any of the existing lines of power. Finally, these agencies need to stop competing 
each other while they should learn to cooperate in order to improve accountability practices 
in the same target area. 
Chapter 6 concerns the labour participation of the population. Community participation in 
community-driven reconstruction programmes takes in practice the form of labour or 
volunteer work, which may be viewed differently by participants. We examined the 
effectiveness of the CDR approach, specifically the mobilization of voluntary manual labour 
for public works in the Tushiriki programme. We found that overall, people’s participation 
was lower than expected, that their motivation depended on the type of work related to the 
selected project and there was common unwillingness to perform manual labour for free. We 
argue that people’s behaviour regarding labour is influenced by repetitive cycles of forced 
manual labour in the area. In addition, people lacked motivation because of the contested 
notion of public goods such as road and education in the area. 
Looking at four cases described in chapter 7 about local ownership in the Tushiriki 
programme, we have observed that where the existing institutions favour the sense of local 
ownership or where a programme creates a space for such sense of ownership, beneficiaries 
can develop it. We then bring to the attention that programmes need to improve the views of 
residents to own a project while implementing a participatory development/reconstruction 
intervention. 
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These different chapters together convey the social dynamics of Tushiriki. In the 
conclusion, the insights are captured to analyse the role of different actors in the programme. 
Overall, it can be stated that the community-driven programme failed to a large extent to 
reach its governance objectives, even though it succeeded in the construction of 
reconstruction projects. The programme’s strategies to involve different actors and the 
mechanisms to enhance accountability were little suited to the existing social relations and 
practices of accountability. The reason why the project often succeeded was that the staff 
adapted the programme to local realities. The local elite, rather than being excluded was able 
to play a large and often decisive role in mobilizing people for meetings and to contribute 
with their labour. Accountability relations that evolved were more between elites and the staff 
than directed to the population, a phenomenon which I called ‘power over power’. The 
conclusion ends with some implications with regard to a CDR programme and emphasises 
key findings and key lessons. Finally it discusses some limitations of the research and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
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RESUME (SUMMARY IN FRENCH) 
Le développement/reconstruction participatif(ve) est devenu(e) une des approches populaires 
non seulement pour la réduction de la pauvreté, mais aussi pour le renforcement du fait de 
rendre compte dans les zones post-conflit et post-désastre. Cette approche fait l’objet de 
beaucoup de popularités de la part d’agences internationales, de donateurs et de ceux qui 
plaident pour l’action collective. Il s’agit d’une collection allant de plusieurs millions à 
plusieurs milliards de dollars pour le développement/reconstruction par les donateurs 
bilatéraux et les agences internationales. Parmi ces agences, il y a lieu de citer la Banque 
Mondiale, l’Organisation Internationale de Travail, l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé et le 
Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement. Un atout additionnel de l’approche 
est son potentiel d’appuyer la décentralisation en zones post-conflit. 
Par contre, les critiques de l’approche sont diverses. Elles vont de l’effectivité à apporter 
des changements en termes de gouvernance, de la complexité des relations de pouvoir, du 
concept problématique de « communauté » et du doute à propos de sa prédisposition à la 
durabilité. Cette thèse présente l’étude de cas en profondeur d’un programme CDR à l’Est de 
la RDC, en vue de donner la lumière sur ces questions.  Elle analyse les questions relatives au 
renforcement de capacité et ses résultats attendus du développement de capacité des 
communautés locales; aussi bien qu’elle jette un regard sur les techniques utilisées pour 
rendre compte et comment celles-ci fonctionnent en pratique. La thèse met aussi en lumière 
les questions relatives au pouvoir et au labeur et comment ces dynamiques changent dans un 
programme CDR, et examine le niveau d’appropriation que la population pensait avoir à 
propos de projets.  
Cette thèse voudrait contribuer aux débats sur la Reconstruction Dirigée par la 
Communauté (CDR) en offrant une étude de cas détaillée dans un programme CDR à l’Est de 
la RDC : le programme Tushiriki financé par SV qui a été implémenté par IRC. Elle clarifie 
les réalités de qui dirige les processus, comment les relations sociales sont construites autour 
de l’intervention, quelle est la source de légitimité de ceux qui la dirige, quels sont les 
mécanismes d’améliorer le rendre compte local dans le contexte post-conflit. Mais aussi 
comment le renforcement de capacité a été entrepris et formé par les acteurs, et quels sont les 
types de labeur et de structure incitative dans les dynamiques du programme. A travers cette 
étude de cas, la boite noire de la reconstruction dirigée par la communauté peut être ouverte 
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pour révéler le fonctionnement interne de ce programme, en vue d’arriver à une meilleure 
compréhension des réalités contradictoires avec l’approche.  
L’objectif de cette recherche est de comprendre les dynamiques sociales autour et les 
significations attachées au programme de Reconstruction Dirigée par la Communauté appelé 
Tushiriki dans les communautés ciblées de la partie Est de la République Démocratique du 
Congo (RDC). Ceci, en vue d’informer les suppositions et approches qui soulignent la 
conception et l’implémentation du programme CDR. Le programme a été géré par SV-IRC 
(Stichting Vluchteling-International Rescue Committee). Ma principale question de recherche 
est comment les populations locales et le staff IRC arrangent le développement à travers leur 
pratique de tous les jours dans les communautés de Burhinyi, Luhwindja et Kaziba et 
comment les dynamiques sociales et les relations de pouvoir influencent-elles la prise de 
décision et l’implémentation du programme CDR, de 2008 à 2010? 
1. Quelles sont les dynamiques sociales et relations de pouvoir dans les zones 
d’implémentation? 
2. Comment ces dynamiques sont-elles engagées dans la prise de décision au niveau individuel 
et communautaire? 
3. Comment les objectifs de CDR (bonne gouvernance et reconstruction) et les activités 
du programme (formation des comités et implémentation de projets) sont traduits en 
pratique et comment les communautés membres et le staff local de l’IRC y ont-ils 
répondus? 
4. Comment d’autres interventions de reconstruction exécutées dans le passé ou au 
même moment affectent le fonctionnement de CDR dans les communautés? 
5. Quelles sont les implications des résultats au regard des suppositions, politiques, et 
pratiques de CDR en général? 
Il s’agit d’une étude qualitative basée sur l’ethnographie que j’ai entreprise dans trois 
chefferies (Burhinyi, Luhwindja et Kaziba) au Sud-Kivu à l’est de la RDC. J’ai utilisé comme 
techniques de collecte de données l’observation participante, les interviews semi-structurées 
et la revue de données secondaires. L’étude a été exécutée à la demande de Stichting 
Vluchteling, qui avait financé le programme en vue d’avoir un suivi qualitatif indépendant de 
ce programme. Durant la période de recherche, j’ai donné le feedback au management et au 
staff du programme et j’ai fait partie de trois équipes d’évaluation en relation avec ce 
programme. 
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Dans le chapitre 2, je présente la revue de la littérature sur le développement 
/reconstruction participatif(ve). Je mesure sa valeur et montre son potentiel de transformation, 
ses avantages et ses inconvénients. J’argumente alors que malgré sa contribution au 
développement/reconstruction, un de ses aspects négatifs reste la persistance de l’inégalité 
des relations de pouvoir entre élites et non-élites. Une voie pour la recherche future serait de 
regarder plus sur la manière dont les changements sont induits à travers les négociations qui 
prennent place dans l’arène de pouvoir de politique locale. Une autre voie pour le futur tourne 
autour d’un besoin urgent de l’anthropologie de développement à regarder le 
développement/reconstruction comme processus; c’est-à-dire, regarder aux discours, aux 
institutions et aux pratiques et la manière dont ils sont ordonnés. Et finalement, d’autres 
voies, non les moindre, il est nécessaire aux praticiens de trouver des options pour balancer le 
contrôle de bas en haut avec l’autorité de haut en bas. Pour ceci, il est important de partager 
des nouvelles expériences positives et négatives au regard du développement/reconstruction 
participatif(ve) et ses méthodes. 
Dans le chapitre 3, je discute les acteurs du renforcement de capacité pour la gouvernance 
dans le programme Tushiriki. Nous montrons que l’absence d’impact en matière de 
gouvernance, mentionnée par la récente évaluation robuste sur un programme similaire de 
CDR, tient aux processus de renforcement de capacité. Il y a des aspects négatifs importants 
dans le contenu des messages éducationnels, à l’incitation du staff délivrant la formation et à 
l’interface entre les formateurs et les formés. Les autres difficultés sont liées à l’existence des 
relations de pouvoir sur le terrain et les types des comptabilités existantes dans ces zones, qui 
ne coïncident pas aux types de comptabilité prescrite dans les programmes CDR. 
Ces résultats nous amènent à argumenter qu’il y avait une inconsistance dans le contenu 
de formations pour le développement de capacité. La formation était peu connectée à la vie 
sociale de la population. Il peut être surprenant, que la formation a été dans une certaine 
mesure effective, mais non transférée aux tenants de pouvoir qui pouvaient, à leur tour, la 
transférer à la population locale dans les communautés. Ceci signifie qu’il y a moyen 
d’améliorer les pratiques de gouvernance dans Tushiriki et programmes similaires, mais les 
dynamiques communautaires existantes ont besoin d’être considérées, ainsi que les pratiques 
et normes de comptabilité existantes. En plus, le contenu de formation a besoin d’être ajusté 
aux réalités locales, incluant la bonne traduction dans la langue locale des principaux 
concepts du message de formation. Bien plus, il y a besoin de bien coordonner avec d’autres 
acteurs œuvrant pour la promotion des pratiques de bonne gouvernance dans le même milieu. 
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Le chapitre 4 concerne l’arrangement institutionnel à l’est de la RDC. Il discute 
l’assemblée générale rapport, le rôle watch-dog de la société civile et le postage des rapports 
comme techniques pour rendre compte et comment ces mécanismes sont vus par les 
résidents. Nous argumentons que les bénéficiaires du programme sont plus intéressés par les 
réalisations concrètes que par les concepts abstraits telle que la comptabilité, qui a sa 
signification spécifique selon le contexte. Aussi, il existe les types des comptabilités 
localement existantes qui sont en conflit avec la comptabilité démocratique prescrite par le 
programme. Comme voies pour le futur, nous suggérons qu’une attention soit faite sur la 
manière dont les bénéficiaires regardent l’aspect demande de la comptabilité et de la 
reconstruction. Bien plus, comme les réunions publiques sont ancrées dans la culture locale, 
une place particulière devrait être réservée à celles-ci comme mécanisme pour accroitre la 
comptabilité à la fois publique et vers le bas. 
Le chapitre 5 examine le concept de « relations de pouvoir », souvent décrit comme la 
variable clé responsable de l’échec des approches participatives. Nous avons voulu 
comprendre les dynamiques entre les tenants du pouvoir et les autres dans les communautés 
ciblées par le programme Tushiriki. Nous argumentons que l’implication des chefs et leaders 
religieux dans la reconstruction contribue à son achèvement dans le contexte de compétition 
inter-élite pour contrôler les fonds venant de l’extérieur et où une forme d’élite est mauvaise 
qu’une autre. Aussi, la sélection et l’exécution du projet est plus l’effet d’institutions 
existantes plutôt que l’effet des processus démocratiques. La chefferie et les églises sont des 
institutions existantes qui sont basées sur la même identité et culture. Elles sont des réseaux 
auxquels on peut connecter une action de développement/reconstruction dans une zone 
affectée par le conflit ou dans un contexte similaire du milieu rural de la RDC. Finalement, 
comme les églises avaient remplacé l’Etat dans la provision de l’éducation et la santé, elles 
sont souvent plus puissantes que les chefs. 
Les agences qui utilisent le développement/reconstruction participatif(ve) tel que le CDR 
ont besoin de bien identifier et comprendre les institutions existantes à travers lesquelles les 
relations de pouvoir opèrent. Elles ont aussi besoin de travailler avec et là où c’est faisable, 
d’appliquer ce que nous appelons « pouvoir sur pouvoir » à travers n’importe quelles lignes 
existantes de pouvoir. Finalement, ces agences ont besoin de stopper la compétition pendant 
qu’elles devront apprendre à coopérer dans le but d’améliorer les pratiques de rendre compte 
dans la même zone cible. 
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Le chapitre 6 analyse la mobilisation de la contribution locale dans le programme 
Tushiriki. La participation communautaire dans les programmes de reconstruction dirigée par 
la communauté prend en pratique la forme de labeur ou travail volontaire, qui peut être vu 
différemment par les participants. Nous avons examiné l’effectivité de l’approche CDR, 
spécifiquement le labeur manuel volontaire pour les travaux publics dans le programme 
Tushiriki. Nous avons trouvé, en général, que la participation populaire a été plutôt faible 
qu’espérée, que la motivation dépendait du type de travail relatif au projet sélectionné et qu’il 
y avait un manque commun de volonté de réaliser le labeur manuel gratuitement. Nous 
argumentons que le comportement des gens au regard du labeur est influencé par les cycles 
répétitifs du labeur manuel forcé dans le pays.  
Au regard de quatre cas décrits dans le chapitre 7 à propos de l’appropriation locale dans 
le programme Tushiriki, nous avons observé que là où les institutions existantes sont en 
faveur du sens de l’appropriation locale ou là où le programme crée un espace pour ce sens, 
les bénéficiaires peuvent le développer. Nous en appelons ainsi à l’attention que les 
programmes ont besoin de booster les représentations des résidents à s’approprier un projet 
en implémentant une intervention basée sur le développement /reconstruction participatif(ve). 
Ces différents chapitres, pris ensemble, expriment les dynamiques sociales de Tushiriki. 
Dans la conclusion, les compréhensions sont capturées pour analyser le rôle de différents 
acteurs dans le programme. En général, il peut être dit que le programme de reconstruction 
dirigée par la communauté a échoué, dans une grande mesure, d’atteindre ses objectifs de 
gouvernance, bien qu’il a réussi dans la reconstruction des projets. Les stratégies du 
programme d’impliquer les différents acteurs et les mécanismes pour améliorer le rendre 
compte ont été peu appropriés aux relations sociales et pratiques existantes de rendre compte. 
La raison pour laquelle le projet a souvent réussi est que le staff a adapté le programme aux 
réalités locales. L’élite locale, au lieu d’être exclu, a été capable de jouer un important rôle 
souvent décisif en mobilisant les habitants aux réunions et aux contributions locales. Les 
relations de rendre compte développées les ont été plus entre l’élite et le staff plutôt que 
dirigée vers la population, un phénomène que nous avons dénommé « pouvoir sur pouvoir ». 
La conclusion se termine par quelques implications au regard du programme CDR et met 
l’accent sur les résultats et leçons clés. Finalement, elle discute quelques limitations de cette 
recherche et trace quelques pistes pour la recherche future. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Participatieve ontwikkeling in wederopbouw is tegenwoordig een van de belangrijkste 
benaderingen, niet enkel voor armoedebestrijding, maar ook om er voor te zorgen dat er 
betere verantwoording wordt afgelegd over gedane uitgaven in de opbouwfase na conflicten 
en rampen. Er is veel aandacht en steun voor vanuit internationale organisaties en donoren. 
De steun varieert van enkele miljoenen tot zelfs miljarden die beschikbaar worden gesteld 
door bilaterale donoren en internationale instanties, zoals de Wereldbank, de Internationale 
Arbeidsorganisatie, de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie en het Ontwikkelingsprogramma van 
de Verenigde Naties. Een belangrijk pluspunt van de benadering is de mogelijkheid die het 
biedt om steun te geven aan processen van decentralisering in de naoorlogse context. Er is 
echter ook kritiek; de benadering roept vragen op over de effectiviteit waar het gaat om het 
teweegbrengen van veranderingen in beleid, de complexiteit van machtsrelaties, het lastige 
concept ‘gemeenschap’ en de hang naar duurzaamheid. Dit proefschrift presenteert een 
uitvoerige case studie van een programma van gemeenschapsgedreven wederopbouw 
(community-driven reconstruction; CDR) in Oost-Congo, waarbij ingegaan wordt op 
bovengenoemde onderwerpen. Het proefschrift analyseert vraagstukken rondom 
capaciteitsopbouw en hoe dit leidt tot capaciteitsontwikkeling van lokale gemeenschappen; 
het kijkt naar technieken die gebruikt worden om verantwoording af te leggen en hoe die 
werken in de praktijk. Verder belicht het de dynamiek van macht en arbeidsverdeling binnen 
een CDR-programma, en onderzoekt het de mate waarin de lokale bevolking zich eigenaar 
voelt van de projecten (en daarmee ook verantwoordelijk). 
Dit proefschrift wil bijdragen aan debatten over wederopbouw aangestuurd door 
gemeenschappen middels een gedetailleerde case studie van een CDR programma in Oost- 
Congo; het mede door Stichting Vluchteling gefinancierde Tushiriki programma, dat werd 
uitgevoerd door IRC (International Rescue Committee). Het ontrafelt de praktijk van het 
programma: wie stuurt het proces aan; hoe zijn sociale relaties rondom de interventie 
opgebouwd; wat is de bron van legitimiteit voor degenen die het proces aansturen; welke 
mechanismen worden gebruikt om tot betere lokale verantwoording te komen in de 
naoorlogse context; hoe wordt capaciteit verbeterd en vormgegeven door verschillende 
actoren; welk vormen van arbeid zijn en welke beloningsstructuur dragen bij aan de 
dynamiek van het programma? Middels een case studie komen we meer te weten over de 
Samenvatting 
246 
 
manier waarop een gemeenschapsgedreven wederopbouw programma werkt. Dit helpt om tot 
een beter begrip te komen van de tegenstrijdige ervaringen die er zijn met de benadering. 
Doel van dit onderzoek is om de sociale dynamiek in de doelgroepen van het CDR-
programma Tushiriki in het oosten van de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC) te 
begrijpen, alsmede de betekenis die in de doelgemeenschappen aan het programma wordt 
gegeven. Op die manier maakt het onderzoek meer duidelijk omtrent de veronderstellingen 
en benaderingen die ten grondslag liggen aan ontwerp en uitvoering van het CDR 
programma. Het programma was een samenwerking van Stichting Vluchteling met het 
International Rescue Committee (SV-IRC). De hoofdvraag van het onderzoek is: Hoe geven 
lokale mensen en IRC personeel vorm aan ontwikkeling in hun dagelijkse praktijk in de 
gemeenschappen Burhinyi, Luhwindja en Kaziba, en wat is de invloed van machtsrelaties en 
andere sociale processen op besluitvorming en uitvoering van het CDR programma in de 
periode 2008-2010? 
Deelvragen: 
1. Hoe werken machtsrelaties en andere sociale processen in de dorpen waar het 
programma wordt uitgevoerd? 
2. Welke invloed hebben deze sociale processen en relaties op besluitvorming op 
individueel- en gemeenschapsniveau?  
3. Hoe worden de doelstellingen van CDR (goed bestuur en wederopbouw) en de 
programma activiteiten (training van comités en uitvoering van projecten) vertaald 
naar de praktijk en hoe reageren dorpsbewoners en lokaal personeel van IRC hier 
op? 
4. Welke invloed hebben andere wederopbouw interventies uit verleden of heden op de 
werking van CDR in de dorpen? 
5. Welke implicaties hebben de bevindingen voor de veronderstellingen, beleid, en 
uitvoering van CDR in het algemeen?  
Dit is een kwalitatief onderzoek –gebaseerd op etnografisch veldwerk- uitgevoerd in twee 
chiefdoms (Burhinyi en Luhwindja) in de provincie Zuid-Kivu in het oosten van de DRC. Als 
methodes van dataverzameling heb ik gebruik gemaakt van participatieve observatie, semi- 
gestructureerde diepte-interviews, en een literatuurstudie van secondaire bronnen. De studie 
is uitgevoerd op verzoek van Stichting Vluchteling als een onafhankelijke, kwalitatieve 
monitoring van het programma. Stichting Vluchteling heeft het onderzoek gefinancierd. 
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Gedurende de onderzoeksperiode heb ik verschillende keren feedback gegeven aan personeel 
en management team. Daarnaast heb ik deel uitgemaakt van drie evaluatieteams van het 
programma. 
In hoofdstuk 2 geef ik een overzicht van de literatuur over participatieve ontwikkeling en 
wederopbouw. Ik beoordeel de waarde hiervan, en laat de mogelijkheden tot transformatie 
zien die participatieve ontwikkeling biedt, de voordelen, maar ook de nadelen. Op basis 
daarvan beargumenteer ik dat participatie weliswaar helpt om tot ontwikkeling/wederopbouw 
te komen, maar dat er ook een schaduwkant aan zit; namelijk de ongelijke 
machtsverhoudingen tussen elite en niet-elite die ondanks de interventie in stand blijven. Het 
zou kunnen helpen als er in onderzoek beter wordt gekeken naar de manier waarop 
onderhandelingen in de lokale machtsarena tot veranderingen kunnen leiden. Een andere stap 
vooruit voor ontwikkelingsantropologie is door meer naar ontwikkeling en wederopbouw als 
processen te kijken; dus kijken naar het discours dat er wordt gebruikt, naar instituties, en 
naar de praktijken en hoe die gezamenlijk tot verandering leiden. Tenslotte is het 
noodzakelijk voor de uitvoerende organisaties om een optimale balans te vinden tussen 
controle van onderaf en gezag van boven. Het is daarvoor belangrijk om nieuwe positieve en 
negatieve ervaringen met participatieve ontwikkeling en wederopbouw  -en de methodes die 
daarbij horen- te delen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik hoe er binnen het Tushiriki programma wordt gewerkt aan het 
verbeteren van de bestuurscapaciteit. Een recente, robuuste evaluatie van een vergelijkbaar 
CDR programma laat zien dat er vrijwel geen impact is op bestuur. Ik laat hier zien dat dit 
gebrek aan impact te maken heeft met de manier waarop capaciteitsopbouw plaatsvindt. Er 
zijn behoorlijk wat valkuilen; in de inhoud van de educatieve boodschappen; in de motivatie 
van het personeel dat de training geeft; en in het contact tussen trainers en degenen die 
getraind worden. Andere problemen zijn gerelateerd aan de lokaal bestaande machtsrelaties 
en manieren waarop er verantwoording wordt afgelegd. Deze komen niet overeen met de 
vormen van verantwoording die zijn voorgeschreven in de CDR programma’s. Op basis van 
deze bevindingen stellen we dat de inhoud van de training voor capaciteitsontwikkeling 
inconsistenties bevatte. De training was maar weinig aangepast aan de sociale werkelijkheid. 
Desondanks bleek de training toch nog wel enig effect te hebben, maar omdat de training zich 
niet richtte op de meest invloedrijke personen, vond er geen overdracht plaats naar de rest van 
de bevolking. Er is dus behoorlijk wat ruimte om de bestuurspraktijken te verbeteren, zowel 
binnen Tushiriki als in vergelijkbare programma’s, maar dan moet er wel aandacht worden 
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geschonken aan bestaande gemeenschapsdynamiek en aan bestaande normen en praktijken 
van verantwoording. Daarnaast moet de inhoud van de training worden aangepast aan de 
lokale realiteit. Daarbij hoort ook een juiste vertaling in de lokale taal van de belangrijkste 
boodschap van de training. Tenslotte moet er beter gecoördineerd worden met andere actoren 
die goed bestuur willen bevorderen in dezelfde setting. 
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de interventietechnieken van het programma in Oost Congo. Het 
bespreekt de verslagen van de algemene dorpsvergadering, de rol van waakhond die is 
weggelegd voor het maatschappelijk middenveld, en het ophangen van verslagen als 
technieken om verantwoording af te leggen. Het laat zien hoe deze mechanismes worden 
gezien door de bevolking. We stellen dat begunstigden van het programma meer 
geïnteresseerd zijn in concrete resultaten dan in abstracte concepten zoals ‘verantwoording’. 
Daarnaast heeft deze term z’n eigen context-specifieke betekenis. Lokaal bestaande vormen 
van verantwoording conflicteren met de democratische verantwoording die het programma 
voorschrijft. Een stap vooruit kan worden gezet door meer aandacht te schenken aan hoe de 
begunstigden aankijken tegen de vraagzijde van zowel verantwoording als van 
wederopbouw. Publieke bijeenkomsten bijvoorbeeld, zijn al ingebed in de lokale cultuur en 
zouden een meer prominente plek kunnen krijgen als mechanisme om publieke 
verantwoording af te leggen aan de bevolking. 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op machtsrelaties. Machtsrelaties worden vaak gezien als primaire 
oorzaak voor de ineffectiviteit van participatieve benaderingen. Ons doel is het de dynamiek 
beter te begrijpen tussen machtshebbers en andere mensen in de dorpen waar het Tushiriki 
programma wordt uitgevoerd. We laten zien dat de betrokkenheid van lokale chefs en 
kerkelijk leiders bij wederopbouw leidt tot betere resultaten op het moment dat er lokale 
competitie is tussen machthebbers waarbij de ene machthebber zich verantwoordelijk voelt 
voor het controleren van de ander. Ook laten we zien dat de selectie en uitvoering van een 
project meer afhangt van de bestaande instituties dan dat het ’t resultaat is van democratische 
processen. Lokale chefs en kerken zijn bestaande instituties, die gebaseerd zijn op dezelfde 
identiteit en cultuur. Het zijn netwerken waaraan een bepaalde ontwikkelings- of 
wederopbouwactiviteit zich kan verbinden in een conflictgebied, of in een vergelijkbare 
context zoals ruraal Congo. Tenslotte laten we zien dat kerken vaak meer macht hebben dan 
lokale chefs. Dit komt voor een deel omdat kerken de rol van de staat hebben overgenomen 
als het gaat over voorzieningen zoals onderwijs en gezondheid. Tenslotte laten we zien dat 
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kerken vaak meer macht hebben dan lokale chefs. Dit komt mede doordat kerken de rol van 
de staat hebben overgenomen in de onderwijs- en gezondheidssector. 
Het is van belang dat instanties die een benadering van participatieve 
ontwikkeling/wederopbouw (zoals CDR) toepassen meer doen om machtsrelaties tussen 
bestaande instituties te identificeren en begrijpen. Ze moeten er samenwerking mee zoeken 
en –wanneer dit mogelijk is- gebruik maken van ‘macht over macht’, ofwel de bestaande 
machtslijnen. Tenslotte moeten deze instanties stoppen te concurreren met anderen, maar 
samenwerken om er voor te zorgen dat er beter verantwoording wordt afgelegd over 
programma’s die in dezelfde gebieden worden uitgevoerd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de arbeidsdeelname van de bevolking. Deelname van de bevolking in 
wederopbouw programma’s komt in de praktijk neer op arbeid of vrijwilligerswerk. 
Deelnemers hebben hier verschillende meningen over. We hebben de effectiviteit van de 
CDR benadering bekeken, met name wat betreft de manier waarop vrijwillige handarbeid 
wordt gemobiliseerd voor publieke werken in het Tushiriki programma. We hebben gevonden 
dat participatie in het algemeen lager is dan verwacht, dat motivatie afhangt van het soort 
werk dat er gedaan moet worden, en dat mensen in het algemeen niet bereid zijn om voor 
niks te werken. We stellen dat de houding van deelnemers ten aanzien van de arbeid die zij in 
moeten zetten wordt beïnvloed door herhaaldelijke cycli van gedwongen arbeid in het gebied 
in het verleden. Daarnaast was er een gebrek aan motivatie omdat de notie van publieke 
goederen zoals wegen en onderwijs omstreden was. 
In hoofdstuk 7 beschrijf ik 4 cases die gaan over de manier waarop mensen zich lokaal zien 
als ‘eigenaar’ binnen het Tushiriki programma. We laten zien dat waar de bestaande 
instituties mensen aanmoedigen zichzelf als eigenaar van een project te zien, -of waar het 
programma ruimte geeft aan mensen om zichzelf zo te zien - dat dit gevoel van ‘eigenaar’ 
zijn zich ook kan ontwikkelen. Ik vestig er de aandacht op dat het belangrijk is dat 
programma’s er aan werken dat de bevolking zichzelf ook eigenaar voelt van – en dus 
verantwoordelijk voor-  een project bij een interventie die zich richt op participatieve 
ontwikkeling/wederopbouw. 
De verschillende hoofdstukken samen laten de sociale dynamiek van Tushiriki zien. In de 
conclusie worden deze inzichten samengebracht om de rol van de verschillende actoren in het 
programma te analyseren. In het algemeen kan worden gesteld dat het 
gemeenschapsgedreven programma er grotendeels niet in slaagde zijn bestuursdoelstellingen 
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te halen, al slaagde het wel in het opzetten van de wederopbouwprojecten. De strategie van 
het programma om verschillende actoren te betrekken, en de verantwoordingsmechanismen 
die werden gebruikt strookten niet met de bestaande sociale relaties en vormen van 
verantwoording. De reden waarom een project vaak toch slaagde, was dat het personeel het 
programma aanpaste aan de lokale realiteit. In plaats van uitgesloten te worden, kon de lokale 
elite zo juist een grote en vaak beslissende rol spelen bij het mobiliseren van mensen voor 
bijeenkomsten of voor arbeid. De relatie van verantwoording liep vaak meer tussen lokale 
elite en programma medewerkers, dan richting de bevolking. In mijn proefschrift noem ik dit 
‘macht over macht’. De conclusie eindigt met enkele suggesties voor CDR programma’s en 
benadrukt de belangrijkste bevindingen en lessen die er getrokken kunnen worden. Tenslotte 
bespreek ik enkele beperkingen van het onderzoek en doe ik suggesties voor toekomstig 
onderzoek. 
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